[tomcat7] 01/01: Prepare next security release for Wheezy.
Markus Koschany
apo at moszumanska.debian.org
Fri Nov 4 14:34:53 UTC 2016
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
apo pushed a commit to branch wheezy
in repository tomcat7.
commit b0a66d829f152186b8e260dfcffa919b0b694cf4
Author: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
Date: Fri Nov 4 15:04:31 2016 +0100
Prepare next security release for Wheezy.
---
debian/changelog | 32 +++
...-java.security.policy-file-in-catalina.sh.patch | 20 +-
debian/patches/CVE-2016-0762.patch | 25 ++
debian/patches/CVE-2016-5018.patch | 107 +++++++++
debian/patches/CVE-2016-6794.patch | 145 ++++++++++++
debian/patches/CVE-2016-6796.patch | 111 +++++++++
debian/patches/CVE-2016-6797.patch | 258 +++++++++++++++++++++
debian/patches/series | 5 +
debian/tomcat7.init | 11 +-
debian/tomcat7.postrm.in | 1 +
10 files changed, 702 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 4f8b5df..10eaff7 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,35 @@
+tomcat7 (7.0.28-4+deb7u7) UNRELEASED; urgency=high
+
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-0762: The Realm implementations did not process the supplied
+ password if the supplied user name did not exist. This made a timing attack
+ possible to determine valid user names.
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-5018: A malicious web application was able to bypass
+ a configured SecurityManager via a Tomcat utility method that was
+ accessible to web applications.
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-6794: When a SecurityManager is configured, a web
+ application's ability to read system properties should be controlled by
+ the SecurityManager. Tomcat's system property replacement feature for
+ configuration files could be used by a malicious web application to bypass
+ the SecurityManager and read system properties that should not be visible.
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-6796: A malicious web application was able to bypass
+ a configured SecurityManager via manipulation of the configuration
+ parameters for the JSP Servlet.
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-6797: The ResourceLinkFactory did not limit web application
+ access to global JNDI resources to those resources explicitly linked to the
+ web application. Therefore, it was possible for a web application to access
+ any global JNDI resource whether an explicit ResourceLink had been
+ configured or not.
+ * CVE-2016-1240 follow-up:
+ - The previous init.d fix was vulnerable to a race condition that could
+ be exploited to make any existing file writable by the tomcat user.
+ Thanks to Paul Szabo for the report and the fix.
+ - The catalina.policy file generated on startup was affected by a similar
+ vulnerability that could be exploited to overwrite any file on the system.
+ Thanks to Paul Szabo for the report.
+ * Hardened the init.d script, thanks to Paul Szabo
+
+ -- Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org> Thu, 03 Nov 2016 17:15:18 +0100
+
tomcat7 (7.0.28-4+deb7u6) wheezy-security; urgency=high
* Team upload.
diff --git a/debian/patches/0009-Use-java.security.policy-file-in-catalina.sh.patch b/debian/patches/0009-Use-java.security.policy-file-in-catalina.sh.patch
index a516ce9..1ebaefc 100644
--- a/debian/patches/0009-Use-java.security.policy-file-in-catalina.sh.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/0009-Use-java.security.policy-file-in-catalina.sh.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
From: Adam Guthrie <asguthrie at gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 21:53:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Use java.security.policy file in catalina.sh
+Subject: Use java.security.policy file in catalina.sh
Make sure catalina.sh uses the Debian/Ubuntu java.security.policy
file location when Tomcat is started with a security manager.
