[Pkg-openssl-changes] r319 - openssl/trunk/ssl
chrism at alioth.debian.org
chrism at alioth.debian.org
Tue Jun 10 13:16:06 UTC 2008
Author: chrism
Date: 2008-06-10 13:16:06 +0000 (Tue, 10 Jun 2008)
New Revision: 319
Added:
openssl/trunk/ssl/s3_clnt.c
Log:
Added upstream source of s3_clnt.c
Added: openssl/trunk/ssl/s3_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- openssl/trunk/ssl/s3_clnt.c (rev 0)
+++ openssl/trunk/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2008-06-10 13:16:06 UTC (rev 319)
@@ -0,0 +1,2613 @@
+/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id);
+int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs);
+#endif
+
+static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_client_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_connect,
+ ssl3_get_client_method)
+
+int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL),l;
+ long num1;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int ret= -1;
+ int new_state,state,skip=0;;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch(s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->new_session=1;
+ s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+ /* break */
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ s->server=0;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+ s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ buf=NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ /* setup buffing BIO */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
+ if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+ s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* at this point we check that we have the
+ * required stuff from the server */
+ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+ ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
+ * sent back */
+ /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
+ * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
+ * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
+ * We need to skip the certificate verify
+ * message when client's ECDH public key is sent
+ * inside the client certificate.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+ else
+ s->session->compress_meth=
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+ /* clear flags */
+ s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+#endif
+
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+ /* number of bytes to be flushed */
+ num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
+ if (num1 > 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ }
+
+ s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
+ * remove the buffering now */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ ret=1;
+ /* s->server=0; */
+ s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ /* did we do anything */
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+ {
+ if (s->debug)
+ {
+ if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip=0;
+ }
+end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+
+int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long Time,l;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int j;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ if ((s->session == NULL) ||
+ (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+ (s->session->not_resumable))
+ {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p=s->s3->client_random;
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ l2n(Time,p);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d=p= &(buf[4]);
+
+ *(p++)=s->version>>8;
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+ s->client_version=s->version;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ i=0;
+ else
+ i=s->session->session_id_length;
+ *(p++)=i;
+ if (i != 0)
+ {
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
+ p+=i;
+ }
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=1;
+#else
+ if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL)
+ j=0;
+ else
+ j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++)=1+j;
+ for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+ {
+ comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
+ *(p++)=comp->id;
+ }
+#endif
+ *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ l=(p-d);
+ d=buf;
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ l2n3(l,d);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i,al,ok;
+ unsigned int j;
+ long n;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
+ -1,
+ 20000, /* ?? */
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+ {
+ if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else /* already sent a cookie */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
+ al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p+=2;
+
+ /* load the server hello data */
+ /* load the server random */
+ memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j= *(p++);
+
+ if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+ && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
+ {
+ if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
+ {
+ /* actually a client application bug */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->hit=1;
+ }
+ else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
+ {
+ /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
+ * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
+ s->hit=0;
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ s->session->session_id_length=j;
+ memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
+ }
+ p+=j;
+ c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ {
+ /* unknown cipher */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+
+ sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+ i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+ and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
+ cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
+ if (s->session->cipher)
+ s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
+ {
+ if (!(s->options &
+ SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
+
+ /* lets get the compression algorithm */
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (*(p++) != 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#else
+ j= *(p++);
+ if (j == 0)
+ comp=NULL;
+ else
+ comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
+
+ if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
+ {
+ /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+
+ if (p != (d+n))
+ {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
+ unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
+ X509 *x=NULL;
+ const unsigned char *q,*p;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ n2l3(p,llen);
+ if (llen+3 != n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
+ {
+ n2l3(p,l);
+ if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ q=p;
+ x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (q != (p+l))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x=NULL;
+ nc+=l+3;
+ p=q;
+ }
+
+ i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
+ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ )
+ {
+ al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+
+ sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (sc == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert=sc;
+
+ sc->cert_chain=sk;
+ /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
+ * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
+ x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
+ sk=NULL;
+ /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
+
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
+
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
+ & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
+ printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
+ printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
+ {
+ x=NULL;
+ al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
+ if (need_cert && i < 0)
+ {
+ x=NULL;
+ al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (need_cert)
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ /* Why would the following ever happen?
+ * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
+ sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer=x;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ sc->peer_key= NULL;
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer=NULL;
+ }
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ x=NULL;
+ ret=1;
+
+ if (0)
+ {
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ }
+err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ unsigned char *param,*p;
+ int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
+ long n,alg;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ int curve_nid = 0;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
+ * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
+ {
+ DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ }
+
+ param_len=0;
+ alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len+=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+ n-=param_len;
+
+ /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
+ if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
+ rsa=NULL;
+ }
+#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+ if (0)
+ ;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (alg & SSL_kEDH)
+ {
+ if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len+=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len+=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+ n-=param_len;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+#else
+ if (0)
+ ;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if (alg & SSL_aDSS)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
+#endif
+ /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
+ dh=NULL;
+ }
+ else if ((alg & SSL_kDHr) || (alg & SSL_kDHd))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg & SSL_kECDHE)
+ {
+ EC_GROUP *ngroup;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
+ * server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
+ * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
+ * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
+ */
+
+ /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
+ * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+ */
+ param_len=3;
+ if ((param_len > n) ||
+ (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
+ ((curve_nid = curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
+ if (ngroup == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p+=3;
+
+ /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
+ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
+ ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
+ p+=1;
+ param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
+ if ((param_len > n) ||
+ (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
+ p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ n-=param_len;
+ p+=encoded_pt_len;
+
+ /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
+ * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
+ * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (0) ;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+#endif
+ /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+ EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
+ ecdh=NULL;
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ }
+ else if (alg & SSL_kECDH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+ if (alg & SSL_aFZA)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+
+ /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
+
+ /* if it was signed, check the signature */
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ n2s(p,i);
+ n-=2;
+ j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+
+ if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
+ {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ int num;
+
+ j=0;
+ q=md_buf;
+ for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
+ {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+ ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
+ q+=i;
+ j+=i;
+ }
+ i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ /* lets do DSS */
+ EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
+ if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ /* let's do ECDSA */
+ EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
+ if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* still data left over */
+ if (!(alg & SSL_aNULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (n != 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(1);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (dh != NULL)
+ DH_free(dh);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ if (ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok,ret=0;
+ unsigned long n,nc,l;
+ unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i;
+ X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p,*q;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ if (l & SSL_aNULL)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get the certificate types */
+ ctype_num= *(p++);
+ if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
+ ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
+ for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
+ p+=ctype_num;
+
+ /* get the CA RDNs */
+ n2s(p,llen);
+#if 0
+{
+FILE *out;
+out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
+fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
+fclose(out);
+}
+#endif
+
+ if ((llen+ctype_num+2+1) != n)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
+ {
+ n2s(p,l);
+ if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
+ {
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+ goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ q=p;
+
+ if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
+ {
+ /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
+ goto cont;
+ else
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (q != (p+l))
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p+=l;
+ nc+=l+2;
+ }
+
+ if (0)
+ {
+cont:
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+
+ /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
+ s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
+ ca_sk=NULL;
+
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
+ {
+ return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen;
+ long n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *d;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
+ -1,
+ 16384,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (n < 6)
+ {
+ /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
+ n2s(p, ticklen);
+ /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
+ if (ticklen + 6 != n)
+ {
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+
+ ret=1;
+ return(ret);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok,ret=0;
+ long n;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
+ SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
+ 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ if (n > 0)
+ {
+ /* should contain no data */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ret=1;
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+
+int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int n;
+ unsigned long l;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[4]);
+
+ l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (l & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+ {
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ if ((pkey == NULL) ||
+ (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
+ (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
+ tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
+
+ q=p;
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ p+=2;
+ n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+ tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
+#endif
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ s2n(n,q);
+ n+=2;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ else if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ l, SSL_kKRB5);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ authp = NULL;
+#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+ if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
+#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
+ &kssl_err);
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5rc)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+ **
+ ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ **
+ ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+ ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw at sxw.org.uk>)
+ ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+ ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+ ** Example:
+ ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+ ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
+ ** optional authenticator omitted.
