[tomcat6] 01/01: Prepare new security release for Wheezy
Markus Koschany
apo at moszumanska.debian.org
Mon Nov 7 12:58:49 UTC 2016
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
apo pushed a commit to branch wheezy
in repository tomcat6.
commit be6c35620b29bae4d3009808303bbe8f3b76a2b1
Author: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
Date: Mon Nov 7 13:58:12 2016 +0100
Prepare new security release for Wheezy
---
debian/changelog | 32 ++++++
debian/patches/CVE-2016-0762.patch | 85 +++++++++++++++
debian/patches/CVE-2016-5018.patch | 88 ++++++++++++++++
debian/patches/CVE-2016-6794.patch | 141 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
debian/patches/CVE-2016-6796.patch | 78 ++++++++++++++
debian/patches/CVE-2016-6797.patch | 211 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
debian/patches/series | 5 +
7 files changed, 640 insertions(+)
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 28b5fbc..85928c9 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,35 @@
+tomcat6 (6.0.45+dfsg-1~deb7u3) wheezy-security; urgency=high
+
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-0762: The Realm implementations did not process the supplied
+ password if the supplied user name did not exist. This made a timing attack
+ possible to determine valid user names.
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-5018: A malicious web application was able to bypass
+ a configured SecurityManager via a Tomcat utility method that was
+ accessible to web applications.
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-6794: When a SecurityManager is configured, a web
+ application's ability to read system properties should be controlled by
+ the SecurityManager. Tomcat's system property replacement feature for
+ configuration files could be used by a malicious web application to bypass
+ the SecurityManager and read system properties that should not be visible.
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-6796: A malicious web application was able to bypass
+ a configured SecurityManager via manipulation of the configuration
+ parameters for the JSP Servlet.
+ * Fixed CVE-2016-6797: The ResourceLinkFactory did not limit web application
+ access to global JNDI resources to those resources explicitly linked to the
+ web application. Therefore, it was possible for a web application to access
+ any global JNDI resource whether an explicit ResourceLink had been
+ configured or not.
+ * CVE-2016-1240 follow-up:
+ - The previous init.d fix was vulnerable to a race condition that could
+ be exploited to make any existing file writable by the tomcat user.
+ Thanks to Paul Szabo for the report and the fix.
+ - The catalina.policy file generated on startup was affected by a similar
+ vulnerability that could be exploited to overwrite any file on the system.
+ Thanks to Paul Szabo for the report.
+ * Hardened the init.d script, thanks to Paul Szabo
+
+ -- Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org> Mon, 07 Nov 2016 13:46:30 +0100
+
tomcat6 (6.0.45+dfsg-1~deb7u2) wheezy-security; urgency=high
* Team upload.
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-0762.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-0762.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bd0052
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-0762.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2016 13:38:38 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-0762
+
+Origin: https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1758506
+---
+ java/org/apache/catalina/realm/MemoryRealm.java | 30 +++++++++++++++----------
+ java/org/apache/catalina/realm/RealmBase.java | 14 +++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/MemoryRealm.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/MemoryRealm.java
+index 56bc970..8e6bf68 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/MemoryRealm.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/MemoryRealm.java
+@@ -142,23 +142,29 @@ public class MemoryRealm extends RealmBase {
+ * @param credentials Password or other credentials to use in
+ * authenticating this username
+ */
++ @Override
+ public Principal authenticate(String username, String credentials) {
+
+- GenericPrincipal principal =
+- (GenericPrincipal) principals.get(username);
++ // No user or no credentials
++ // Can't possibly authenticate, don't bother the database then
++ if (username == null || credentials == null) {
++ return null;
++ }
++
++ GenericPrincipal principal = principals.get(username);
+
+ boolean validated = false;
+- if (principal != null && credentials != null) {
+- if (hasMessageDigest()) {
+- // Hex hashes should be compared case-insensitive
+- validated = (digest(credentials)
+- .equalsIgnoreCase(principal.getPassword()));
+- } else {
+- validated =
+- (digest(credentials).equals(principal.getPassword()));
+- }
++ String dbCredentials = null;
++ if (principal != null) {
++ dbCredentials = principal.getPassword();
+ }
+-
++ if (hasMessageDigest()) {
++ // Hex hashes should be compared case-insensitive
++ validated = (digest(credentials).equalsIgnoreCase(dbCredentials));
++ } else {
++ validated = (digest(credentials).equals(dbCredentials));
++ }
++
+ if (validated) {
+ if (log.isDebugEnabled())