@@ -9,35 +9,37 @@ Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/591802
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/585379
Forwarded: not-needed
---
- bin/catalina.sh | 6 +++---
- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ bin/catalina.sh | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/bin/catalina.sh b/bin/catalina.sh
+index 1690c14..a0e0aed 100755
--- a/bin/catalina.sh
+++ b/bin/catalina.sh
-@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
+@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ if [ "$1" = "debug" ] ; then
-Djava.endorsed.dirs="$JAVA_ENDORSED_DIRS" -classpath "$CLASSPATH" \
-sourcepath "$CATALINA_HOME"/../../java \
-Djava.security.manager \
- -Djava.security.policy=="$CATALINA_BASE"/conf/catalina.policy \
-+ -Djava.security.policy=="$CATALINA_BASE"/work/catalina.policy \
++ -Djava.security.policy=="$CATALINA_BASE"/policy/catalina.policy \
-Dcatalina.base="$CATALINA_BASE" \
-Dcatalina.home="$CATALINA_HOME" \
-Djava.io.tmpdir="$CATALINA_TMPDIR" \
-@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@
+@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ elif [ "$1" = "run" ]; then
eval exec \"$_RUNJAVA\" \"$LOGGING_CONFIG\" $JAVA_OPTS $CATALINA_OPTS \
-Djava.endorsed.dirs=\"$JAVA_ENDORSED_DIRS\" -classpath \"$CLASSPATH\" \
-Djava.security.manager \
- -Djava.security.policy==\"$CATALINA_BASE/conf/catalina.policy\" \
-+ -Djava.security.policy==\"$CATALINA_BASE/work/catalina.policy\" \
++ -Djava.security.policy==\"$CATALINA_BASE/policy/catalina.policy\" \
-Dcatalina.base=\"$CATALINA_BASE\" \
-Dcatalina.home=\"$CATALINA_HOME\" \
-Djava.io.tmpdir=\"$CATALINA_TMPDIR\" \
-@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@
+@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ elif [ "$1" = "start" ] ; then
eval \"$_RUNJAVA\" \"$LOGGING_CONFIG\" $JAVA_OPTS $CATALINA_OPTS \
-Djava.endorsed.dirs=\"$JAVA_ENDORSED_DIRS\" -classpath \"$CLASSPATH\" \
-Djava.security.manager \
- -Djava.security.policy==\"$CATALINA_BASE/conf/catalina.policy\" \
-+ -Djava.security.policy==\"$CATALINA_BASE/work/catalina.policy\" \
++ -Djava.security.policy==\"$CATALINA_BASE/policy/catalina.policy\" \
-Dcatalina.base=\"$CATALINA_BASE\" \
-Dcatalina.home=\"$CATALINA_HOME\" \
-Djava.io.tmpdir=\"$CATALINA_TMPDIR\" \
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-0762.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-0762.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..308b7c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-0762.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2016 00:05:38 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-0762
+
+Only JNDIRealm class is affected in Wheezy.
+
+Origin: https://svn.apache.org/r1758502
+---
+ java/org/apache/catalina/realm/JNDIRealm.java | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/JNDIRealm.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/JNDIRealm.java
+index 541063f..8554bf4 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/JNDIRealm.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/JNDIRealm.java
+@@ -1488,6 +1488,9 @@ public class JNDIRealm extends RealmBase {
+ containerLog.trace(sm.getString("jndiRealm.authenticateSuccess",
+ user.getUserName()));
+ } else {
++ // User was not found in the database.
++ // Waste a bit of time as not to reveal that the user does not exist.
