[Pkg-openssl-changes] r698 - in openssl/branches/squeeze/debian: . patches
Kurt Roeckx
kroeckx at moszumanska.debian.org
Sat Nov 1 15:26:07 UTC 2014
Author: kroeckx
Date: 2014-11-01 15:26:07 +0000 (Sat, 01 Nov 2014)
New Revision: 698
Added:
openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3567.patch
openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3568.patch
openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3569.patch
openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/fallback_scsv.patch
Modified:
openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/changelog
openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/series
Log:
* Fix CVE-2014-3567
* Fix CVE-2014-3568
* Add Fallback SCSV support to mitigate CVE-2014-3566
* Fix CVE-2014-3569
Modified: openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/changelog
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/changelog 2014-10-15 17:57:43 UTC (rev 697)
+++ openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/changelog 2014-11-01 15:26:07 UTC (rev 698)
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+openssl (0.9.8o-4squeeze18) squeeze-lts; urgency=medium
+
+ * Fix CVE-2014-3567
+ * Fix CVE-2014-3568
+ * Add Fallback SCSV support to mitigate CVE-2014-3566
+ * Fix CVE-2014-3569
+
+ -- Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx.be> Sat, 01 Nov 2014 15:04:34 +0100
+
openssl (0.9.8o-4squeeze17) squeeze-lts; urgency=medium
* Fix for CVE-2014-3510
Added: openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3567.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3567.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3567.patch 2014-11-01 15:26:07 UTC (rev 698)
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 8638eb9..68c527d 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1101,7 +1101,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
++ {
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ goto tickerr;
++ }
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
Added: openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3568.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3568.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3568.patch 2014-11-01 15:26:07 UTC (rev 698)
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+index 910682d..1231208 100644
+--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+@@ -72,9 +72,11 @@ static SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_client_method());
+ #endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_client_method());
+- else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
++#endif
++ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_client_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+@@ -533,6 +535,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ /* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
+
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+@@ -547,7 +550,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
+ s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
+ }
+- else if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
++ else
++#endif
++ if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ {
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+index df08873..3d0069b 100644
+--- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+@@ -124,9 +124,11 @@ static SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_server_method());
+ #endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_server_method());
+- else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
++#endif
++ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_server_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+@@ -557,6 +559,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
+ {
+ /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
++ s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
++ if (s->method == NULL)
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
+
+@@ -580,11 +588,6 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
+ s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
+ }
+-
+- if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+- s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
+- else
+- s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
+ #if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
+ s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
+ #endif
+diff --git a/util/mk1mf.pl b/util/mk1mf.pl
+index a21f6f4..0ddd2ca 100755
+--- a/util/mk1mf.pl
++++ b/util/mk1mf.pl
+@@ -786,12 +786,6 @@ foreach (values %lib_nam)
+ $lib_obj=$lib_obj{$_};
+ local($slib)=$shlib;
+
+- if (($_ eq "SSL") && $no_ssl2 && $no_ssl3)
+- {
+- $rules.="\$(O_SSL):\n\n";
+- next;
+- }
+-
+ if ((!$fips && ($_ eq "CRYPTO")) || ($fips && ($_ eq "FIPS")))
+ {
+ if ($cpuid_asm_obj ne "")
Added: openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3569.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3569.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/CVE-2014-3569.patch 2014-11-01 15:26:07 UTC (rev 698)
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+index 3d0069b..5486a36 100644
+--- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+@@ -559,12 +559,14 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
+ {
+ /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
+- s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+- if (s->method == NULL)
++ SSL_METHOD *new_method;
++ new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
++ if (new_method == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
++ s->method = new_method;
+
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
+
Added: openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/fallback_scsv.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/fallback_scsv.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/fallback_scsv.patch 2014-11-01 15:26:07 UTC (rev 698)
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
+index b1739f6..8e9952d 100644
+--- a/CHANGES
++++ b/CHANGES
+@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8zb and 0.9.8zc [xx XXX xxxx]
+
++ *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
++ Client applications doing fallback retries should call
++ SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
++ (CVE-2014-3566)
++ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
++
+ *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
+
+ Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
+index 54a32ec..74790f4 100644
+--- a/apps/s_client.c
++++ b/apps/s_client.c
