diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog index 982cbafac0..cb0d81fc96 100644 --- a/debian/changelog +++ b/debian/changelog @@ -1,3 +1,24 @@ +glib2.0 (2.84.4-3~deb13u2) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium + + * d/patches: Add patches from 2.86.3 upstream to avoid integer overflows + - d/p/gconvert-Error-out-if-g_escape_uri_string-would-overflow.patch, + d/p/fuzzing-Add-fuzz-tests-for-g_filename_-to-from-_uri.patch: + Fix an integer overflow when interpolating hundreds of megabytes of + unescaped text into a URI, and add test coverage + (CVE-2025-13601, glib#3827 upstream, Closes: #1121488) + - d/p/gvariant-parser-Fix-potential-integer-overflow-parsing-by.patch: + Fix an integer overflow when parsing very large strings in GVariant + text format (CVE-2025-14087, glib#3834 upstream, Closes: #1122347) + - d/p/gvariant-parser-Use-size_t-to-count-numbers-of-child-elem.patch, + d/p/gvariant-parser-Convert-error-handling-code-to-use-size_t.patch: + Fix other potential integer overflows parsing very large container + types in GVariant text format, related to CVE-2025-14087 + - d/p/gfileattribute-Fix-integer-overflow-calculating-escaping-.patch: + Fix an integer overflow when escaping invalid characters in very + large file attributes (glib#3845 upstream, Closes: #1122346) + + -- Simon McVittie Wed, 10 Dec 2025 12:13:08 +0000 + glib2.0 (2.84.4-3~deb13u1) trixie; urgency=medium * Go back to debian/trixie branch for a stable update diff --git a/debian/patches/fuzzing-Add-fuzz-tests-for-g_filename_-to-from-_uri.patch b/debian/patches/fuzzing-Add-fuzz-tests-for-g_filename_-to-from-_uri.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7cb6e04ac9 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/fuzzing-Add-fuzz-tests-for-g_filename_-to-from-_uri.patch @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 18:31:43 +0000 +Subject: fuzzing: Add fuzz tests for g_filename_{to,from}_uri() + +These functions could be called on untrusted input data, and since they +do URI escaping/unescaping, they have non-trivial string handling code. + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall +Origin: upstream, 2.86.3, commit:7e5489cb921d0531ee4ebc9938da30a02084b2fa +Bug: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3827 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1121488 +--- + ...get_locale_variants.c => fuzz_filename_from_uri.c} | 19 +++++++------------ + ...z_get_locale_variants.c => fuzz_filename_to_uri.c} | 19 +++++++------------ + fuzzing/meson.build | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) + copy fuzzing/{fuzz_get_locale_variants.c => fuzz_filename_from_uri.c} (70%) + copy fuzzing/{fuzz_get_locale_variants.c => fuzz_filename_to_uri.c} (70%) + +diff --git a/fuzzing/fuzz_get_locale_variants.c b/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_from_uri.c +similarity index 70% +copy from fuzzing/fuzz_get_locale_variants.c +copy to fuzzing/fuzz_filename_from_uri.c +index 248dbbf..9b7a715 100644 +--- a/fuzzing/fuzz_get_locale_variants.c ++++ b/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_from_uri.c +@@ -15,9 +15,6 @@ + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this library; if not, see . +- * +- * Authors: +- * - Philip Withnall + */ + + #include "fuzz.h" +@@ -26,20 +23,18 @@ int + LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (const unsigned char *data, size_t size) + { + unsigned char *nul_terminated_data = NULL; +- char **v; ++ char *filename = NULL; ++ GError *local_error = NULL; + + fuzz_set_logging_func (); + +- /* ignore @size (g_get_locale_variants() doesn’t support it); ensure @data is nul-terminated */ ++ /* ignore @size (g_filename_from_uri() doesn’t support it); ensure @data is nul-terminated */ + nul_terminated_data = (unsigned char *) g_strndup ((const char *) data, size); +- +- v = g_get_locale_variants ((char *) nul_terminated_data); +- g_assert_nonnull (v); +- /* g_get_locale_variants() guarantees that the input is always in the output: */ +- g_assert_true (g_strv_contains ((const char * const *) v, (char *) nul_terminated_data)); +- g_strfreev (v); +- ++ filename = g_filename_from_uri ((const char *) nul_terminated_data, NULL, &local_error); + g_free (nul_terminated_data); + ++ g_free (filename); ++ g_clear_error (&local_error); ++ + return 0; + } +diff --git a/fuzzing/fuzz_get_locale_variants.c b/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_to_uri.c +similarity index 70% +copy from fuzzing/fuzz_get_locale_variants.c +copy to fuzzing/fuzz_filename_to_uri.c +index 248dbbf..acb3192 100644 +--- a/fuzzing/fuzz_get_locale_variants.c ++++ b/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_to_uri.c +@@ -15,9 +15,6 @@ + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this library; if not, see . +- * +- * Authors: +- * - Philip Withnall + */ + + #include "fuzz.h" +@@ -26,20 +23,18 @@ int + LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (const unsigned char *data, size_t size) + { + unsigned char *nul_terminated_data = NULL; +- char **v; ++ char *uri = NULL; ++ GError *local_error = NULL; + + fuzz_set_logging_func (); + +- /* ignore @size (g_get_locale_variants() doesn’t support it); ensure @data is nul-terminated */ ++ /* ignore @size (g_filename_to_uri() doesn’t support it); ensure @data is nul-terminated */ + nul_terminated_data = (unsigned char *) g_strndup ((const char *) data, size); +- +- v = g_get_locale_variants ((char *) nul_terminated_data); +- g_assert_nonnull (v); +- /* g_get_locale_variants() guarantees that the input is always in the output: */ +- g_assert_true (g_strv_contains ((const char * const *) v, (char *) nul_terminated_data)); +- g_strfreev (v); +- ++ uri = g_filename_to_uri ((const char *) nul_terminated_data, NULL, &local_error); + g_free (nul_terminated_data); + ++ g_free (uri); ++ g_clear_error (&local_error); ++ + return 0; + } +diff --git a/fuzzing/meson.build b/fuzzing/meson.build +index d3107a1..accff0a 100644 +--- a/fuzzing/meson.build ++++ b/fuzzing/meson.build +@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ fuzz_targets = [ + 'fuzz_date_parse', + 'fuzz_date_time_new_from_iso8601', + 'fuzz_dbus_message', ++ 'fuzz_filename_from_uri', ++ 'fuzz_filename_to_uri', + 'fuzz_get_locale_variants', + 'fuzz_inet_address_mask_new_from_string', + 'fuzz_inet_address_new_from_string', diff --git a/debian/patches/gconvert-Error-out-if-g_escape_uri_string-would-overflow.patch b/debian/patches/gconvert-Error-out-if-g_escape_uri_string-would-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73cdcdfd72 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/gconvert-Error-out-if-g_escape_uri_string-would-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 18:27:22 +0000 +Subject: gconvert: Error out if g_escape_uri_string() would overflow +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +If the string to escape contains a very large number of unacceptable +characters (which would need escaping), the calculation of the length of +the escaped string could overflow, leading to a potential write off the +end of the newly allocated string. + +In addition to that, the number of unacceptable characters was counted +in a signed integer, which would overflow to become negative, making it +easier for an attacker to craft an input string which would cause an +out-of-bounds write. + +Fix that by validating the allocation length, and using an unsigned +integer to count the number of unacceptable characters. + +Spotted by treeplus. Thanks to the Sovereign Tech Resilience programme +from the Sovereign Tech Agency. ID: #YWH-PGM9867-134 + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall + +Backport 2.86: Changed the translatable error message to re-use an +existing translatable string, to avoid adding new translatable strings +to a stable branch. The re-used string doesn’t perfectly match the +error, but it’s good enough given that no users will ever see it. + +Origin: upstream, 2.86.3, commit:9bcd65ba5fa1b92ff0fb8380faea335ccef56253 +Bug: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3827 +Bug-CVE: CVE-2025-13601 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1121488 +--- + glib/gconvert.