+ log.debug(sm.getString("memoryRealm.authenticateSuccess", username));
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/RealmBase.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/RealmBase.java
+index 4f7c27f..cd62bf4 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/RealmBase.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/realm/RealmBase.java
+@@ -336,15 +336,19 @@ public abstract class RealmBase
+ */
+ public Principal authenticate(String username, String credentials) {
+
++ // No user or no credentials
++ // Can't possibly authenticate, don't bother the database then
++ if (username == null || credentials == null) {
++ return null;
++ }
++
+ String serverCredentials = getPassword(username);
+
+ boolean validated ;
+- if ( serverCredentials == null ) {
+- validated = false;
+- } else if(hasMessageDigest()) {
+- validated = serverCredentials.equalsIgnoreCase(digest(credentials));
++ if(hasMessageDigest()) {
++ validated = digest(credentials).equalsIgnoreCase(serverCredentials);
+ } else {
+- validated = serverCredentials.equals(credentials);
++ validated = credentials.equals(serverCredentials);
+ }
+ if(! validated ) {
+ if (containerLog.isTraceEnabled()) {
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-5018.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-5018.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d5d709
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-5018.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2016 13:31:22 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-5018
+
+Origin: https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1754904
+---
+ .../apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java | 54 +---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 53 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java b/java/org/apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java
+index 02d21dd..bdc769f 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/jasper/runtime/JspRuntimeLibrary.java
+@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+-
+ package org.apache.jasper.runtime;
+
+ import java.beans.PropertyEditor;
+@@ -60,35 +59,6 @@ public class JspRuntimeLibrary {
+ private static final String JSP_EXCEPTION
+ = "javax.servlet.jsp.jspException";
+
+- protected static class PrivilegedIntrospectHelper
+- implements PrivilegedExceptionAction {
+-
+- private Object bean;
+- private String prop;
+- private String value;
+- private ServletRequest request;
+- private String param;
+- private boolean ignoreMethodNF;
+-
+- PrivilegedIntrospectHelper(Object bean, String prop,
+- String value, ServletRequest request,
+- String param, boolean ignoreMethodNF)
+- {
+- this.bean = bean;
+- this.prop = prop;
+- this.value = value;
+- this.request = request;
+- this.param = param;
+- this.ignoreMethodNF = ignoreMethodNF;
+- }
+-
+- public Object run() throws JasperException {
+- internalIntrospecthelper(
+- bean,prop,value,request,param,ignoreMethodNF);
+- return null;
+- }
+- }
+-
+ /**
+ * Returns the value of the javax.servlet.error.exception request
+ * attribute value, if present, otherwise the value of the
+@@ -292,29 +262,7 @@ public class JspRuntimeLibrary {
+ public static void introspecthelper(Object bean, String prop,
+ String value, ServletRequest request,
+ String param, boolean ignoreMethodNF)
+- throws JasperException
+- {
+- if( Constants.IS_SECURITY_ENABLED ) {
+- try {
+- PrivilegedIntrospectHelper dp =
+- new PrivilegedIntrospectHelper(
+- bean,prop,value,request,param,ignoreMethodNF);
+- AccessController.doPrivileged(dp);
+- } catch( PrivilegedActionException pe) {
+- Exception e = pe.getException();
+- throw (JasperException)e;
+- }
+- } else {
+- internalIntrospecthelper(
+- bean,prop,value,request,param,ignoreMethodNF);
+- }
+- }
+-
+- private static void internalIntrospecthelper(Object bean, String prop,
+- String value, ServletRequest request,
+- String param, boolean ignoreMethodNF)
+- throws JasperException
+- {
++ throws JasperException {
+ Method method = null;
+ Class type = null;
+ Class propertyEditorClass = null;
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6794.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6794.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ad88e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6794.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2016 12:36:03 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-6794
+
+Origin: https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1754733
+---
+ .../apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java | 27 ++++++++++++--
+ java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java | 10 +++++
+ .../tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 java/org/apache/tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java
+index 528d906..dab7299 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/loader/WebappClassLoader.java
+@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ import org.apache.naming.resources.ProxyDirContext;
+ import org.apache.naming.resources.Resource;
+ import org.apache.naming.resources.ResourceAttributes;
+ import org.apache.tomcat.util.IntrospectionUtils;
++import org.apache.tomcat.util.security.PermissionCheck;
+
+ /**
+ * Specialized web application class loader.
