[Freedombox-discuss] BitTorrent Sync

Jonathan Wilkes jancsika at yahoo.com
Wed Jan 30 22:42:19 UTC 2013

----- Original Message -----
> From: simo <idra at samba.org>
> To: Elena ``of Valhalla'' <elena.valhalla at gmail.com>
> Cc: freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
> Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2013 5:03 PM
> Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] BitTorrent Sync
> On Wed, 2013-01-30 at 22:10 +0100, Elena ``of Valhalla'' wrote:
>>  On 2013-01-30 at 09:28:14 -0800, 
> FreedomBox-Discuss.NeoPhyte_Rep at OrdinaryAmerican.net wrote:
>>  > Doesn't that assume the devices are never the subject of a search 
> warrant?
>>  in some countries in that case simple encryption isn't enough to 
> protect
>>  you, since you are also forced to reveal your password by law.
>>  In other countries the same applies, not because you are forced 
>>  by the law, but because the police have no incentive not to 
>>  use unlawful methods to force you to reveal your password.
>>  In either cases, a solution that works at the filesystem layer is 
>>  probably going to work better, expecially for the hiding part.
> Actually hiding data in a fully encrypted partition is much easier and
> *safe* than encrypting only some files at the filesystem level and
> hoping they won't find them.
> A simple block level analysis will easily find encrypted data via
> statistical means if only some data is encrypted, also copies of the
> data may be easily found in swap spaces and temporary files.
> There are also full encryption tools that allow you to have 2 sets of
> data, one real and one fake and innocuous that will be revealed by using
> a different password in a non-detectable way.

Is it designed so as to allow _only_ 2 sets of data?  Again, if one cannot
reasonably convince the authorities that there isn't yet another set of
hidden data out there with the data they're after, it could be worse than
not encrypting at all.


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