[Pkg-samba-maint] r1736 - branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches
bubulle at alioth.debian.org
bubulle at alioth.debian.org
Sat Mar 8 21:29:16 UTC 2008
Author: bubulle
Date: 2008-03-08 21:29:16 +0000 (Sat, 08 Mar 2008)
New Revision: 1736
Modified:
branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/autoconf.patch
branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-assignpaths.patch
branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-filespaths-debatable.patch
branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-filespaths.patch
branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-newpaths.patch
branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/smbpasswd-syslog.patch
branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/smbstatus-locking.patch
Log:
Here's what I come up with right now...but doesn't compile well...:)
Modified: branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/autoconf.patch
===================================================================
--- branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/autoconf.patch 2008-03-08 11:49:26 UTC (rev 1735)
+++ branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/autoconf.patch 2008-03-08 21:29:16 UTC (rev 1736)
@@ -2087,8 +2087,8 @@
- case "$withval" in
+ withval=$with_fhs; case "$withval" in
yes)
-- lockdir="\${VARDIR}/run/samba"
-+ lockdir="\${VARDIR}/lib/samba"
+- lockdir="\${VARDIR}/lib/samba"
++ lockdir="\${VARDIR}/run/samba"
piddir="\${VARDIR}/run"
mandir="\${prefix}/share/man"
logfilebase="\${VARDIR}/log/samba"
@@ -2096,11 +2096,11 @@
test "${libdir}" || libdir="\${prefix}/lib/samba"
configdir="\${sysconfdir}/samba"
swatdir="\${DATADIR}/samba/swat"
-- codepagedir="\${DATADIR}/samba"
-+ codepagedir="\${LIBDIR}"
+- codepagedir="\${LIBDIR}"
++ codepagedir="\${DATADIR}/samba"
statedir="\${VARDIR}/lib/samba"
-- cachedir="\${VARDIR}/cache/samba"
-+ cachedir="\${VARDIR}/lib/samba"
+- cachedir="\${VARDIR}/lib/samba"
++ cachedir="\${VARDIR}/cache/samba"
cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
#define FHS_COMPATIBLE 1
Modified: branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-assignpaths.patch
===================================================================
--- branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-assignpaths.patch 2008-03-08 11:49:26 UTC (rev 1735)
+++ branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-assignpaths.patch 2008-03-08 21:29:16 UTC (rev 1736)
@@ -35,20 +35,20 @@
{"pid directory", P_STRING, P_GLOBAL, &Globals.szPidDir, NULL, NULL, FLAG_ADVANCED},
#ifdef WITH_UTMP
{"utmp directory", P_STRING, P_GLOBAL, &Globals.szUtmpDir, NULL, NULL, FLAG_ADVANCED},
-Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/configure
+Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/m4/check_path.m4
===================================================================
---- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/configure
-+++ samba-3.2.0pre2/source/configure
-@@ -1607,7 +1607,7 @@
- withval="$with_fhs"
- case "$withval" in
+--- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/m4/check_path.m4
++++ samba-3.2.0pre2/source/m4/check_path.m4
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
+ [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-fhs],[Use FHS-compliant paths (default=no)])],
+ [ case "$withval" in
yes)
- lockdir="\${VARDIR}/lib/samba"
+ lockdir="\${VARDIR}/run/samba"
piddir="\${VARDIR}/run"
mandir="\${prefix}/share/man"
logfilebase="\${VARDIR}/log/samba"
-@@ -1615,9 +1615,9 @@
+@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@
test "${libdir}" || libdir="\${prefix}/lib/samba"
configdir="\${sysconfdir}/samba"
swatdir="\${DATADIR}/samba/swat"
@@ -57,6 +57,6 @@
statedir="\${VARDIR}/lib/samba"
- cachedir="\${VARDIR}/lib/samba"
+ cachedir="\${VARDIR}/cache/samba"
-
- cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
- #define FHS_COMPATIBLE 1
+ AC_DEFINE(FHS_COMPATIBLE, 1, [Whether to use fully FHS-compatible paths])
+ ;;
+ esac])
Modified: branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-filespaths-debatable.patch
===================================================================
--- branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-filespaths-debatable.patch 2008-03-08 11:49:26 UTC (rev 1735)
+++ branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-filespaths-debatable.patch 2008-03-08 21:29:16 UTC (rev 1736)
@@ -1,27 +1,83 @@
Goal: Prepare the sources to better respect FHS
New configurable paths are introduced in fhs-newpaths.patch
This patch associates files with the new paths
- This part is debated with upstream but contains the move to
- "cache" path which seems to be the most difficult chunk for
- upstream to adopt
+ This part is debated with upstream
Fixes: #49011
-Status wrt upstream: Fowarded and dscussed
+Status wrt upstream: Mean to be forwarded upstream (a good rationale
+ about FHS is probably recommended)
Note: Use dedicated directories for:
- discardable cache data (/var/cache/samba):
browse.dat, printers.tbd, <printer>.tdb
+ - non discardable state data:
+ all TDB files that may need to be backed up
+ - shared data (/usr/share/samba):
+ codepage stuff
This patch needs work to be cleaner wrt people who want to run
multiple instances of samba
The patch *must* be reviewed after every new upstream release.