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/glib/gconvert.c b/glib/gconvert.c +index c6a2441..7a23d7d 100644 +--- a/glib/gconvert.c ++++ b/glib/gconvert.c +@@ -1336,8 +1336,9 @@ static const gchar hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; + /* Note: This escape function works on file: URIs, but if you want to + * escape something else, please read RFC-2396 */ + static gchar * +-g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string, +- UnsafeCharacterSet mask) ++g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string, ++ UnsafeCharacterSet mask, ++ GError **error) + { + #define ACCEPTABLE(a) ((a)>=32 && (a)<128 && (acceptable[(a)-32] & use_mask)) + +@@ -1345,7 +1346,7 @@ g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string, + gchar *q; + gchar *result; + int c; +- gint unacceptable; ++ size_t unacceptable; + UnsafeCharacterSet use_mask; + + g_return_val_if_fail (mask == UNSAFE_ALL +@@ -1362,7 +1363,14 @@ g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string, + if (!ACCEPTABLE (c)) + unacceptable++; + } +- ++ ++ if (unacceptable >= (G_MAXSIZE - (p - string)) / 2) ++ { ++ g_set_error_literal (error, G_CONVERT_ERROR, G_CONVERT_ERROR_BAD_URI, ++ _("Invalid hostname")); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + result = g_malloc (p - string + unacceptable * 2 + 1); + + use_mask = mask; +@@ -1387,12 +1395,13 @@ g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string, + + + static gchar * +-g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname, +- const gchar *pathname) ++g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname, ++ const gchar *pathname, ++ GError **error) + { + char *escaped_hostname = NULL; +- char *escaped_path; +- char *res; ++ char *escaped_path = NULL; ++ char *res = NULL; + + #ifdef G_OS_WIN32 + char *p, *backslash; +@@ -1413,10 +1422,14 @@ g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname, + + if (hostname && *hostname != '\0') + { +- escaped_hostname = g_escape_uri_string (hostname, UNSAFE_HOST); ++ escaped_hostname = g_escape_uri_string (hostname, UNSAFE_HOST, error); ++ if (escaped_hostname == NULL) ++ goto out; + } + +- escaped_path = g_escape_uri_string (pathname, UNSAFE_PATH); ++ escaped_path = g_escape_uri_string (pathname, UNSAFE_PATH, error); ++ if (escaped_path == NULL) ++ goto out; + + res = g_strconcat ("file://", + (escaped_hostname) ? escaped_hostname : "", +@@ -1424,6 +1437,7 @@ g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname, + escaped_path, + NULL); + ++out: + #ifdef G_OS_WIN32 + g_free ((char *) pathname); + #endif +@@ -1757,7 +1771,7 @@ g_filename_to_uri (const gchar *filename, + hostname = NULL; + #endif + +- escaped_uri = g_escape_file_uri (hostname, filename); ++ escaped_uri = g_escape_file_uri (hostname, filename, error); + + return escaped_uri; + } diff --git a/debian/patches/gfileattribute-Fix-integer-overflow-calculating-escaping-.patch b/debian/patches/gfileattribute-Fix-integer-overflow-calculating-escaping-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d90bf1c6df --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/gfileattribute-Fix-integer-overflow-calculating-escaping-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2025 16:37:19 +0000 +Subject: gfileattribute: Fix integer overflow calculating escaping for byte + strings + +The number of invalid characters in the byte string (characters which +would have to be percent-encoded) was only stored in an `int`, which +gave the possibility of a long string largely full of invalid +characters overflowing this and allowing an attacker-controlled buffer +size to be allocated. + +This could be triggered by an attacker controlled file attribute (of +type `G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_BYTE_STRING`), such as +`G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_THUMBNAIL_PATH` or `G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME`, +being read by user code. + +Spotted by Codean Labs. + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall + +Origin: upstream, 2.86.3, commit:4f0399c0aaf3ffc86b5625424580294bc7460404 +Bug: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3845 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1122346 +--- + gio/gfileattribute.c | 11 +++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/gio/gfileattribute.c b/gio/gfileattribute.c +index c6fde60..d3083e5 100644 +--- a/gio/gfileattribute.c ++++ b/gio/gfileattribute.c +@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + + #include "config.h" + ++#include + #include + + #include "gfileattribute.h" +@@ -166,11 +167,12 @@ valid_char (char c) + return c >= 32 && c <= 126 && c != '\\'; + } + ++/* Returns NULL on error */ + static char * + escape_byte_string (const char *str) + { + size_t i, len; +- int num_invalid; ++ size_t num_invalid; + char *escaped_val, *p; + unsigned char c; + const char hex_digits[] = "0123456789abcdef"; +@@ -188,7 +190,12 @@ escape_byte_string (const char *str) + return g_strdup (str); + else + { +- escaped_val = g_malloc (len + num_invalid*3 + 1); ++ /* Check for overflow. We want to check the inequality: ++ * !