[Pkg-privacy-maintainers] Bug#836266: Bug#836266: Bug#836266: Bug#836266: Bug#836266: dirmngr: Please disable "use-tor" by default.

[intrigeri]

Hi!

Antoine Beaupré:
> I know this is not Parcimonie's fault. It's gnupg's fault or, more
> precisely, dirmngr's, but it seems difficult to change things over
> there: this would require rewriting dirmngr's network routines

… at least so they're network-status aware and don't treat "my system
is offline" as "the keyserver is down".

> or reimplementing parcimonie within dirmngr itself.

Sure, that would be ideal. Note that it *also* requires fixing dirmngr.

> Instead, I've started thinking about what a parcimonie rewrite would
> look like, one that would *not* depend on dirmngr (or, in fact, any
> specific OpenPGP implementation). If you permit, I would like to use
> this space to brainstorm such a design […]

I'm glad you're bringing such out-of-the-box thinking in this space!
It's refreshing. I did not put much thought into it yet but at first
glance, your design makes sense to me.

> All this doesn't seem that complicated to me. The tricky bit is the gate
> to keep garbage and hostile keys from going into the keyring.

Agreed, that was my concern as well.

> I would welcome feedback on how this could be done, or if it's just an
> incredibly stupid idea.

I'll happily let you reuse the parcimonie name once you have it
working with good enough™ backwards compatibility with the
current interfaces.

> Thanks, and sorry for hijacking this thread with such wild ideas. :)

By all means, please keep going wild :)

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri