[Freedombox-discuss] What Do You want to use the FreedomBox for?

Jonathan Wilkes jancsika at yahoo.com
Mon May 28 01:46:42 UTC 2012

----- Original Message -----

> From: Bjarni Rúnar Einarsson <bre at pagekite.net>
> To: Jonathan Wilkes <jancsika at yahoo.com>
> Cc: Jay Sulzberger <jays at panix.com>; "freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org" <freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org>
> Sent: Sunday, May 27, 2012 7:54 PM
> Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] What Do You want to use the FreedomBox for?
> A minor clarification... :-)
> On Sat, May 26, 2012 at 11:26 PM, Jonathan Wilkes <jancsika at yahoo.com> 
> wrote:
>>  The approaches I can think of are:
>>  a) pagekite et al, which would then become a central point of 
> attack/failure
> Yes and no. PageKite's "central point of failure" is by design the
> exact same central point as that of the web itself: the DNS system.
> PageKite assumes that there are many different front-end relay servers
> available, and connections can move from one to another at any time.
> So if one relay is taken down, the website is simply routed to another
> one and DNS gets updated.  This works today.
> Of course, the PageKite service which my company provides is indeed a
> "central point of attack/failure", but as the solution is open source,
> you don't need to rely on it unless you want to.
> Obviously as we grow
> we hope to become more resilient and robust and remain "the best way
> to use PageKite", but we're certainly not the *only* way.

How resilient would the rest of the relays be if your service happened to get 
taken down?

> One other option, is the possibility for the community to
> collaboratively share resources and provide relay service whenever a
> FreedomBox detects that it is lucky enough to have a public,
> unfiltered IP address.  The reason the project didn't go down that
> road from the very start, was due to security: as PageKite carries a
> fair bit of legacy plain-text HTTP traffic, a volunteer-based relay
> network would be a tempting target for abuse because relays could
> rewrite web pages on the fly to inject malware.
> However, if people only tunnel end-to-end SSL encrypted HTTPS traffic
> (which is arguably the only reasonable strategy for the FreedomBox use
> cases anyway) then it would actually be perfectly safe to accept relay
> service from untrusted strangers. :-)

That could be a workable solution, but would require the 
tech-whiz(zes) in one's group of friends to also have a decent high-speed 
internet connection to provide everyone with reliable enough service.  
(Maybe Ripple would come in handy here.)


> Censorship via. the DNS network is really the only major stumbling
> block, but it affects many other services as well, not just PageKite.
> -- 
> Bjarni R. Einarsson
> Founder, lead developer of PageKite.
> Make localhost servers visible to the world: https://pagekite.net/

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