[Pkg-openssl-changes] r697 - in openssl/branches/wheezy/debian: . patches
Kurt Roeckx
kroeckx at moszumanska.debian.org
Wed Oct 15 17:57:43 UTC 2014
Author: kroeckx
Date: 2014-10-15 17:57:43 +0000 (Wed, 15 Oct 2014)
New Revision: 697
Added:
openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-for-SRTP-Memory-Leak.patch
openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-for-session-tickets-memory-leak.patch
openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-no-ssl3-configuration-option.patch
openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Support-TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.patch
Modified:
openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/changelog
openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/series
Log:
* Fixes CVE-2014-3513
* Fixes CVE-2014-3567
* Add Fallback SCSV support to mitigate CVE-2014-3566
* Fixes CVE-2014-3568
Modified: openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/changelog
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/changelog 2014-10-15 17:43:05 UTC (rev 696)
+++ openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/changelog 2014-10-15 17:57:43 UTC (rev 697)
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+openssl (1.0.1e-2+deb7u13) wheezy-security; urgency=medium
+
+ * Fixes CVE-2014-3513
+ * Fixes CVE-2014-3567
+ * Add Fallback SCSV support to mitigate CVE-2014-3566
+ * Fixes CVE-2014-3568
+
+ -- Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx.be> Wed, 15 Oct 2014 19:45:25 +0200
+
openssl (1.0.1e-2+deb7u12) wheezy-security; urgency=medium
* Fix for CVE-2014-3512
Added: openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-for-SRTP-Memory-Leak.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-for-SRTP-Memory-Leak.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-for-SRTP-Memory-Leak.patch 2014-10-15 17:57:43 UTC (rev 697)
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+From 2b0532f3984324ebe1236a63d15893792384328d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 01:20:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Fix for SRTP Memory Leak
+
+CVE-2014-3513
+
+This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an origi
+issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the i
+was performed by the OpenSSL team.
+
+The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_srtp.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------------------
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 9 +++---
+ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+index ab9c419..535539b 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_srtp.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
+- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
+- {
+- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
+-
+- p=srtp_known_profiles;
+- while(p->name)
+- {
+- if(p->id == profile_num)
+- {
+- *pptr=p;
+- return 0;
+- }
+- p++;
+- }
+-
+- return 1;
+- }
+-
+ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
+@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTE
+ if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
+ col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
+ {
++ if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
++ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
++ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max
+
+ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
+ {
+- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
+- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
++ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
++ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
+ int ct;
+ int mki_len;
+- int i,j;
+- int id;
+- int ret;
++ int i, srtp_pref;
++ unsigned int id;
+
+ /* Length value + the MKI length */
+ if(len < 3)
+@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++ srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
++ s->srtp_profile = NULL;
++ /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
++ srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
+
+- clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
+-
+ while(ct)
+ {
+ n2s(d,id);
+ ct-=2;
+ len-=2;
+
+- if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
++ /*
++ * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
++ * current match.
++ * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
++ * does nothing.
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
+ {
+- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
+- }
+- else
+- {
+- ; /* Ignore */
++ sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
++ if (sprof->id == id)
++ {
++ s->srtp_profile = sprof;
++ srtp_pref = i;
++ break;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+- srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+-
+- /* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
+- configured then the outer loop doesn't run
+- (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
+- and so we just return without doing anything */
+- for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
+- {
+- sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
+-
+- for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
+- {
+- cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
+-
+- if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
+- {
+- s->srtp_profile=sprof;
+- *al=0;
+- ret=0;
+- goto done;
+- }
+- }
+- }
+-
+- ret=0;
+-
+-done:
+- if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
+-
+- return ret;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 022a4fb..12ee3c9 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
++ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+ {
+ int el;
+
+@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- if(s->srtp_profile)
++ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
+ {
+ int el;
+
+@@ -1444,7 +1444,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
+
+ /* session ticket processed earlier */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
++ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
++ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ {
+ if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ al))
+@@ -1698,7 +1699,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
+ }
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
++ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ {
+ if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ al))
+--
+2.1.1
+
Added: openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-for-session-tickets-memory-leak.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-for-session-tickets-memory-leak.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-for-session-tickets-memory-leak.patch 2014-10-15 17:57:43 UTC (rev 697)
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 7fd4ce6a997be5f5c9e744ac527725c2850de203 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve at openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 01:53:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Fix for session tickets memory leak.