++ compareCredentials(context, user, credentials);
+ containerLog.trace(sm.getString("jndiRealm.authenticateFailure",
+ user.getUserName()));
+ }
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-5018.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-5018.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..343238d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-5018.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 16:37:46 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-5018
+
+Origin: http://svn.apache.org/r1754902
+---
+ .../apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java | 59 +---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 58 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java b/java/org/apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java
+index 9fb6e55..73ea608 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java
+@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+-
+ package org.apache.jasper.runtime;
+
+ import java.beans.PropertyEditor;
+@@ -23,9 +22,6 @@ import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
+ import java.io.IOException;
+ import java.io.OutputStreamWriter;
+ import java.lang.reflect.Method;
+-import java.security.AccessController;
+-import java.security.PrivilegedActionException;
+-import java.security.PrivilegedExceptionAction;
+ import java.util.Enumeration;
+
+ import javax.servlet.RequestDispatcher;
+@@ -37,7 +33,6 @@ import javax.servlet.jsp.JspWriter;
+ import javax.servlet.jsp.PageContext;
+ import javax.servlet.jsp.tagext.BodyContent;
+
+-import org.apache.jasper.Constants;
+ import org.apache.jasper.JasperException;
+ import org.apache.jasper.compiler.Localizer;
+ import org.apache.jasper.util.ExceptionUtils;
+@@ -56,36 +51,6 @@ import org.apache.jasper.util.ExceptionUtils;
+ */
+ public class JspRuntimeLibrary {
+
+- protected static class PrivilegedIntrospectHelper
+- implements PrivilegedExceptionAction<Void> {
+-
+- private Object bean;
+- private String prop;
+- private String value;
+- private ServletRequest request;
+- private String param;
+- private boolean ignoreMethodNF;
+-
+- PrivilegedIntrospectHelper(Object bean, String prop,
+- String value, ServletRequest request,
+- String param, boolean ignoreMethodNF)
+- {
+- this.bean = bean;
+- this.prop = prop;
+- this.value = value;
+- this.request = request;
+- this.param = param;
+- this.ignoreMethodNF = ignoreMethodNF;
+- }
+-
+- @Override
+- public Void run() throws JasperException {
+- internalIntrospecthelper(
+- bean,prop,value,request,param,ignoreMethodNF);
+- return null;
+- }
+- }
+-
+ /**
+ * Returns the value of the javax.servlet.error.exception request
+ * attribute value, if present, otherwise the value of the
+@@ -290,29 +255,7 @@ public class JspRuntimeLibrary {
+ public static void introspecthelper(Object bean, String prop,
+ String value, ServletRequest request,
+ String param, boolean ignoreMethodNF)
+- throws JasperException
+- {
+- if( Constants.IS_SECURITY_ENABLED ) {
+- try {
+- PrivilegedIntrospectHelper dp =
+- new PrivilegedIntrospectHelper(
+- bean,prop,value,request,param,ignoreMethodNF);
+- AccessController.doPrivileged(dp);
+- } catch( PrivilegedActionException pe) {
+- Exception e = pe.getException();
+- throw (JasperException)e;
+- }
+- } else {
+- internalIntrospecthelper(
+- bean,prop,value,request,param,ignoreMethodNF);
+- }
+- }
+-
+- private static void internalIntrospecthelper(Object bean, String prop,
+- String value, ServletRequest request,
+- String param, boolean ignoreMethodNF)
+- throws JasperException
+- {
++ throws JasperException {
+ Method method = null;
+ Class<?> type = null;
+ Class<?> propertyEditorClass = null;
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6794.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6794.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53d60d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6794.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 16:36:01 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-6794
+
+Origin: http://svn.apache.org/r1754728
+---
+ .../apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java | 24 +++++++++++-
+ java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java | 10 +++++
+ .../tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 java/org/apache/tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java
+index b182ce3..dfb3ee7 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java
+@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ import org.apache.naming.resources.ResourceAttributes;
+ import org.apache.tomcat.util.ExceptionUtils;
+ import org.apache.tomcat.util.IntrospectionUtils;
+ import org.apache.tomcat.util.res.StringManager;
++import org.apache.tomcat.util.security.PermissionCheck;
+
+ /**
+ * Specialized web application class loader.