+@@ -112,10 +113,8 @@ import org.apache.tomcat.util.IntrospectionUtils;
+ * @author Craig R. McClanahan
+ *
+ */
+-public class WebappClassLoader
+- extends URLClassLoader
+- implements Reloader, Lifecycle
+- {
++public class WebappClassLoader extends URLClassLoader
++ implements Reloader, Lifecycle, PermissionCheck {
+
+ protected static org.apache.juli.logging.Log log=
+ org.apache.juli.logging.LogFactory.getLog( WebappClassLoader.class );
+@@ -1711,6 +1710,26 @@ public class WebappClassLoader
+
+ }
+
++ public boolean check(Permission permission) {
++ if (!Globals.IS_SECURITY_ENABLED) {
++ return true;
++ }
++ Policy currentPolicy = Policy.getPolicy();
++ if (currentPolicy != null) {
++ ResourceEntry entry = findResourceInternal("/", "/");
++ if (entry != null) {
++ CodeSource cs = new CodeSource(
++ entry.codeBase, (java.security.cert.Certificate[]) null);
++ PermissionCollection pc = currentPolicy.getPermissions(cs);
++ if (pc.implies(permission)) {
++ return true;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++ return false;
++
++ }
++
+
+ /**
+ * Returns the search path of URLs for loading classes and resources.
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java
+index ffae93f..afa8f6a 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/digester/Digester.java
+@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ import org.xml.sax.SAXParseException;
+ import org.xml.sax.XMLReader;
+ import org.xml.sax.ext.DefaultHandler2;
+ import org.xml.sax.helpers.AttributesImpl;
++import java.security.Permission;
++import java.util.PropertyPermission;
++import org.apache.tomcat.util.security.PermissionCheck;
+
+
+ /**
+@@ -80,6 +83,13 @@ public class Digester extends DefaultHandler2 {
+ private static class SystemPropertySource
+ implements IntrospectionUtils.PropertySource {
+ public String getProperty( String key ) {
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ if (cl instanceof PermissionCheck) {
++ Permission p = new PropertyPermission(key, "read");
++ if (!((PermissionCheck) cl).check(p)) {
++ return null;
++ }
++ }
+ return System.getProperty(key);
+ }
+ }
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ba2bdd3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/security/PermissionCheck.java
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
++/*
++ * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
++ * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
++ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
++ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
++ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
++ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
++ *
++ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
++ *
++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
++ * limitations under the License.
++ */
++package org.apache.tomcat.util.security;
++
++import java.security.Permission;
++
++/**
++ * This interface is implemented by components to enable privileged code to
++ * check whether the component has a given permission.
++ * This is typically used when a privileged component (e.g. the container) is
++ * performing an action on behalf of an untrusted component (e.g. a web
++ * application) without the current thread having passed through a code source
++ * provided by the untrusted component. Because the current thread has not
++ * passed through a code source provided by the untrusted component the
++ * SecurityManager assumes the code is trusted so the standard checking
++ * mechanisms can't be used.
++ */
++public interface PermissionCheck {
++
++ /**
++ * Does this component have the given permission?
++ *
++ * @param permission The permission to test
++ *
++ * @return {@code false} if a SecurityManager is enabled and the component
++ * does not have the given permission, otherwise {@code false}
++ */
++ boolean check(Permission permission);
++}
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6796.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6796.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c0668a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6796.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2016 12:54:08 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-6796
+
+Origin: https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1758496
+---
+ conf/web.xml | 4 ++++
+ java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java | 4 ++++
+ java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties | 1 +
+ java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java | 6 ++++++
+ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/conf/web.xml b/conf/web.xml
+index 2e8815e..7062250 100644
+--- a/conf/web.xml
++++ b/conf/web.xml
+@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@
+ <!-- engineOptionsClass Allows specifying the Options class used to -->
+ <!-- configure Jasper. If not present, the default -->
+ <!-- EmbeddedServletOptions will be used. -->
++ <!-- This option is ignored when running under a -->
++ <!-- SecurityManager. -->
+ <!-- -->
+ <!-- errorOnUseBeanInvalidClassAttribute -->
+ <!-- Should Jasper issue an error when the value of -->
+@@ -238,6 +240,8 @@
+ <!-- scratchdir What scratch directory should we use when -->
+ <!-- compiling JSP pages? [default work directory -->
+ <!-- for the current web application] -->
++ <!-- This option is ignored when running under a -->
++ <!-- SecurityManager. -->
+ <!-- -->
+ <!-- suppressSmap Should the generation of SMAP info for JSR45 -->
+ <!-- debugging be suppressed? [false] -->
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java b/java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java
+index 3399a32..fa3d5f2 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/jasper/EmbeddedServletOptions.java
+@@ -586,6 +586,10 @@ public final class EmbeddedServletOptions implements Options {
+ * scratchdir
+ */
+ String dir = config.getInitParameter("scratchdir");
++ if (dir != null && Constants.IS_SECURITY_ENABLED) {
++ log.info(Localizer.getMessage("jsp.info.ignoreSetting", "scratchdir", dir));
++ dir = null;
++ }
+ if (dir != null) {
+ scratchDir = new File(dir);
+ } else {
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties b/java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties
+index 03532ea..edb02c9 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties
++++ b/java/org/apache/jasper/resources/LocalStrings.properties
+@@ -448,6 +448,7 @@ jsp.error.nested_jsproot=Nested <jsp:root>
+ jsp.error.unbalanced.endtag=The end tag \"</{0}\" is unbalanced
+ jsp.error.invalid.bean=The value for the useBean class attribute {0} is invalid.