FAILURE TO DO SO MAY RESULT IN DATA LOSS FOR OUR USERS!
-
- See comment in fhs-filespaths.patch
+ export QUILT_PATCHES=debian/patches
+ quilt push fhs.patch
+ grep -r lock_path source/ | grep -vE \
+ '"((brlock|connections|gencache|locking|messages|notify|sessionid|unexpected|wins)\.tdb|namelist.debug|lang_)|char \*lock_path|WINBINDD_PRIV_SOCKET_SUBDIR'
+ - This will get you the list of any new, unexpected references to
+ lock_path. The files mentioned above are the known good uses of
+ lock_path; everything else needs to be investigated.
+ - If the file name occurs elsewhere in the fhs.patch, update the
+ patch to fix these new references to the same place (either
+ cache_path or state_path)
+ - If the file is a tdb file, and the code that opens it uses
+ TDB_CLEAR_IF_FIRST, lock_path is correct; just update the query
+ above with the new filename, no other changes are needed.
+ - Otherwise, if this is the first use of the file, you must
+ determine where the file belongs -- i.e., whether it's
+ persistent data, a cache, or runtime-only data. Consult
+ upstream if necessary.
+ - Repeat these steps for lp_lockdir(), which is less common but
+ still used in the code.
+
+ grep -r lp_lockdir source/ | grep -vE \
+ '%s/smb_(tmp_)*krb5|source/(lib/util|param/loadparm|dynconfig|utils/testparm)\.c|WINBINDD_PRIV_SOCKET_SUBDIR|(directory_exist|mkdir)\(lp_lockdir\(\),|koplock\.%d|%s/sync\.%d'
+
+Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/lib/util.c
+===================================================================
+--- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/lib/util.c
++++ samba-3.2.0pre2/source/lib/util.c
+@@ -2543,6 +2543,27 @@
+ return xx_path(name, get_dyn_STATEDIR());
+ }
+
++
++/*****************************************************************
++a useful function for returning a path in the Samba cache directory
++ *****************************************************************/
++char *cache_path(char *name)
++{
++ static pstring fname;
++
++ pstrcpy(fname,dyn_CACHEDIR());
++ trim_string(fname,"","/");
++
++ if (!directory_exist(fname,NULL)) {
++ mkdir(fname,0755);
++ }
++
++ pstrcat(fname,"/");
++ pstrcat(fname,name);
++
++ return fname;
++}
++
+ /**
+ * @brief Returns the platform specific shared library extension.
+ *
Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/libsmb/samlogon_cache.c
===================================================================
--- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/libsmb/samlogon_cache.c
@@ -44,6 +100,1467 @@
WINBINDD_CACHE_TDB_DEFAULT_HASH_SIZE,
TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR, 0600);
if (!tdb) {
+Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/nmbd/nmbd_serverlistdb.c
+===================================================================
+--- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/nmbd/nmbd_serverlistdb.c
++++ samba-3.2.0pre2/source/nmbd/nmbd_serverlistdb.c
+@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@
+
+ updatecount++;
+
+- fname = talloc_strdup(ctx, lp_lockdir());
++ fname = talloc_strdup(ctx, dyn_CACHEDIR());
+ if (!fname) {
+ return;
+ }
+Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/passdb/login_cache.c
+===================================================================
+--- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/passdb/login_cache.c
++++ samba-3.2.0pre2/source/passdb/login_cache.c
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
+ /* skip file open if it's already opened */
+ if (cache) return True;
+
+- asprintf(&cache_fname, "%s/%s", lp_lockdir(), LOGIN_CACHE_FILE);
++ asprintf(&cache_fname, "%s/%s", dyn_CACHEDIR(), LOGIN_CACHE_FILE);
+ if (cache_fname)
+ DEBUG(5, ("Opening cache file at %s\n", cache_fname));
+ else {
+Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/passdb/secrets.c
+===================================================================
+--- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/passdb/secrets.c
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,1430 +0,0 @@
+-/*
+- Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+- Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
+- Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
+- Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
+- Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
+-
+- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+- it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+- the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+- (at your option) any later version.
+-
+- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+- GNU General Public License for more details.
+-
+- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+- along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+-*/
+-
+-/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information
+- such as the local SID and machine trust password */
+-
+-#include "includes.h"
+-
+-#undef DBGC_CLASS
+-#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB
+-
+-static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
+-
+-/* Urrrg. global.... */
+-bool global_machine_password_needs_changing;
+-
+-/**
+- * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed.
+- *
+- * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts,
+- * and incremented by one each time it is needed.
+- *
+- * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom.