+@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ import org.apache.tomcat.util.res.StringManager;
+ */
+ public class WebappClassLoader
+ extends URLClassLoader
+- implements Lifecycle
++ implements Lifecycle, PermissionCheck
+ {
+
+ private static final org.apache.juli.logging.Log log=
+@@ -1744,6 +1745,27 @@ public class WebappClassLoader
+ }
+
+
++ @Override
++ public boolean check(Permission permission) {
++ if (!Globals.IS_SECURITY_ENABLED) {
++ return true;
++ }
++ Policy currentPolicy = Policy.getPolicy();
++ if (currentPolicy != null) {
++ ResourceEntry entry = findResourceInternal("/", "/");
++ if (entry != null) {
++ CodeSource cs = new CodeSource(
++ entry.codeBase, (java.security.cert.Certificate[]) null);
++ PermissionCollection pc = currentPolicy.getPermissions(cs);
++ if (pc.implies(permission)) {
++ return true;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++ return false;
++ }
++
++
+ /**
+ * Returns the search path of URLs for loading classes and resources.
+ * This includes the original list of URLs specified to the constructor,
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java
+index 84cbeb3..d631528 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java
+@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ import java.util.HashMap;
+ import java.util.Iterator;
+ import java.util.List;
+ import java.util.Map;
++import java.util.PropertyPermission;
++import java.security.Permission;
+
+ import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException;
+ import javax.xml.parsers.SAXParser;
+@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ import org.apache.juli.logging.Log;
+ import org.apache.juli.logging.LogFactory;
+ import org.apache.tomcat.util.ExceptionUtils;
+ import org.apache.tomcat.util.IntrospectionUtils;
++import org.apache.tomcat.util.security.PermissionCheck;
+ import org.xml.sax.Attributes;
+ import org.xml.sax.EntityResolver;
+ import org.xml.sax.ErrorHandler;
+@@ -80,6 +83,13 @@ public class Digester extends DefaultHandler {
+ implements IntrospectionUtils.PropertySource {
+ @Override
+ public String getProperty( String key ) {
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ if (cl instanceof PermissionCheck) {
++ Permission p = new PropertyPermission(key, "read");
++ if (!((PermissionCheck) cl).check(p)) {
++ return null;
++ }
++ }
+ return System.getProperty(key);
+ }
+ }
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ba2bdd3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
++/*
++ * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
++ * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
++ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
++ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
++ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
++ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
++ *
++ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
++ *
++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
++ * limitations under the License.
++ */
++package org.apache.tomcat.util.security;
++
++import java.security.Permission;
++
++/**
++ * This interface is implemented by components to enable privileged code to
++ * check whether the component has a given permission.
++ * This is typically used when a privileged component (e.g. the container) is
++ * performing an action on behalf of an untrusted component (e.g. a web
++ * application) without the current thread having passed through a code source
++ * provided by the untrusted component. Because the current thread has not
++ * passed through a code source provided by the untrusted component the
++ * SecurityManager assumes the code is trusted so the standard checking
++ * mechanisms can't be used.
++ */
++public interface PermissionCheck {
++
++ /**
++ * Does this component have the given permission?
++ *
++ * @param permission The permission to test
++ *
++ * @return {@code false} if a SecurityManager is enabled and the component
++ * does not have the given permission, otherwise {@code false}
++ */
++ boolean check(Permission permission);
++}
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6796.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6796.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ee2ae3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6796.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 16:27:56 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-6796
+
+Origin: http://svn.apache.org/r1758495
+---
+ conf/web.xml | 4 ++++