(len + num_invalid * 3 + 1 > SIZE_MAX) */ ++ if (num_invalid >= (SIZE_MAX - len) / 3) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ escaped_val = g_malloc (len + num_invalid * 3 + 1); + + p = escaped_val; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) diff --git a/debian/patches/gfileutils-Preserve-mode-during-atomic-updates.patch b/debian/patches/gfileutils-Preserve-mode-during-atomic-updates.patch index 5d0771924c..ba158cfd97 100644 --- a/debian/patches/gfileutils-Preserve-mode-during-atomic-updates.patch +++ b/debian/patches/gfileutils-Preserve-mode-during-atomic-updates.patch @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Comment: This was actually reverted from the glib-2-84 branch but 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/glib/gfileutils.c b/glib/gfileutils.c -index bc4bcf1..1768358 100644 +index 9930030..62928fd 100644 --- a/glib/gfileutils.c +++ b/glib/gfileutils.c @@ -1318,8 +1318,8 @@ g_file_set_contents (const gchar *filename, diff --git a/debian/patches/gvariant-parser-Convert-error-handling-code-to-use-size_t.patch b/debian/patches/gvariant-parser-Convert-error-handling-code-to-use-size_t.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2701039ffb --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/gvariant-parser-Convert-error-handling-code-to-use-size_t.patch @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 19:25:58 +0000 +Subject: gvariant-parser: Convert error handling code to use size_t + +The error handling code allows for printing out the range of input bytes +related to a parsing error. This was previously done using `gint`, but +the input could be longer than `INT_MAX`, so it should really be done +using `size_t`. + +Spotted while working on #3834. + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall +Origin: upstream, 2.86.3, commit:dd333a40aa95819720a01caf6de564cd8a4a6310 +Bug: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3834 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1122347 +--- + glib/gvariant-parser.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/glib/gvariant-parser.c b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +index 519baa3..1b1ddd6 100644 +--- a/glib/gvariant-parser.c ++++ b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ g_variant_parser_get_error_quark (void) + + typedef struct + { +- gint start, end; ++ /* Offsets from the start of the input, in bytes. Can be equal when referring ++ * to a point rather than a range. The invariant `end >= start` always holds. */ ++ size_t start, end; + } SourceRef; + + G_GNUC_PRINTF(5, 0) +@@ -106,14 +108,16 @@ parser_set_error_va (GError **error, + GString *msg = g_string_new (NULL); + + if (location->start == location->end) +- g_string_append_printf (msg, "%d", location->start); ++ g_string_append_printf (msg, "%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT, location->start); + else +- g_string_append_printf (msg, "%d-%d", location->start, location->end); ++ g_string_append_printf (msg, "%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT "-%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT, ++ location->start, location->end); + + if (other != NULL) + { + g_assert (other->start != other->end); +- g_string_append_printf (msg, ",%d-%d", other->start, other->end); ++ g_string_append_printf (msg, ",%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT "-%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT, ++ other->start, other->end); + } + g_string_append_c (msg, ':'); + +@@ -140,11 +144,15 @@ parser_set_error (GError **error, + + typedef struct + { ++ /* We should always have the following ordering constraint: ++ * start <= this <= stream <= end ++ * Additionally, unless in an error or EOF state, `this < stream`. ++ */ + const gchar *start; + const gchar *stream; + const gchar *end; + +- const gchar *this; ++ const gchar *this; /* (nullable) */ + } TokenStream; + + +@@ -175,7 +183,7 @@ token_stream_set_error (TokenStream *stream, + static gboolean + token_stream_prepare (TokenStream *stream) + { +- gint brackets = 0; ++ gssize brackets = 0; + const gchar *end; + + if (stream->this != NULL) +@@ -407,7 +415,7 @@ static void + pattern_copy (gchar **out, + const gchar **in) + { +- gint brackets = 0; ++ gssize brackets = 0; + + while (**in == 'a' || **in == 'm' || **in == 'M') + *(*out)++ = *(*in)++; +@@ -2765,7 +2773,7 @@ g_variant_builder_add_parsed (GVariantBuilder *builder, + static gboolean + parse_num (const gchar *num, + const gchar *limit, +- guint *result) ++ size_t *result) + { + gchar *endptr; + gint64 bignum; +@@ -2775,10 +2783,12 @@ parse_num (const gchar *num, + if (endptr != limit) + return FALSE; + ++ /* The upper bound here is more restrictive than it technically needs to be, ++ * but should be enough for any practical situation: */ + if (bignum < 0 || bignum > G_MAXINT) + return FALSE; + +- *result = (guint) bignum; ++ *result = (size_t) bignum; + + return TRUE; + } +@@ -2789,7 +2799,7 @@ add_last_line (GString *err, + { + const gchar *last_nl; + gchar *chomped; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + /* This is an error at the end of input. If we have a file + * with newlines, that's probably the empty string after the +@@ -2934,7 +2944,7 @@ g_variant_parse_error_print_context (GError *error, + + if (dash == NULL || colon < dash) + { +- guint point; ++ size_t point; + + /* we have a single point */ + if (!parse_num (error->message, colon, &point)) +@@ -2952,7 +2962,7 @@ g_variant_parse_error_print_context (GError *error, + /* We have one or two ranges... */ + if (comma && comma < colon) + { +- guint start1, end1, start2, end2; ++ size_t start1, end1, start2, end2; + const gchar *dash2; + + /* Two ranges */ +@@ -2968,7 +2978,7 @@ g_variant_parse_error_print_context (GError *error, + } + else + { +- guint start, end; ++ size_t start, end; + + /* One range */ + if (!parse_num (error->message, dash, &start) || !parse_num (dash + 1, colon, &end)) diff --git a/debian/patches/gvariant-parser-Fix-potential-integer-overflow-parsing-by.patch b/debian/patches/gvariant-parser-Fix-potential-integer-overflow-parsing-by.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c34b4ed5a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/gvariant-parser-Fix-potential-integer-overflow-parsing-by.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 19:02:56 +0000 +Subject: gvariant-parser: Fix potential integer overflow parsing + (byte)strings + +The termination condition for parsing string and bytestring literals in +GVariant text format input was subject to an integer overflow for input +string (or bytestring) literals longer than `INT_MAX`. + +Fix that by counting as a `size_t` rather than as an `int`. The counter +can never correctly be negative. + +Spotted by treeplus. Thanks to the Sovereign Tech Resilience programme +from the Sovereign Tech Agency. ID: #YWH-PGM9867-145 + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall +Origin: upstream, 2.86.3, commit:3e72fe0fbb32c18a66486c4da8bc851f656af287 +Bug: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3834 +Bug-CVE: CVE-2025-14087 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1122347 +--- + glib/gvariant-parser.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/glib/gvariant-parser.c b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +index 2f1d3db..2d6e985 100644 +--- a/glib/gvariant-parser.c ++++ b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ ast_resolve (AST *ast, + { + GVariant *value; + gchar *pattern; +- gint i, j = 0; ++ size_t i, j = 0; + + pattern = ast_get_pattern (ast, error); + +@@ -1637,9 +1637,9 @@ string_free (AST *ast) + */ + static gboolean + unicode_unescape (const gchar *src, +- gint *src_ofs, ++ size_t *src_ofs, + gchar *dest, +- gint *dest_ofs, ++ size_t *dest_ofs, + gsize length, + SourceRef *ref, + GError **error) +@@ -1700,7 +1700,7 @@ string_parse (TokenStream *stream, + gsize length; + gchar quote; + gchar *str; +- gint i, j; ++ size_t i, j; + + token_stream_start_ref (stream, &ref); + token = token_stream_get (stream); +@@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ bytestring_parse (TokenStream *stream, + gsize length; + gchar quote; + gchar *str; +- gint i, j; ++ size_t i, j; + + token_stream_start_ref (stream, &ref); + token = token_stream_get (stream); diff --git a/debian/patches/gvariant-parser-Use-size_t-to-count-numbers-of-child-elem.patch b/debian/patches/gvariant-parser-Use-size_t-to-count-numbers-of-child-elem.