+ jsp.error.prefix.use_before_dcl=The prefix {0} specified in this tag directive has been previously used by an action in file {1} line {2}.
++jsp.info.ignoreSetting=Ignored setting for [{0}] of [{1}] because a SecurityManager was enabled
+
+ jsp.exception=An exception occurred processing JSP page {0} at line {1}
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java b/java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java
+index 76ea446..6830093 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet.java
+@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ public class JspServlet extends HttpServlet implements PeriodicEventListener {
+ // Check for a custom Options implementation
+ String engineOptionsName =
+ config.getInitParameter("engineOptionsClass");
++ if (Constants.IS_SECURITY_ENABLED && engineOptionsName != null) {
++ log.info(Localizer.getMessage(
++ "jsp.info.ignoreSetting", "engineOptionsClass", engineOptionsName));
++ engineOptionsName = null;
++ }
++
+ if (engineOptionsName != null) {
+ // Instantiate the indicated Options implementation
+ try {
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6797.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6797.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f42f47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6797.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo at debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2016 13:20:10 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-6797
+
+Origin: https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1757285
+---
+ .../catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java | 78 ++++++++++++++--------
+ .../apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java | 60 +++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java
+index 2b8256a..cfd612f 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/core/NamingContextListener.java
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ import org.apache.naming.ResourceRef;
+ import org.apache.naming.ServiceRef;
+ import org.apache.naming.TransactionRef;
+ import org.apache.tomcat.util.modeler.Registry;
++import org.apache.naming.factory.ResourceLinkFactory;
+
+
+ /**
+@@ -280,37 +281,48 @@ public class NamingContextListener
+ if (!initialized)
+ return;
+
+- // Setting the context in read/write mode
+- ContextAccessController.setWritable(getName(), container);
+- ContextBindings.unbindContext(container, container);
++ try {
++ // Setting the context in read/write mode
++ ContextAccessController.setWritable(getName(), container);
++ ContextBindings.unbindContext(container, container);
++
++ if (container instanceof Context) {
++ ContextBindings.unbindClassLoader
++ (container, container,
++ ((Container) container).getLoader().getClassLoader());
++ }
+
+- if (container instanceof Context) {
+- ContextBindings.unbindClassLoader
+- (container, container,
+- ((Container) container).getLoader().getClassLoader());
+- }
++ if (container instanceof Server) {
++ namingResources.removePropertyChangeListener(this);
++ ContextBindings.unbindClassLoader
++ (container, container,
++ this.getClass().getClassLoader());
++ }
+
+- if (container instanceof Server) {
+- namingResources.removePropertyChangeListener(this);
+- ContextBindings.unbindClassLoader
+- (container, container,
+- this.getClass().getClassLoader());
+- }
++ ContextAccessController.unsetSecurityToken(getName(), container);
++ ContextAccessController.unsetSecurityToken(container, container);
+
+- ContextAccessController.unsetSecurityToken(getName(), container);
+- ContextAccessController.unsetSecurityToken(container, container);
++ // unregister mbeans.
++ if (!objectNames.isEmpty()) {
++ Collection<ObjectName> names = objectNames.values();
++ Registry registry = Registry.getRegistry(null, null);
++ for (ObjectName objectName : names) {
++ registry.unregisterComponent(objectName);
++ }
++ }
+
+- // unregister mbeans.