+ java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java | 4 ++++
+ java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties | 1 +
+ java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java | 9 +++++++--
+ webapps/docs/jasper-howto.xml | 4 ++--
+ 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/conf/web.xml b/conf/web.xml
+index 2482d93..9126d54 100644
+--- a/conf/web.xml
++++ b/conf/web.xml
+@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@
+ <!-- engineOptionsClass Allows specifying the Options class used to -->
+ <!-- configure Jasper. If not present, the default -->
+ <!-- EmbeddedServletOptions will be used. -->
++ <!-- This option is ignored when running under a -->
++ <!-- SecurityManager. -->
+ <!-- -->
+ <!-- errorOnUseBeanInvalidClassAttribute -->
+ <!-- Should Jasper issue an error when the value of -->
+@@ -219,6 +221,8 @@
+ <!-- scratchdir What scratch directory should we use when -->
+ <!-- compiling JSP pages? [default work directory -->
+ <!-- for the current web application] -->
++ <!-- This option is ignored when running under a -->
++ <!-- SecurityManager. -->
+ <!-- -->
+ <!-- suppressSmap Should the generation of SMAP info for JSR45 -->
+ <!-- debugging be suppressed? [false] -->
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java b/java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java
+index 6c5ddbd..05c6fe6 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java
+@@ -640,6 +640,10 @@ public final class EmbeddedServletOptions implements Options {
+ * scratchdir
+ */
+ String dir = config.getInitParameter("scratchdir");
++ if (dir != null && Constants.IS_SECURITY_ENABLED) {
++ log.info(Localizer.getMessage("jsp.info.ignoreSetting", "scratchdir", dir));
++ dir = null;
++ }
+ if (dir != null) {
+ scratchDir = new File(dir);
+ } else {
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties b/java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties
+index 4b67a9c..5cd0657 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties
++++ b/java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties
+@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ jsp.error.unbalanced.endtag=The end tag \"</{0}\" is unbalanced
+ jsp.error.invalid.bean=The value for the useBean class attribute {0} is invalid.
+ jsp.error.prefix.use_before_dcl=The prefix {0} specified in this tag directive has been previously used by an action in file {1} line {2}.
+ jsp.error.lastModified=Unable to determine last modified date for file [{0}]
++jsp.info.ignoreSetting=Ignored setting for [{0}] of [{1}] because a SecurityManager was enabled
+
+ jsp.exception=An exception occurred processing JSP page {0} at line {1}
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java b/java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java
+index 289b9e9..4e253e3 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java
+@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ public class JspServlet extends HttpServlet implements PeriodicEventListener {
+ private ServletConfig config;
+ private transient Options options;
+ private transient JspRuntimeContext rctxt;
+- //jspFile for a jsp configured explicitly as a servlet, in environments where this configuration is
+- //translated into an init-param for this servlet.
++ // jspFile for a jsp configured explicitly as a servlet, in environments where this
++ // configuration is translated into an init-param for this servlet.
+ private String jspFile;
+
+
+@@ -90,6 +90,11 @@ public class JspServlet extends HttpServlet implements PeriodicEventListener {
+ // Check for a custom Options implementation
+ String engineOptionsName =
+ config.getInitParameter("engineOptionsClass");
++ if (Constants.IS_SECURITY_ENABLED && engineOptionsName != null) {
++ log.info(Localizer.getMessage(
++ "jsp.info.ignoreSetting", "engineOptionsClass", engineOptionsName));
++ engineOptionsName = null;
++ }
+ if (engineOptionsName != null) {
+ // Instantiate the indicated Options implementation
+ try {
+diff --git a/webapps/docs/jasper-howto.xml b/webapps/docs/jasper-howto.xml
+index 826c051..fb9b28e 100644
+--- a/webapps/docs/jasper-howto.xml
++++ b/webapps/docs/jasper-howto.xml
+@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ default <code>true</code>.
+
+ <li><strong>engineOptionsClass</strong> - Allows specifying the Options class
+ used to configure Jasper. If not present, the default EmbeddedServletOptions
+-will be used.
++will be used. This option is ignored if running under a SecurityManager.