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cab75cc353 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/gvariant-parser-Use-size_t-to-count-numbers-of-child-elem.patch @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +From: Philip Withnall +Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 19:19:16 +0000 +Subject: gvariant-parser: Use size_t to count numbers of child elements +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Rather than using `gint`, which could overflow for arrays (or dicts, or +tuples) longer than `INT_MAX`. There may be other limits which prevent +parsed containers becoming that long, but we might as well make the type +system reflect the programmer’s intention as best it can anyway. + +For arrays and tuples this is straightforward. For dictionaries, it’s +slightly complicated by the fact that the code used +`dict->n_children == -1` to indicate that the `Dictionary` struct in +question actually represented a single freestanding dict entry. In +GVariant text format, that would be `{1, "one"}`. + +The implementation previously didn’t define the semantics of +`dict->n_children < -1`. + +Now, instead, change `Dictionary.n_children` to `size_t`, and define a +magic value `DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY` to indicate that +the `Dictionary` represents a single freestanding dict entry. + +This magic value is `SIZE_MAX`, and given that a dictionary entry takes +more than one byte to represent in GVariant text format, that means it’s +not possible to have that many entries in a parsed dictionary, so this +magic value won’t be hit by a normal dictionary. An assertion checks +this anyway. + +Spotted while working on #3834. + +Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall +Origin: upstream, 2.86.3, commit:6fe481cec709ec65b5846113848723bc25a8782a +Bug: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3834 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1122347 +--- + glib/gvariant-parser.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- + 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/glib/gvariant-parser.c b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +index 2d6e985..519baa3 100644 +--- a/glib/gvariant-parser.c ++++ b/glib/gvariant-parser.c +@@ -662,9 +662,9 @@ static AST *parse (TokenStream *stream, + GError **error); + + static void +-ast_array_append (AST ***array, +- gint *n_items, +- AST *ast) ++ast_array_append (AST ***array, ++ size_t *n_items, ++ AST *ast) + { + if ((*n_items & (*n_items - 1)) == 0) + *array = g_renew (AST *, *array, *n_items ? 2 ** n_items : 1); +@@ -673,10 +673,10 @@ ast_array_append (AST ***array, + } + + static void +-ast_array_free (AST **array, +- gint n_items) ++ast_array_free (AST **array, ++ size_t n_items) + { +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < n_items; i++) + ast_free (array[i]); +@@ -685,11 +685,11 @@ ast_array_free (AST **array, + + static gchar * + ast_array_get_pattern (AST **array, +- gint n_items, ++ size_t n_items, + GError **error) + { + gchar *pattern; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + /* Find the pattern which applies to all children in the array, by l-folding a + * coalesce operation. +@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ ast_array_get_pattern (AST **array, + * pair of values. + */ + { +- int j = 0; ++ size_t j = 0; + + while (TRUE) + { +@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ typedef struct + AST ast; + + AST **children; +- gint n_children; ++ size_t n_children; + } Array; + + static gchar * +@@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ array_get_value (AST *ast, + Array *array = (Array *) ast; + const GVariantType *childtype; + GVariantBuilder builder; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + if (!g_variant_type_is_array (type)) + return ast_type_error (ast, type, error); +@@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ typedef struct + AST ast; + + AST **children; +- gint n_children; ++ size_t n_children; + } Tuple; + + static gchar * +@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ tuple_get_pattern (AST *ast, + Tuple *tuple = (Tuple *) ast; + gchar *result = NULL; + gchar **parts; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + parts = g_new (gchar *, tuple->n_children + 4); + parts[tuple->n_children + 1] = (gchar *) ")"; +@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ tuple_get_value (AST *ast, + Tuple *tuple = (Tuple *) ast; + const GVariantType *childtype; + GVariantBuilder builder; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + if (!g_variant_type_is_tuple (type)) + return ast_type_error (ast, type, error); +@@ -1320,9 +1320,16 @@ typedef struct + + AST **keys; + AST **values; +- gint n_children; ++ ++ /* Iff this is DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY then this struct ++ * represents a single freestanding dict entry (`{1, "one"}`) rather than a ++ * full dict. In the freestanding case, @keys and @values have exactly one ++ * member each. */ ++ size_t n_children; + } Dictionary; + ++#define DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY ((size_t) -1) ++ + static gchar * + dictionary_get_pattern (AST *ast, + GError **error) +@@ -1337,7 +1344,7 @@ dictionary_get_pattern (AST *ast, + return g_strdup ("Ma{**}"); + + key_pattern = ast_array_get_pattern (dict->keys, +- abs (dict->n_children), ++ (dict->n_children == DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) ? 1 : dict->n_children, + error); + + if (key_pattern == NULL) +@@ -1368,7 +1375,7 @@ dictionary_get_pattern (AST *ast, + return NULL; + + result = g_strdup_printf ("M%s{%c%s}", +- dict->n_children > 0 ? "a" : "", ++ (dict->n_children > 0 && dict->n_children != DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) ? "a" : "", + key_char, value_pattern); + g_free (value_pattern); + +@@ -1382,7 +1389,7 @@ dictionary_get_value (AST *ast, + { + Dictionary *dict = (Dictionary *) ast; + +- if (dict->n_children == -1) ++ if (dict->n_children == DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) + { + const GVariantType *subtype; + GVariantBuilder builder; +@@ -1415,7 +1422,7 @@ dictionary_get_value (AST *ast, + { + const GVariantType *entry, *key, *val; + GVariantBuilder builder; +- gint i; ++ size_t i; + + if (!g_variant_type_is_subtype_of (type, G_VARIANT_TYPE_DICTIONARY)) + return ast_type_error (ast, type, error); +@@ -1456,12 +1463,12 @@ static void + dictionary_free (AST *ast) + { + Dictionary *dict = (Dictionary *) ast; +- gint n_children; ++ size_t n_children; + +- if (dict->n_children > -1) +- n_children = dict->n_children; +- else ++ if (dict->n_children == DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) + n_children = 1; ++ else ++ n_children = dict->n_children; + + ast_array_free (dict->keys, n_children); + ast_array_free (dict->values, n_children); +@@ -1479,7 +1486,7 @@ dictionary_parse (TokenStream *stream, + maybe_wrapper, dictionary_get_value, + dictionary_free + }; +- gint n_keys, n_values; ++ size_t n_keys, n_values; + gboolean only_one; + Dictionary *dict; + AST *first; +@@ -1522,7 +1529,7 @@ dictionary_parse (TokenStream *stream, + goto error; + + g_assert (n_keys == 1 && n_values == 1); +- dict->n_children = -1; ++ dict->n_children = DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY; + + return (AST *) dict; + } +@@ -1555,6 +1562,7 @@ dictionary_parse (TokenStream *stream, + } + + g_assert (n_keys == n_values); ++ g_assert (n_keys != DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY); + dict->n_children = n_keys; + + return (AST *) dict; diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series index b289a11790..1efc465162 100644 --- a/debian/patches/series +++ b/debian/patches/series @@ -15,3 +15,9 @@ workarounds/tests-Skip-debugcontroller-test.patch workarounds/testfilemonitor-Skip-if-we-are-avoiding-flaky-tests.patch debian/girepository-Describe-the-Debian-specific-cross-prefixed-.patch gfileutils-Preserve-mode-during-atomic-updates.patch +gconvert-Error-out-if-g_escape_uri_string-would-overflow.patch +fuzzing-Add-fuzz-tests-for-g_filename_-to-from-_uri.patch +gvariant-parser-Fix-potential-integer-overflow-parsing-by.patch +gvariant-parser-Use-size_t-to-count-numbers-of-child-elem.patch +gvariant-parser-Convert-error-handling-code-to-use-size_t.patch +gfileattribute-Fix-integer-overflow-calculating-escaping-.patch