+
+CVE-2014-3567
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 5dc6070a03779cd524f0e67f76c945cb0ac38320)
+---
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 12ee3c9..d6aff4b 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -2348,7 +2348,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
++ {
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return 2;
++ }
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+--
+2.1.1
+
Added: openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-no-ssl3-configuration-option.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-no-ssl3-configuration-option.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Fix-no-ssl3-configuration-option.patch 2014-10-15 17:57:43 UTC (rev 697)
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From 26a59d9b46574e457870197dffa802871b4c8fc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Geoff Thorpe <geoff at openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 03:25:50 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Fix no-ssl3 configuration option
+
+CVE-2014-3568
+
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia at openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/s23_clnt.c | 9 +++++++--
+ ssl/s23_srvr.c | 18 +++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+index d4e43c3..86ab3de 100644
+--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+@@ -125,9 +125,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_client_method());
+ #endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_client_method());
+- else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
++#endif
++ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_client_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
+@@ -698,6 +700,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ /* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
+
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+@@ -712,7 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
+ s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
+ }
+- else if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
++ else
++#endif
++ if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ {
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+index 567a6b1..93ca7d5 100644
+--- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+@@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_server_method());
+ #endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_server_method());
+- else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
++#endif
++ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_server_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
+@@ -600,6 +602,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
+ {
+ /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
++ s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
++ if (s->method == NULL)
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
+
+@@ -627,14 +635,6 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
+ s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
+ }
+- if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+- s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
+- else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+- s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
+- else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+- s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
+- else
+- s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
+ #if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
+ s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
+ #endif
+--
+2.1.1
+
Added: openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Support-TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Support-TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/Support-TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.patch 2014-10-15 17:57:43 UTC (rev 697)
@@ -0,0 +1,534 @@
+From 6bfe55380abbf7528e04e59f18921bd6c896af1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bodo Moeller <bodo at openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 04:05:42 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
+---
+ CHANGES | 6 ++++++
+ apps/s_client.c | 10 +++++++++
+ crypto/err/openssl.ec | 1 +
+ ssl/d1_lib.c | 10 +++++++++
+ ssl/dtls1.h | 3 ++-
+ ssl/s23_clnt.c | 3 +++
+ ssl/s23_srvr.c | 3 +++
+ ssl/s2_lib.c | 4 +++-
+ ssl/s3_enc.c | 2 +-
+ ssl/s3_lib.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ ssl/ssl.h | 9 ++++++++
+ ssl/ssl3.h | 7 +++++-
+ ssl/ssl_err.c | 2 ++
+ ssl/ssl_lib.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ ssl/t1_enc.c | 1 +
+ ssl/tls1.h | 15 +++++++------
+ 16 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/apps/s_client.c 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c 2014-10-15 17:48:07.272419336 +0000
+@@ -335,6 +335,7 @@
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_1 - just use TLSv1.1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n");
++ BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
+@@ -615,6 +616,7 @@
+ char *sess_out = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr peer;
+ int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
++ int fallback_scsv = 0;
+ int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
+ long socket_mtu = 0;
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+@@ -829,6 +831,10 @@
+ socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
+ }
+ #endif
++ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
++ {
++ fallback_scsv = 1;
++ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0)
+ bugs=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
+@@ -1233,6 +1239,10 @@
+ SSL_set_session(con, sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ }
++
++ if (fallback_scsv)
++ SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (servername != NULL)
+ {
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/err/openssl.ec
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/crypto/err/openssl.ec 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/err/openssl.ec 2014-10-15 17:46:43.878259185 +0000
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
++R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
+ R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/d1_lib.c 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c 2014-10-15 17:46:43.878259185 +0000
+@@ -262,6 +262,16 @@
+ case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
+ ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
+ break;
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
++#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
++# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
++#endif
++ /* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
++ * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
++ return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
+
+ default:
+ ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/dtls1.h 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h 2014-10-15 17:46:43.878259185 +0000
+@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@
+ #endif
+
+ #define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF
++#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_VERSION
++
+ #define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100
+
+ #if 0
+@@ -284,4 +286,3 @@
+ }
+ #endif
+ #endif
+-
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2014-10-15 17:46:43.878259185 +0000
+@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@
+ goto err;
+ }
+
++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
++
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
+ {
+ /* fatal alert */
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2014-10-15 17:46:21.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2014-10-15 17:46:43.878259185 +0000
+@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@
+ }
+ }
+
++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
++
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
+ {
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/s2_lib.c 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c 2014-10-15 17:46:43.878259185 +0000
+@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
+ ret=s->hit;
+ break;
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@
+ if (p != NULL)
+ {
+ l=c->id;
+- if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
++ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
+ p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
+ p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
+ p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/s3_enc.c 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c 2014-10-15 17:46:43.878259185 +0000
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ default: return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+-
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c 2014-10-15 17:46:21.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c 2014-10-15 17:46:43.878259185 +0000
+@@ -3355,6 +3355,33 @@
+ #endif
+
+ #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
++
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
++ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
++ return 1;
++ /* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD
++ * (not at its highest protocol version). */
++ if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version)
++ {
++#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
++# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
++#endif
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
++ return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
++ return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
++ return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
++ return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
++ return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
