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From: Sumit Verma &lt;automationcanadian@gmail.com&gt;
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2026 12:43:13 -0800
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Message-ID: &lt;CAHQpNRaW3NomHJMU2AETUfiJt6Uftjj=cvDS_e=caQbP8mto0Q@mail.gmail.com&gt;
Subject: libaec: CVE-2026-120457: out-of-bounds read in m_se_decode, fixed in
 upstream 1.1.8
To: submit@bugs.debian.org
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Delivered-To: submit@bugs.debian.org

--00000000000068eb56065f8d8be9
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Source: libaec
Version: 1.1.7-1
Severity: important
Tags: security upstream fixed-upstream

Hi,

CVE-2026-120457 was published for libaec: in m_se_decode() (src/decode.c),
the slow path of the Second Extension decoder, the fundamental sequence
length is stored in a signed int32_t taken from the uint32_t state-&gt;fs. A
sequence of 2^31 or more zero bits makes it negative, so the &quot;m &gt;
SE_TABLE_SIZE&quot; check passes and se_table is read out of bounds. The slow
path is used when the output buffer is smaller than one block.

Upstream fixed it in commit efcc8f200fdc5fc674353cebcb20c1fe197bc055 (&quot;Use
unsigned FS length in m_se_decode&quot;, upstream issue 64, PR 66), which
changes &quot;int32_t m;&quot; to &quot;uint32_t m;&quot; and adds a regression test
(check_se_huge_fs_small_output in tests/check_corrupt_input.c). The fix is
part of upstream release 1.1.8 (2026-11-04). The 1.1.8 changelog also lists
other memory-safety fixes: a heap buffer overflow in SZ_BufftoBuffCompress
with negative parameters, a heap buffer overflow when decoding resumed
after AEC_DATA_ERROR, and uninitialized memory returned by aec_decode_range
and SZ_BufftoBuffDecompress for truncated input.

The vulnerable code is present in 1.0.4-1, 1.0.6-1, 1.1.3-1 and 1.1.7-1;
the one-line src/decode.c hunk applies to all of them with &quot;patch -p1
--dry-run&quot; (only line offsets differ).

I built upstream's regression test (tests/check_corrupt_input.c from 1.1.8)
against the 1.1.3-1 decoder with ASan/UBSan and got:

src/decode.c:551:36: runtime error: signed integer overflow: -2147483644 *
2 cannot be represented in type 'int'

With 1.1.8 the same test passes. (Against 1.1.7-1 the test program stops
earlier at an unrelated check that 1.1.8 also fixes, so for 1.1.7-1 this is
based on the code and the patch dry-run.)

The security tracker marks this no-dsa for trixie and postponed for
bookworm, so packaging 1.1.8 in unstable (or applying the one-line patch)
should be enough.

Thanks,
Sumit Verma

--00000000000068eb56065f8d8be9
Content-Type: text/html; charset=&quot;UTF-8&quot;
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

&lt;html&gt;&lt;body&gt;&lt;div dir=3D&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Source: libaec&lt;br&gt;Version: 1.1.7-1&lt;br&gt;Severit=
y: important&lt;br&gt;Tags: security upstream fixed-upstream&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Hi,&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;CV=
E-2026-120457 was published for libaec: in m_se_decode() (src/decode.c), th=
e slow path of the Second Extension decoder, the fundamental sequence lengt=
h is stored in a signed int32_t taken from the uint32_t state-&gt;fs. A seq=
uence of 2^31 or more zero bits makes it negative, so the &quot;m &gt; SE_T=
ABLE_SIZE&quot; check passes and se_table is read out of bounds. The slow p=
ath is used when the output buffer is smaller than one block.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Upstre=
am fixed it in commit efcc8f200fdc5fc674353cebcb20c1fe197bc055 (&quot;Use u=
nsigned FS length in m_se_decode&quot;, upstream issue 64, PR 66), which ch=
anges &quot;int32_t m;&quot; to &quot;uint32_t m;&quot; and adds a regressi=
on test (check_se_huge_fs_small_output in tests/check_corrupt_input.c). The=
 fix is part of upstream release 1.1.8 (2026-11-04). The 1.1.8 changelog al=
so lists other memory-safety fixes: a heap buffer overflow in SZ_BufftoBuff=
Compress with negative parameters, a heap buffer overflow when decoding res=
umed after AEC_DATA_ERROR, and uninitialized memory returned by aec_decode_=
range and SZ_BufftoBuffDecompress for truncated input.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The vulnerabl=
e code is present in 1.0.4-1, 1.0.6-1, 1.1.3-1 and 1.1.7-1; the one-line sr=
c/decode.c hunk applies to all of them with &quot;patch -p1 --dry-run&quot;=
 (only line offsets differ).&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;I built upstream&#39;s regression test =
(tests/check_corrupt_input.c from 1.1.8) against the 1.1.3-1 decoder with A=
San/UBSan and got:&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;  src/decode.c:551:36: runtime error: signed inte=
ger overflow: -2147483644 * 2 cannot be represented in type &#39;int&#39;&lt;b=
r&gt;&lt;br&gt;With 1.1.8 the same test passes. (Against 1.1.7-1 the test program st=
ops earlier at an unrelated check that 1.1.8 also fixes, so for 1.1.7-1 thi=
s is based on the code and the patch dry-run.)&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The security tracker =
marks this no-dsa for trixie and postponed for bookworm, so packaging 1.1.8=
 in unstable (or applying the one-line patch) should be enough.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Than=
ks,&lt;br&gt;Sumit Verma&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/body&gt;&lt;/html&gt;

--00000000000068eb56065f8d8be9--
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