[pkg-cryptsetup-devel] Bug#715525: No need to sleep after a bad password; cryptsetup handles that securely itself

Josh Triplett josh at joshtriplett.org
Wed Jul 10 02:22:44 UTC 2013


Package: cryptsetup
Version: 2:1.6.1-1
Severity: normal
File: /usr/share/initramfs-tools/scripts/local-top/cryptroot

The initramfs-tools handling for encrypted root device passphrases has a
"sleep 3" after each failure to enter the correct passphrase, presumably
to deter brute-forcing.  However, this is not required.  LUKS already
has its own built-in secure delay mechanism inherent in the format, by
using iterated hashing to force a certain amount of work to check a
passphrase (specifically, PBKDF2).  Any attempt to brute-force a device
passphrase will necessarily incur that computational delay for each
passphrase checked (calibrated by default to take about 1 second on the
machine that created the encrypted partition), whereas anyone attempting
to brute-force the crypto passphrase would simply remove the sleep call
(and for that matter the whole shell script, and the keyboard input).

So, with that in mind, the sleep 3 has no security value, but it does
serve to add extra annoyance to anyone who mistypes their password.

Please remove it.

- Josh Triplett



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