+ */
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
+ s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+ p+= enc_ticket->length;
+ n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
+ if (authp && authp->length)
+ {
+ s2n(authp->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+ p+= authp->length;
+ n+= authp->length + 2;
+
+ free(authp->data);
+ authp->data = NULL;
+ authp->length = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
+ n+=2;
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
+ tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ ** kssl_ctx->length);
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
+ kssl_ctx->key,iv);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > sizeof epms)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ s2n(outl,p);
+ memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+ p+=outl;
+ n+=outl + 2;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ {
+ DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ else
+ {
+ /* we get them from the cert */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a new random key */
+ if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
+ * make sure to clear it out afterwards */
+
+ n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
+
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,p,n);
+ /* clean up */
+ memset(p,0,n);
+
+ /* send off the data */
+ n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
+ s2n(n,p);
+ BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
+ n+=2;
+
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+
+ /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
+ {
+ const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *tkey;
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
+ * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ */
+ if ((l & SSL_kECDH) && (s->cert != NULL))
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+ * To add such support, one needs to add
+ * code that checks for appropriate
+ * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ * For example, the cert have an ECC
+ * key on the same curve as the server's
+ * and the key should be authorized for
+ * key agreement.
+ *
+ * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+ * to skip sending the certificate verify
+ * message.
+ *
+ * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+ * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+ * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+ */
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
+ srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+ if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
+ (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
+ (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
+ }
+
+ srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+
+ if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
+ {
+ /* Reuse key info from our certificate
+ * We only need our private key to perform
+ * the ECDH computation.
+ */
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+ if (priv_key == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
+ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
+ * make sure to clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
+ if (field_size <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
+ -> generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+
+ memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
+
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
+ {
+ /* Send empty client key exch message */
+ n = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encoded_pt_len =
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
+ sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
+ (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key */
+ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+
+ *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
+ /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+ p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+ /* increment n to account for length field */
+ n += 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Free allocated memory */
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+ else
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=n+4;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned u=0;
+#endif
+ unsigned long n;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ int j;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[4]);
+ pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),&(data[0]));
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n=u+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
+ s->init_num=(int)n+4;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ X509 *x509=NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
+ {
+ if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to get a client cert */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
+ {
+ /* If we get an error, we need to
+ * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
+ * We then get retied later */
+ i=0;
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb != NULL)
+ i=s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,&(x509),&(pkey));
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
+ !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
+ i=0;
+ }
+ else if (i == 1)
+ {
+ i=0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ }
+
+ if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
+ if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ok, we have a cert */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
+ l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
+ (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+ s->init_num=(int)l;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
+
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,idx;
+ long algs;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh;
+#endif
+
+ sc=s->session->sess_cert;
+
+ algs=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+
+ /* we don't have a certificate */
+ if (algs & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5))
+ return(1);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+#endif
+
+ /* This is the passed certificate */
+
+ idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
+ {
+ if (check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0)
+ { /* check failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+
+ /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
+ if ((algs & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if ((algs & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if ((algs & SSL_kRSA) &&
+ !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if ((algs & SSL_kEDH) &&
+ !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else if ((algs & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if ((algs & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (algs & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ if (rsa == NULL
+ || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (algs & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ {
+ if (dh == NULL
+ || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ return(1);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+err:
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+/* This is the complement of nid2curve_id in s3_srvr.c. */
+static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
+{
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
+ * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
+ static int nid_list[26] =
+ {
+ 0,
+ NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ };
+
+ if ((curve_id < 1) || (curve_id > 25)) return 0;
+
+ return nid_list[curve_id];
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
+ * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
+ * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ long n;
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return 1;
+ /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
+ * message, so permit appropriate message length */
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
+ return 2;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
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