[From nobody Thu Jul 30 21:39:10 2026
Received: (at submit) by bugs.debian.org; 30 Jul 2026 18:56:24 +0000
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1-bugs.debian.org_2005_01_02
 (2024-03-25) on buxtehude.debian.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.9 required=4.0 tests=BAYES_00, FOURLA,
 FROMDEVELOPER, 
 NO_RELAYS,XMAILER_REPORTBUG autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
 version=4.0.1-bugs.debian.org_2005_01_02
X-Spam-Bayes: score:0.0000 Tokens: new, 35; hammy, 148; neutral, 140; spammy,
 2. spammytokens:0.993-1--FOUR, 0.987-1--rises
 hammytokens:0.000-+--XDebbugsCc, 0.000-+--X-Debbugs-Cc,
 0.000-+--H*F:U*carnil, 0.000-+--H*Ad:N*Bug, 0.000-+--HTo:N*Debian
Return-path: &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Received: via submission by buxtehude.debian.org with esmtp (Exim 4.96)
 (envelope-from &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;) id 1wpVva-00HXUX-1W
 for submit@bugs.debian.org; Thu, 30 Jul 2026 18:56:24 +0000
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=&quot;us-ascii&quot;
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
To: Debian Bug Tracking System &lt;submit@bugs.debian.org&gt;
Subject: libdate-manip-perl: CVE-2026-60074 CVE-2026-60075
Message-ID: &lt;178543777807.1468628.837343905517156786.reportbug@eldamar.lan&gt;
X-Mailer: reportbug 13.2.0+nmu1
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 20:56:18 +0200
Delivered-To: submit@bugs.debian.org

Source: libdate-manip-perl
Version: 6.99-1
Severity: important
Tags: security upstream
X-Debbugs-Cc: carnil@debian.org, Debian Security Team &lt;team@security.debian.org&gt;

Hi,

The following vulnerabilities were published for libdate-manip-perl.

CVE-2026-60074[0]:
| Date::Manip versions through 6.99 for Perl return corrupted dates
| via non-ASCII decimal digits that pass the numeric range tests in
| check.  The parse regexes capture year, month and day with the `\d`
| shorthand, which on a character string matches the whole Unicode
| decimal digit property `\p{Nd}` and not just `[0-9]`.
| Date::Manip::Base::check then validates the captured fields with
| numeric comparisons alone (`$y&lt;1 || $y&gt;9999`, `$m&lt;1 || $m&gt;12`, `$d&lt;1
| || $d&gt;$days`), and _parse_check stores the numified fields (`$y+0`).
| Perl truncates a string at the first character that is not an ASCII
| digit, so a field whose leading characters are ASCII digits numifies
| to an in-range prefix and satisfies every test: a year field of
| three ASCII digits followed by U+0664 ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT FOUR
| numifies to 202, giving the year 0202, and one non-ASCII digit in
| the month or day field shifts those fields the same way. The hour,
| minute and second fields match explicit ASCII character classes
| (`0?[0-9]`, `[0-5][0-9]`) and do not shift, though a non-ASCII digit
| in a fractional hour or minute field truncates the fraction.  Any
| caller that passes an untrusted character string to ParseDate() or
| Date::Manip::Date-&gt;parse() can get back a date that differs from the
| string it parsed, with no parse error. Where the parsed date gates
| logic such as an expiry check or a retention window, the shift goes
| unnoticed.


CVE-2026-60075[1]:
| Date::Manip versions through 6.99 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via
| quadratic backtracking in the unanchored time substitution in
| _parse_time.  _parse_time removes a time from anywhere in the string
| with the unanchored substitution `s/$timerx/ /`, where $timerx is an
| auto-generated alternation of time patterns reached through a
| leading `(?:$atrx|^|\s+)`. The engine therefore retries the match at
| every position of an interior whitespace run: at each start position
| the leading `\s+` consumes the rest of the run greedily, the time
| alternation fails because the run holds no digits, and the engine
| backtracks a space at a time across the run before advancing the
| start position, which is quadratic in the length of the run. No time
| need be present in the string for this to happen, only a long run of
| whitespace, and the parse time rises about fourfold for each
| doubling of the run: a few kilobytes of whitespace costs seconds of
| CPU per parse and tens of kilobytes costs minutes.  Any caller that
| passes an untrusted string of unbounded length to ParseDate(),
| Date::Manip::Date-&gt;parse() or -&gt;parse_time() can be made to spend
| unbounded CPU in a single parse, a denial of service.


If you fix the vulnerabilities please also make sure to include the
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities &amp; Exposures) ids in your changelog entry.

For further information see:

[0] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-60074
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60074
    https://lists.security.metacpan.org/cve-announce/msg/42266594/
[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-60075
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60075
    https://lists.security.metacpan.org/cve-announce/msg/42266599/

Regards,
Salvatore
]