+@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -ssl3 - just use SSLv3\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n");
++ BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
+@@ -339,6 +340,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ char *sess_out = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr peer;
+ int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
++ int fallback_scsv = 0;
+ int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
+ long socket_mtu = 0;
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+@@ -488,6 +490,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
+ }
+ #endif
++ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
++ {
++ fallback_scsv = 1;
++ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0)
+ bugs=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
+@@ -778,6 +784,10 @@ bad:
+ SSL_set_session(con, sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ }
++
++ if (fallback_scsv)
++ SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (servername != NULL)
+ {
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.ec b/crypto/err/openssl.ec
+index 1a580c5..5fc31ea 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.ec
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.ec
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
++R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110
+diff --git a/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+index 96307a9..5736e28 100644
+--- a/doc/apps/s_client.pod
++++ b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
+ [B<-no_ssl2>]
+ [B<-no_ssl3>]
+ [B<-no_tls1>]
++[B<-fallback_scsv>]
+ [B<-bugs>]
+ [B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+ [B<-starttls protocol>]
+@@ -198,10 +199,13 @@ these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
+ the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
+ servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate.
+
+-Unfortunately there are a lot of ancient and broken servers in use which
++Unfortunately there are still ancient and broken servers in use which
+ cannot handle this technique and will fail to connect. Some servers only
+-work if TLS is turned off with the B<-no_tls> option others will only
+-support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option.
++work if TLS is turned off.
++
++=item B<-fallback_scsv>
++
++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+
+ =item B<-bugs>
+
+diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
+index 9822544..0ee2343 100644
+--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
++++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
+@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ deal with read/write operations returning without success report. The
+ flag SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY will cause read/write operations to only
+ return after the handshake and successful completion.
+
++=item SSL_MODE_FALLBACK_SCSV
++
++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
++version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
++
+ =back
+
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c
+index c872cb6..8427798 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c
+@@ -305,6 +305,16 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+ case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
+ ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
+ break;
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
++#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
++# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
++#endif
++ /* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
++ * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
++ return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
+
+ default:
+ ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
+diff --git a/ssl/dtls1.h b/ssl/dtls1.h
+index 697ff6e..a1b1884 100644
+--- a/ssl/dtls1.h
++++ b/ssl/dtls1.h
+@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ extern "C" {
+ #endif
+
+ #define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF
++#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_VERSION
++
+ #define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100
+
+ #if 0
+@@ -262,4 +264,3 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
+ }
+ #endif
+ #endif
+-
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+index 830eff0..910682d 100644
+--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+@@ -559,6 +559,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
++
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
+ {
+ /* fatal alert */
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+index e544853..df08873 100644
+--- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+@@ -398,6 +398,9 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ }
+ #endif
+
++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
++
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
+ {
+ /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
+diff --git a/ssl/s2_lib.c b/ssl/s2_lib.c
+index 10751b2..359498c 100644
+--- a/ssl/s2_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/s2_lib.c
+@@ -314,6 +314,8 @@ long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
+ ret=s->hit;
+ break;
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -362,7 +364,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
+ if (p != NULL)
+ {
+ l=c->id;
+- if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
++ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
+ p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
+ p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
+ p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
+index 736bfac..f4391ec 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
+@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ default: return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+-
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
+index fc723a0..fcdbe47 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
+@@ -1986,6 +1986,29 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+ break;
+
+ #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
++
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
++ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
++ return 1;
++ /* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD
++ * (not at its highest protocol version). */
++ if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version)
++ {
++#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_VERSION
++# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_VERSION.