++ }
++ return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
++
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -3714,6 +3741,7 @@
+ break;
+ #endif
+ #endif
++
+ default:
+ return(0);
+ }
+@@ -4291,4 +4319,3 @@
+ return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+ return alg2;
+ }
+-
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2014-10-15 17:46:21.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h 2014-10-15 17:50:19.817503265 +0000
+@@ -645,6 +645,10 @@
+ * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
+ * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
+ #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
++/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
++ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
++#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
+
+ /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
+ * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
+@@ -1503,6 +1507,7 @@
+ #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+ #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
+ #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
++#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */
+
+ #define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0
+ #define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1
+@@ -1613,6 +1618,8 @@
+ #define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82
+ #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83
+
++#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119
++
+ #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
+ #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
+@@ -2367,6 +2374,7 @@
+ #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
+ #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
+ #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
++#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373
+ #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
+ #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
+ #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
+@@ -2513,6 +2521,7 @@
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
++#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-10-15 17:46:21.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-10-15 17:46:43.882259097 +0000
+@@ -128,9 +128,14 @@
+ extern "C" {
+ #endif
+
+-/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
++/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
++ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */
+ #define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF
+
++/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
++ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */
++#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600
++
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c 2014-10-15 17:46:21.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c 2014-10-15 17:46:43.882259097 +0000
+@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"},
+@@ -529,6 +530,7 @@
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2014-10-15 17:46:21.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2014-10-15 17:46:43.882259097 +0000
+@@ -1383,6 +1383,8 @@
+
+ if (sk == NULL) return(0);
+ q=p;
++ if (put_cb == NULL)
++ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
+
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+@@ -1407,24 +1409,36 @@
+ !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+ continue;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+- j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
++ j = put_cb(c,p);
+ p+=j;
+ }
+- /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
+- * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
+- */
+- if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
++ /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
++ * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
++ if (p != q)
+ {
+- static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ if (!s->renegotiate)
+ {
+- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+- };
+- j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
+- p+=j;
++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ {
++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
++ };
++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
++ p+=j;
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
+ #endif
+- }
++ }
++
++ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
++ {
++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ {
++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
++ };
++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
++ p+=j;
++ }
++ }
+
+ return(p-q);
+ }
+@@ -1435,11 +1449,12 @@
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ int i,n;
++
+ if (s->s3)
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+ n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+- if ((num%n) != 0)
++ if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return(NULL);
+@@ -1454,7 +1469,7 @@
+
+ for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
+ {
+- /* Check for SCSV */
++ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+@@ -1474,6 +1489,23 @@
+ continue;
+ }
+
++ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
++ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
++ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
++ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
++ {
++ /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
++ * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
++ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
++ if (s->s3)
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
+ p+=n;
+ if (c != NULL)
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/t1_enc.c 2014-10-15 17:46:21.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c 2014-10-15 17:46:43.882259097 +0000
+@@ -1244,6 +1244,7 @@
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
+ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
+ (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/ssl/tls1.h 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h 2014-10-15 17:46:43.882259097 +0000
+@@ -159,17 +159,19 @@
+
+ #define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0
+
++#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
++#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
+ #define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303
+-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
++#define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION
++
++#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
++#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
+
+-#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
+ #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+ #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02
+
+-#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
+-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
+
+ #define TLS1_get_version(s) \
+ ((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
+@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@
+ #define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */
++#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90
+ #define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
+ /* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/doc/apps/s_client.pod 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod 2014-10-15 17:46:43.882259097 +0000
+@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
+ [B<-no_ssl2>]
+ [B<-no_ssl3>]
+ [B<-no_tls1>]
++[B<-no_tls1_1>]
++[B<-no_tls1_2>]
++[B<-fallback_scsv>]
+ [B<-bugs>]
+ [B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+ [B<-starttls protocol>]
+@@ -176,16 +179,19 @@
+ given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
+ 1a2b3c4d.
+
+-=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>
++=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
+
+ these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
+ the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
+ servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate.
+
+-Unfortunately there are a lot of ancient and broken servers in use which
++Unfortunately there are still ancient and broken servers in use which
+ cannot handle this technique and will fail to connect. Some servers only
+-work if TLS is turned off with the B<-no_tls> option others will only
+-support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option.
++work if TLS is turned off.
++
++=item B<-fallback_scsv>
++
++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+
+ =item B<-bugs>
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1e.orig/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod 2013-02-11 15:26:04.000000000 +0000
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod 2014-10-15 17:46:43.882259097 +0000
+@@ -71,6 +71,12 @@
+ save around 34k per idle SSL connection.
+ This flag has no effect on SSL v2 connections, or on DTLS connections.
+
++=item SSL_MODE_FALLBACK_SCSV
++
++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
++version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
++
+ =back
+
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
Modified: openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/series
===================================================================
--- openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/series 2014-10-15 17:43:05 UTC (rev 696)
+++ openssl/branches/wheezy/debian/patches/series 2014-10-15 17:57:43 UTC (rev 697)
@@ -68,4 +68,8 @@
Fix-SRP-ciphersuite-DoS-vulnerability.patch
Fix-SRP-buffer-overrun-vulnerability.patch
Check-SRP-parameters-early.patch
+Support-TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.patch
+Fix-for-SRTP-Memory-Leak.patch
+Fix-for-session-tickets-memory-leak.patch
+Fix-no-ssl3-configuration-option.patch
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