[Freedombox-discuss] Keeping the noise level up to avoid traffic analysis?

Paul Gardner-Stephen paul at servalproject.org
Mon Aug 19 21:05:39 UTC 2013

It seems that at its' limit this ends up being equivalent to Tor -- having
genuine traffic filling all the links, but it is impossible to know who is
consuming any particular piece of it.


On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 4:53 AM, Petter Reinholdtsen <pere at hungry.com>wrote:

> [Bob Mottram]
> > It's a reasonable enough idea and worth a try so long as the amount of
> > decoy traffic isn't too high.  However, the threat model for this case
> > is sophisticated data mining on the traffic graph, and over a time
> > series such techniques may be able to filter out predictable user
> > patterns from background noise.
> This is not the only threat model I had in mind.  It is known that some
> network monitoring actors pay special attention to everyone visiting
> some web pages, and by sharing URLs we can make sure "everyone" visit
> "every" page visited by someone, making sure those tracking visits to
> some web pages get a lot of noise.  We also make sure the value of any
> legal proof of "this machine own by this person visited these pages"
> become a lot smaller.
> > One way to try to counter that might be to build decoy personas whose
> > fictitious web browsing activity has the same degree of statistical
> > predictability/variance as the real user.  It would be tricky to
> > implement, but perhaps not impossible.
> Well, it really should impersonate some other user too. :)
> --
> Happy hacking
> Petter Reinholdtsen
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