+ </li>
+
+ <li><strong>errorOnUseBeanInvalidClassAttribute</strong> - Should Jasper issue
+@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ may be expensive and could lead to excessive resource usage.</li>
+
+ <li><strong>scratchdir</strong> - What scratch directory should we use when
+ compiling JSP pages? Default is the work directory for the current web
+-application.</li>
++application. This option is ignored if running under a SecurityManager.</li>
+
+ <li><strong>suppressSmap</strong> - Should the generation of SMAP info for JSR45
+ debugging be suppressed? <code>true</code> or <code>false</code>, default
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6797.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6797.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf71759
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6797.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 16:26:45 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-6797
+
+Origin: http://svn.apache.org/r1757275
+---
+ .../catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java | 20 +++++
+ .../apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java | 61 +++++++++++++++
+ test/org/apache/naming/TestNamingContext.java | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 168 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 test/org/apache/naming/TestNamingContext.java
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java
+index 527ad6f..f95416b 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ import org.apache.catalina.Container;
+ import org.apache.catalina.ContainerEvent;
+ import org.apache.catalina.ContainerListener;
+ import org.apache.catalina.Context;
++import org.apache.catalina.Engine;
+ import org.apache.catalina.Host;
+ import org.apache.catalina.Lifecycle;
+ import org.apache.catalina.LifecycleEvent;
+@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ import org.apache.naming.ResourceLinkRef;
+ import org.apache.naming.ResourceRef;
+ import org.apache.naming.ServiceRef;
+ import org.apache.naming.TransactionRef;
++import org.apache.naming.factory.ResourceLinkFactory;
+ import org.apache.tomcat.util.modeler.Registry;
+ import org.apache.tomcat.util.res.StringManager;
+
+@@ -335,6 +337,12 @@ public class NamingContextListener
+ for (ObjectName objectName : names) {
+ Registry.getRegistry(null, null).unregisterComponent(objectName);
+ }
++
++ javax.naming.Context global = getGlobalNamingContext();
++ if (global != null) {
++ ResourceLinkFactory.deregisterGlobalResourceAccess(global);
++ }
++
+ objectNames.clear();
+
+ namingContext = null;
+@@ -1125,6 +1133,17 @@ public class NamingContextListener
+ logger.error(sm.getString("naming.bindFailed", e));
+ }
+
++ ResourceLinkFactory.registerGlobalResourceAccess(
++ getGlobalNamingContext(), resourceLink.getName(), resourceLink.getGlobal());
++ }
++
++
++ private javax.naming.Context getGlobalNamingContext() {
++ if (container instanceof Context) {
++ Engine e = (Engine) ((Context) container).getParent().getParent();
++ return e.getService().getServer().getGlobalNamingContext();
++ }
++ return null;
+ }
+
+
+@@ -1228,6 +1247,7 @@ public class NamingContextListener
+ logger.error(sm.getString("naming.unbindFailed", e));
+ }
+
++ ResourceLinkFactory.deregisterGlobalResourceAccess(getGlobalNamingContext(), name);
+ }
+
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java b/java/org/apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java
+index 03188da..157adfb 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java
+@@ -18,7 +18,10 @@
+
+ package org.apache.naming.factory;
+
++import java.util.HashMap;
+ import java.util.Hashtable;
++import java.util.Map;
++import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
+
+ import javax.naming.Context;
+ import javax.naming.Name;
+@@ -52,6 +55,8 @@ public class ResourceLinkFactory
+ */
+ private static Context globalContext = null;
+
++ private static Map<ClassLoader,Map<String,String>> globalResourceRegistrations =
++ new ConcurrentHashMap<ClassLoader,Map<String,String>>();
+
+ // --------------------------------------------------------- Public Methods
+
+@@ -71,6 +76,56 @@ public class ResourceLinkFactory
+ }
+
+
++ public static void registerGlobalResourceAccess(Context globalContext, String localName,
++ String globalName) {
++ validateGlobalContext(globalContext);
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ Map<String,String> registrations = globalResourceRegistrations.get(cl);
++ if (registrations == null) {
++ // Web application initialization is single threaded so this is
++ // safe.
