[Pkg-privacy-commits] [nautilus-wipe] 78/224: Documentation formatting
Ulrike Uhlig
u-guest at moszumanska.debian.org
Thu Jul 7 19:45:36 UTC 2016
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
u-guest pushed a commit to branch master
in repository nautilus-wipe.
commit 6576e327d1cd5acb11e0a657481c8a30d88a49b4
Author: Colomban Wendling <ban at herbesfolles.org>
Date: Tue Mar 30 17:12:36 2010 +0200
Documentation formatting
---
help/C/nautilus-srm.txt | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/help/C/nautilus-srm.txt b/help/C/nautilus-srm.txt
index 47f0093..986ecf2 100644
--- a/help/C/nautilus-srm.txt
+++ b/help/C/nautilus-srm.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-nautilus-secure-delete Documentation
+% nautilus-secure-delete Documentation
# Short description
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from `nautilus` using the `secure-delete` program written by van Hauser /
THC[1].
[1]. Secure-delete, van Hauser / THC <vh at thc.org>, 1997-2003
- (http://www.thc.org)
+ <http://www.thc.org>
# An introduction to data deletion
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ storage media. It's thus also useful to wipe all the available free
space of a storage media.
[2]. Peter Gutmann: Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State
- Memory, 6th Usenix Security Symposium, 1996
- (http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html)
+ Memory, 6th Usenix Security Symposium, 1996
+ <http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html>
## Limitations
@@ -88,20 +88,20 @@ nautilus-secure-delete enables you to wipe files and free disk space
from `nautilus` using the `secure-delete` program written by van Hauser
/ THC [3]
- The deletion process is as follows:
-
- 1. The overwriting procedure (in the secure mode) does a 38 times
- overwriting. After each pass, the disk cache is flushed.
- 2. truncating the file, so that an attacker don't know which
- disk blocks belonged to the file.
- 3. renaming of the file, so that an attacker can't draw any conclusion
- from the filename on the contents of the deleted file.
- 4. finally deleting the file (unlink).
-
- (`secure-delete` documentation)
+> The deletion process is as follows:
+>
+> 1. The overwriting procedure (in the secure mode) does a 38 times
+> overwriting. After each pass, the disk cache is flushed.
+> 2. truncating the file, so that an attacker don't know which
+> disk blocks belonged to the file.
+> 3. renaming of the file, so that an attacker can't draw any conclusion
+> from the filename on the contents of the deleted file.
+> 4. finally deleting the file (unlink).
+>
+> (`secure-delete` documentation)
[3]. Secure-delete, van Hauser / THC <vh at thc.org>, 1997-2003
- (http://www.thc.org)
+ <http://www.thc.org>
# Using `nautilus-secure-delete`
@@ -157,25 +157,32 @@ introduction to data deletion]].
You can configure the number of times that the data to be wiped is overwritten
by new data.
-38: Overwriting the data 38 times should prevent data recovery through
- magnetic analysis of the hard drive surface. This is achieved by the
- following procedure:
- 1x overwrite with 0xff
- 5x random passes
- 27x overwriting with special values to make the recovery from MFM and
- RLL encoded hard disks hard/impossible - see Gutmann's paper on that
- which is also included.
- 5x random passes
+38
+
+: Overwriting the data 38 times should prevent data recovery through
+ magnetic analysis of the hard drive surface. This is achieved by the
+ following procedure:
+
+ - 1x overwrite with 0xff
+ - 5x random passes
+ - 27x overwriting with special values to make the recovery from MFM and
+ RLL encoded hard disks hard/impossible - see Gutmann's paper on that
+ which is also included.
+ - 5x random passes
+
+ This is the default value.
+
+2
- This is the default value.
+: Only two passes are written: one mode with 0xff and a final mode random
+ values. [FIXME: implications]
-2: Only two passes are written: one mode with 0xff and a final mode random
- values. [FIXME: implications]
+1
-1: Only one random pass is written. Overwriting the data only one time should
- prevent from data recovery by analyzing raw data written on the storage
- media, but is useless against magnetic analysis of the hard drive surface.
+: Only one random pass is written. Overwriting the data only one time should
+ prevent from data recovery by analyzing raw data written on the storage
+ media, but is useless against magnetic analysis of the hard drive surface.
## Fast and insecure mode (no /dev/urandom, no sync)
--
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