Secure boot signing infrastructure - feedback request

[Ben Hutchings]

On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 15:58 +0000, Steve McIntyre wrote:
[...]
> On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 09:48:46PM -0300, Helen Koike wrote:
[...]
> > Is this solution acceptable? If we have an easy way to revoke, then we
> > can easily undo an attacker's work. We can sign everything automatically
> > (if the package is in a whitelist) without the need for the ftp masters
> > to review each upload manually.
> 
> Right. Wanting to go the revocation route would depend on the
> development of yet more new software features. But: this is not
> something that any of the other SB-supporting distros seem to be
> caring about so far so I don't think it's something we should have to
> implement as a pre-requisite.
[...]

As I understand it, SUSE has implemented some kind of downgrade
prevention.

Ben.

-- 
Ben Hutchings
Beware of programmers who carry screwdrivers. - Leonard Brandwein

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