[pkg-gnupg-maint] Bug#835465: [Reproducible-builds] Bug#835465: python-apt: FTBFS: AptKeyError: recv from 'hkp://localhost:19191' failed for '0xa1bD8E9D78F7FE5C3E65D8AF8B48AD6246925553'

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor]

On Tue 2016-08-30 09:47:34 -0400, Julian Andres Klode wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 09:32:15AM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>> On Tue 2016-08-30 08:49:20 -0400, Julian Andres Klode wrote:
>> >> apt/auth.py appears to want to force gnupg to store its secret key
>> >> material in secring.gpg.  This isn't a best practice, and modern
>> >> versions of gpg do not do so by default.  I'd recommend dropping
>> >> tmp_secret_keyring entirely.
>> >
>> > Hmm, there should not even be any secret key material, as apt only
>> > deals with public keys.
>> 
>> agreed, all the more reason to strip out those extra directives ;)
>
> I assume that might change behavior if used with gpg1, so I'd rather
> keep it in if it does no harm.

There should be no behavior that changes based on secret keys if secret
keys are never used.  I'd rather not have spare directives floating
around that we don't need -- i've been doing triage on things that try
to manipulate gnupg programmatically, and the simpler we can make them
the easier it will be to fix any problems that come up in GnuPG itself,
i think.  There's a lot of cruft, and it would help my sanity to
minimize the cruft.

> I don't really care. More important are probably Breaks for software-properties,
> it's Authentication tab is fairly broken now. I think that's also where apt.auth
> was split off from, but I'm not entirely sure...

Can you point me to a report about that?  I'm not seeing it in my scan
of the bts at https://bugs.debian.org/src:software-properties

>> > Maybe there's also an option to display fingerprints instead of keyids
>> > in --with-colons --list-keys?
>> 
>> sure!
>> 
>>   gpg --fixed-list-mode --with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint --with-colons  --list-keys
>> 
>> will produce lines of the form:
>> 
>>  fpr:::::::::0EE5BE979282D80B9F7540F1CCD2ED94D21739E9:
>
> How awful. There should be a way to integrate this into the pub output

To be clear, the output has pub:, then fpr:, then uid: lines in a row.
it's pretty straightforward to track as you read the lines linearly.
for any uid line, it is associated with the most recent fpr line, which
itself is associated with the most recent pub line.

the uid line is split out because you can have multiple uids associated
with each pub+fpr.

For the fields we're interested in, this is the same output across all
versions.

> (and with all the other breaks, it should have just gone fingerprint
> by default everywhere).

i'm working on that, but there are internal data structure
considerations that make it more costly to display the fingerprint
(unfortunately, the datastructures in the keyring are 64-bit keyids, not
full fingerprints).

> APT's subkey handling is fairly broken anyway (it's gpg verification
> does not consider subkeys at all, so if you specify a list signed-by
> of master key ids, APT would fail to validate a repo signed with a
> subkey, unless the subkey is in the list itself...)

interesting -- how is this done?  i thought apt was using gpgv to verify
the signatures, and if there are subkeys in the keyrings gpgv knows
about gpgv will be willing to accept those subkeys.  Are you saying apt
itself parses the output of gpgv and the fingprints in it to some
internal list of acceptable fingerprints?  If you could point to the
right spot in the source, i'd be happy to look into it further.

         --dkg
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