+- Collection<ObjectName> names = objectNames.values();
+- for (ObjectName objectName : names) {
+- Registry.getRegistry(null, null).unregisterComponent(objectName);
+- }
+- objectNames.clear();
++ javax.naming.Context global = getGlobalNamingContext();
++ if (global != null) {
++ ResourceLinkFactory.deregisterGlobalResourceAccess(global);
++ }
++ } finally {
++ objectNames.clear();
+
+- namingContext = null;
+- envCtx = null;
+- compCtx = null;
+- initialized = false;
++ namingContext = null;
++ envCtx = null;
++ compCtx = null;
++ initialized = false;
++ }
+
+ }
+
+@@ -1096,6 +1108,20 @@ public class NamingContextListener
+ logger.error(sm.getString("naming.bindFailed", e));
+ }
+
++ ResourceLinkFactory.registerGlobalResourceAccess(
++ getGlobalNamingContext(), resourceLink.getName(), resourceLink.getGlobal());
++ }
++
++ private javax.naming.Context getGlobalNamingContext() {
++ if (container instanceof Context) {
++ Engine e = (Engine) ((Context) container).getParent().getParent();
++ Server s = e.getService().getServer();
++ if (s instanceof StandardServer) {
++ return ((StandardServer) s).getGlobalNamingContext();
++ }
++ }
++ return null;
++
+ }
+
+
+diff --git a/java/org/apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java b/java/org/apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java
+index 6df82dd..56b1423 100644
+--- a/java/org/apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java
++++ b/java/org/apache/naming/factory/ResourceLinkFactory.java
+@@ -18,7 +18,10 @@
+
+ package org.apache.naming.factory;
+
++import java.util.HashMap;
+ import java.util.Hashtable;
++import java.util.Map;
++import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
+
+ import javax.naming.Context;
+ import javax.naming.Name;
+@@ -52,6 +55,8 @@ public class ResourceLinkFactory
+ */
+ private static Context globalContext = null;
+
++ private static Map<ClassLoader,Map<String,String>> globalResourceRegistrations =
++ new ConcurrentHashMap<ClassLoader,Map<String,String>>();
+
+ // --------------------------------------------------------- Public Methods
+
+@@ -71,6 +76,56 @@ public class ResourceLinkFactory
+ }
+
+
++ public static void registerGlobalResourceAccess(Context globalContext, String localName,
++ String globalName) {
++ validateGlobalContext(globalContext);
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ Map<String,String> registrations = globalResourceRegistrations.get(cl);
++ if (registrations == null) {
++ // Web application initialization is single threaded so this is
++ // safe.
++ registrations = new HashMap<String,String>();
++ globalResourceRegistrations.put(cl, registrations);
++ }
++ registrations.put(localName, globalName);
++ }
++
++
++ public static void deregisterGlobalResourceAccess(Context globalContext, String localName) {
++ validateGlobalContext(globalContext);
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ Map<String,String> registrations = globalResourceRegistrations.get(cl);
++ if (registrations != null) {
++ registrations.remove(localName);
++ }
++ }
++
++
++ public static void deregisterGlobalResourceAccess(Context globalContext) {
++ validateGlobalContext(globalContext);
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ globalResourceRegistrations.remove(cl);
++ }
++
++
++ private static void validateGlobalContext(Context globalContext) {
++ if (ResourceLinkFactory.globalContext != null &&
++ ResourceLinkFactory.globalContext != globalContext) {
++ throw new SecurityException("Caller provided invalid global context");
++ }
++ }
++
++
++ private static boolean validateGlobalResourceAccess(String globalName) {
++ ClassLoader cl = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
++ Map<String,String> registrations = globalResourceRegistrations.get(cl);
++ if (registrations != null && registrations.containsValue(globalName)) {
++ return true;
++ }
++ return false;
++ }
++
++
+ // -------------------------------------------------- ObjectFactory Methods
+
+
+@@ -96,6 +151,11 @@ public class ResourceLinkFactory
+ RefAddr refAddr = ref.get(ResourceLinkRef.GLOBALNAME);
+ if (refAddr != null) {
+ globalName = refAddr.getContent().toString();
++ // Confirm that the current web application is currently configured
++ // to access the specified global resource
++ if (!validateGlobalResourceAccess(globalName)) {
++ return null;
++ }
+ Object result = null;
+ result = globalContext.lookup(globalName);
+ // FIXME: Check type
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index f4fb4ad..5aa3fc5 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -7,3 +7,8 @@
0007-add-OSGi-headers-to-servlet-api.patch
0008-add-OSGI-headers-to-jsp-api.patch
0010-Use-java.security.policy-file-in-catalina.sh.patch
+CVE-2016-0762.patch
+CVE-2016-6794.patch
+CVE-2016-6797.patch
+CVE-2016-5018.patch
+CVE-2016-6796.patch
--
Alioth's /usr/local/bin/git-commit-notice on /srv/git.debian.org/git/pkg-java/tomcat6.git
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