++#endif
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
++ return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
++ return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
++ return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
++ }
++ return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
++
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -2274,6 +2297,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+ break;
+
+ #endif
++
+ default:
+ return(0);
+ }
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
+index 5f2a04e..6435c59 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl.h
+@@ -563,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
+ #define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004L
+ /* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */
+ #define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L
++/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
++ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
++#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
+
+
+ /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
+@@ -1209,6 +1213,7 @@ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
+ #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+ #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
+ #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
++#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */
+
+ #define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0
+ #define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1
+@@ -1298,6 +1303,8 @@ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
+ #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS 77
+ #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78
+
++#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119
++
+ #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
+ #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
+@@ -1945,6 +1952,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
+ #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
+ #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
++#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373
+ #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
+ #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
+ #define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278
+@@ -2072,6 +2080,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
++#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
+index de5e559..76f922e 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
+@@ -129,9 +129,14 @@
+ extern "C" {
+ #endif
+
+-/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
++/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
++ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */
+ #define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF
+
++/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
++ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */
++#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600
++
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
+index 9e28dfd..2896f58 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
+@@ -341,6 +341,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE) ,"invalid purpose"},
+@@ -468,6 +469,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+index 47a0c7c..5db0b52 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -1296,6 +1296,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
+
+ if (sk == NULL) return(0);
+ q=p;
++ if (put_cb == NULL)
++ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
+
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+@@ -1305,24 +1307,36 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
+ continue;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+- j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
++ j = put_cb(c,p);
+ p+=j;
+ }
+- /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
+- * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
+- */
+- if (p != q && !s->new_session)
++ /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
++ * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
++ if (p != q)
+ {
+- static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ if (!s->new_session)
+ {
+- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+- };
+- j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
+- p+=j;
++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ {
++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
++ };
++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
++ p+=j;
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
+ #endif
+- }
++ }
++
++ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
++ {
++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ {
++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
++ };
++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
++ p+=j;
++ }
++ }
+
+ return(p-q);
+ }
+@@ -1333,11 +1347,12 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ int i,n;
++
+ if (s->s3)
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+ n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+- if ((num%n) != 0)
++ if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return(NULL);
+@@ -1352,7 +1367,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
+
+ for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
+ {
+- /* Check for SCSV */
++ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+@@ -1372,6 +1387,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
+ continue;
+ }
+
++ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
++ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
++ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
++ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
++ {
++ /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
++ * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
++ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
++ if (s->s3)
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
+ p+=n;
+ if (c != NULL)
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+index eb4acef..4b9383a 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
+@@ -855,6 +855,7 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
+ (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+@@ -862,4 +863,3 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
+ default: return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+-
+diff --git a/ssl/tls1.h b/ssl/tls1.h
+index 47f25af..d6f5aee 100644
+--- a/ssl/tls1.h
++++ b/ssl/tls1.h
+@@ -80,17 +80,24 @@ extern "C" {
+
+ #define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0
+
++#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
++#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
+ #define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303
+-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
++/* TLS 1.1 and 1.2 are not supported by this version of OpenSSL, so
++ * TLS_MAX_VERSION indicates TLS 1.0 regardless of the above
++ * definitions. (s23_clnt.c and s23_srvr.c have an OPENSSL_assert()
++ * check that would catch the error if TLS_MAX_VERSION was too low.)
++ */
++#define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_VERSION
++
++#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
++#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
+
+-#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
+ #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+ #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02
+
+-#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
+-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
+
+ #define TLS1_get_version(s) \
+ ((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
+@@ -108,6 +115,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */
++#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90
+ #define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
+ /* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
+@@ -419,6 +427,3 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+ }
+ #endif
+ #endif
+-
+-
+-
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+index 5db0b52..542ab5a 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -1401,6 +1401,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ goto err;
+ }
++ p += n;
+ continue;
+ }
+
Modified: openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/series
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/series 2014-10-15 17:57:43 UTC (rev 697)
+++ openssl/branches/squeeze/debian/patches/series 2014-11-01 15:26:07 UTC (rev 698)
@@ -56,3 +56,7 @@
Fix-protocol-downgrade-bug-in-case-of-fragmented-pac.patch
Fix-DTLS-anonymous-EC-DH-denial-of-service.patch
Fix-OID-handling.patch
+fallback_scsv.patch
+CVE-2014-3568.patch
+CVE-2014-3567.patch
+CVE-2014-3569.patch
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