++ registrations = new HashMap<String,String>();
++ globalResourceRegistrations.put(cl, registrations);
++ }
++ registrations.put(localName, globalName);
++ }
++
++
++ public static void deregisterGlobalResourceAccess(Context globalContext, String localName) {
++ validateGlobalContext(globalContext);
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ Map<String,String> registrations = globalResourceRegistrations.get(cl);
++ if (registrations != null) {
++ registrations.remove(localName);
++ }
++ }
++
++
++ public static void deregisterGlobalResourceAccess(Context globalContext) {
++ validateGlobalContext(globalContext);
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ globalResourceRegistrations.remove(cl);
++ }
++
++
++ private static void validateGlobalContext(Context globalContext) {
++ if (ResourceLinkFactory.globalContext != null &&
++ ResourceLinkFactory.globalContext != globalContext) {
++ throw new SecurityException("Caller provided invalid global context");
++ }
++ }
++
++
++ private static boolean validateGlobalResourceAccess(String globalName) {
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ Map<String,String> registrations = globalResourceRegistrations.get(cl);
++ if (registrations != null && registrations.containsValue(globalName)) {
++ return true;
++ }
++ return false;
++ }
++
++
+ // -------------------------------------------------- ObjectFactory Methods
+
+
+@@ -95,6 +150,12 @@ public class ResourceLinkFactory
+ RefAddr refAddr = ref.get(ResourceLinkRef.GLOBALNAME);
+ if (refAddr != null) {
+ globalName = refAddr.getContent().toString();
++ // When running under a security manager confirm that the current
++ // web application has really been configured to access the specified
++ // global resource
++ if (!validateGlobalResourceAccess(globalName)) {
++ return null;
++ }
+ Object result = null;
+ result = globalContext.lookup(globalName);
+ // FIXME: Check type
+diff --git a/test/org/apache/naming/TestNamingContext.java b/test/org/apache/naming/TestNamingContext.java
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f108893
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/org/apache/naming/TestNamingContext.java
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++package org.apache.naming;
++
++import javax.naming.Context;
++import javax.naming.NamingException;
++
++import org.apache.catalina.deploy.ContextEnvironment;
++import org.apache.catalina.deploy.ContextResourceLink;
++import org.apache.catalina.startup.Tomcat;
++import org.apache.catalina.startup.TomcatBaseTest;
++import org.apache.naming.factory.ResourceLinkFactory;
++import org.junit.Assert;
++import org.junit.Test;
++
++public class TestNamingContext extends TomcatBaseTest {
++
++ private static final String COMP_ENV = "comp/env";
++ private static final String GLOBAL_NAME = "global";
++ private static final String LOCAL_NAME = "local";
++ private static final String DATA = "Cabbage";
++
++
++ @Test
++ public void testGlobalNaming() throws Exception {
++ Tomcat tomcat = getTomcatInstance();
++ tomcat.enableNaming();
++
++ org.apache.catalina.Context ctx = tomcat.addContext("", null);
++
++ tomcat.start();
++
++ Context webappInitial = ContextBindings.getContext(ctx);
++
++ // Nothing added at the moment so should be null
++ Object obj = doLookup(webappInitial, COMP_ENV + "/" + LOCAL_NAME);
++ Assert.assertNull(obj);
++
++ ContextEnvironment ce = new ContextEnvironment();
++ ce.setName(GLOBAL_NAME);
++ ce.setValue(DATA);
++ ce.setType(DATA.getClass().getName());
++
++ tomcat.getServer().getGlobalNamingResources().addEnvironment(ce);
++
++ // No link so still should be null
++ obj = doLookup(webappInitial, COMP_ENV + "/" + LOCAL_NAME);
++ Assert.assertNull(obj);
++
++ // Now add a resource link to the context
++ ContextResourceLink crl = new ContextResourceLink();
++ crl.setGlobal(GLOBAL_NAME);
++ crl.setName(LOCAL_NAME);
++ crl.setType(DATA.getClass().getName());
++ ctx.getNamingResources().addResourceLink(crl);
++
++ // Link exists so should be OK now
++ obj = doLookup(webappInitial, COMP_ENV + "/" + LOCAL_NAME);
++ Assert.assertEquals(DATA, obj);
++
++ // Try shortcut
++ ResourceLinkFactory factory = new ResourceLinkFactory();
++ ResourceLinkRef rlr = new ResourceLinkRef(DATA.getClass().getName(), GLOBAL_NAME, null, null);
++ obj = factory.getObjectInstance(rlr, null, null, null);
++ Assert.assertEquals(DATA, obj);
++
++ // Remove the link
++ ctx.getNamingResources().removeResourceLink(LOCAL_NAME);
++
++ // No link so should be null
++ obj = doLookup(webappInitial, COMP_ENV + "/" + LOCAL_NAME);
++ Assert.assertNull(obj);
++
++ // Shortcut should fail too
++ obj = factory.getObjectInstance(rlr, null, null, null);
++ Assert.assertNull(obj);
++ }
++
++
++ private Object doLookup(Context context, String name) {
++ Object result = null;
++ try {
++ result = context.lookup(name);
++ } catch (NamingException nnfe) {
++ // Ignore
++ }
++ return result;
++ }
++}
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index e12269f..72b5561 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -37,3 +37,8 @@ CVE-2016-0706.patch
CVE-2016-0714.patch
CVE-2016-0763.patch
CVE-2016-3092.patch
+CVE-2016-5018.patch
+CVE-2016-6794.patch
+CVE-2016-6796.patch
+CVE-2016-6797.patch
+CVE-2016-0762.patch
diff --git a/debian/tomcat7.init b/debian/tomcat7.init
index 2821a3d..35e3bb3 100644
--- a/debian/tomcat7.init
+++ b/debian/tomcat7.init
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ if [ ! -f "$CATALINA_HOME/bin/bootstrap.jar" ]; then
exit 1
fi
-POLICY_CACHE="$CATALINA_BASE/work/catalina.policy"
+POLICY_CACHE="$CATALINA_BASE/policy/catalina.policy"
if [ -z "$CATALINA_TMPDIR" ]; then
CATALINA_TMPDIR="$JVM_TMP"
@@ -172,7 +172,8 @@ catalina_sh() {
# Run the catalina.sh script as a daemon
set +e
if [ ! -f "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out ]; then
- install -o $TOMCAT7_USER -g adm -m 644 /dev/null "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out
+ # run install as tomcat7 to work around #841371
+ su $TOMCAT7_USER -s /bin/bash -c "install -m 644 /dev/null $CATALINA_BASE/logs/catalina.out"
fi
install -o $TOMCAT7_USER -g adm -m 644 /dev/null "$CATALINA_PID"
start-stop-daemon --start -b -u "$TOMCAT7_USER" -g "$TOMCAT7_GROUP" \
@@ -202,6 +203,8 @@ case "$1" in
# Regenerate POLICY_CACHE file
umask 022
+ rm -rf "$CATALINA_BASE/policy"
+ mkdir "$CATALINA_BASE/policy"
echo "// AUTO-GENERATED FILE from /etc/tomcat7/policy.d/" \
> "$POLICY_CACHE"
echo "" >> "$POLICY_CACHE"
@@ -210,11 +213,11 @@ case "$1" in
# Remove / recreate JVM_TMP directory
rm -rf "$JVM_TMP"
- mkdir -p "$JVM_TMP" || {
+ mkdir "$JVM_TMP" || {
log_failure_msg "could not create JVM temporary directory"
exit 1
}
- chown $TOMCAT7_USER "$JVM_TMP"
+ chown -h $TOMCAT7_USER "$JVM_TMP"
catalina_sh start $SECURITY
sleep 5
diff --git a/debian/tomcat7.postrm.in b/debian/tomcat7.postrm.in
index de35c3a..293ffde 100644
--- a/debian/tomcat7.postrm.in
+++ b/debian/tomcat7.postrm.in
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ LR_CONFFILE=/etc/logrotate.d/tomcat7
# Remove cached files and auto-generated catalina.policy
rm -rf /var/cache/tomcat7/*
+rm -rf /var/lib/tomcat7/policy
case "$1" in
remove)
--
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