+- */
+-static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed)
+-{
+- *new_seed = sys_getpid();
+- if (tdb) {
+- tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1);
+- }
+-}
+-
+-/* open up the secrets database */
+-bool secrets_init(void)
+-{
+- TALLOC_CTX *ctx;
+- char *fname = NULL;
+- unsigned char dummy;
+-
+- if (tdb)
+- return True;
+-
+- ctx = talloc_init("secrets_init");
+- if (!ctx) {
+- return false;
+- }
+- fname = talloc_asprintf(ctx,
+- "%s/secrets.tdb",
+- lp_private_dir());
+- if (!fname) {
+- TALLOC_FREE(ctx);
+- return false;
+- }
+-
+- tdb = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
+-
+- if (!tdb) {
+- DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
+- TALLOC_FREE(ctx);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- TALLOC_FREE(ctx);
+-
+- /**
+- * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator
+- *
+- * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom
+- * could send the same challenge to multiple clients
+- */
+- set_rand_reseed_callback(get_rand_seed);
+-
+- /* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */
+- generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy));
+-
+- return True;
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * close secrets.tdb
+- */
+-void secrets_shutdown(void)
+-{
+- if (!tdb) {
+- return;
+- }
+-
+- tdb_close(tdb);
+- tdb = NULL;
+-}
+-
+-/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result
+- if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there
+- */
+-void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
+-{
+- TDB_DATA dbuf;
+-
+- if (!secrets_init()) {
+- return NULL;
+- }
+-
+- if (!tdb) {
+- return NULL;
+- }
+-
+- dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, string_tdb_data(key));
+- if (size) {
+- *size = dbuf.dsize;
+- }
+-
+- return dbuf.dptr;
+-}
+-
+-/* store a secrets entry
+- */
+-bool secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
+-{
+- if (!secrets_init()) {
+- return false;
+- }
+-
+- if (!tdb) {
+- return false;
+- }
+-
+- return tdb_trans_store(tdb, string_tdb_data(key),
+- make_tdb_data((const uint8 *)data, size),
+- TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
+-}
+-
+-
+-/* delete a secets database entry
+- */
+-bool secrets_delete(const char *key)
+-{
+- if (!secrets_init()) {
+- return false;
+- }
+-
+- if (!tdb) {
+- return false;
+- }
+-
+- return tdb_trans_delete(tdb, string_tdb_data(key)) == 0;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Form a key for fetching the domain sid
+- *
+- * @param domain domain name
+- *
+- * @return keystring
+- **/
+-static const char *domain_sid_keystr(const char *domain)
+-{
+- char *keystr;
+-
+- keystr = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s",
+- SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
+- SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL);
+-
+- strupper_m(keystr);
+-
+- return keystr;
+-}
+-
+-bool secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid)
+-{
+- bool ret;
+-
+- ret = secrets_store(domain_sid_keystr(domain), sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+-
+- /* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */
+- if (ret)
+- reset_global_sam_sid();
+- return ret;
+-}
+-
+-bool secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
+-{
+- DOM_SID *dyn_sid;
+- size_t size = 0;
+-
+- dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(domain_sid_keystr(domain), &size);
+-
+- if (dyn_sid == NULL)
+- return False;
+-
+- if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) {
+- SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- *sid = *dyn_sid;
+- SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
+- return True;
+-}
+-
+-bool secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid)
+-{
+- fstring key;
+-
+- slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+- strupper_m(key);
+- return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct GUID));
+-}
+-
+-bool secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid)
+-{
+- struct GUID *dyn_guid;
+- fstring key;
+- size_t size = 0;
+- struct GUID new_guid;
+-
+- slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+- strupper_m(key);
+- dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+-
+- if (!dyn_guid) {
+- if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
+- smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
+- if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
+- return False;
+- dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+- }
+- if (dyn_guid == NULL) {
+- return False;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) {
+- DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size));
+- SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- *guid = *dyn_guid;
+- SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+- return True;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account sec channel type
+- *
+- * @param domain domain name
+- *
+- * @return keystring
+- **/
+-static const char *machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(const char *domain)
+-{
+- char *keystr;
+-
+- keystr = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s",
+- SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
+- SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL);
+-
+- strupper_m(keystr);
+-
+- return keystr;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account last change time
+- *
+- * @param domain domain name
+- *
+- * @return keystring
+- **/
+-static const char *machine_last_change_time_keystr(const char *domain)
+-{
+- char *keystr;
+-
+- keystr = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s",
+- SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
+- SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL);
+-
+- strupper_m(keystr);
+-
+- return keystr;
+-}
+-
+-
+-/**
+- * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
+- *
+- * @param domain domain name
+- *
+- * @return keystring
+- **/
+-static const char *machine_password_keystr(const char *domain)
+-{
+- char *keystr;
+-
+- keystr = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s",
+- SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
+- SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL);
+-
+- strupper_m(keystr);
+-
+- return keystr;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
+- *
+- * @param domain domain name
+- *
+- * @return stored password's key
+- **/
+-static const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
+-{
+- char *keystr;
+-
+- keystr = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s",
+- SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+- SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL);
+-
+- strupper_m(keystr);
+-
+- return keystr;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
+- *
+- * @param domain trusted domain name
+- *
+- * @return stored password's key
+- **/
+-static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
+-{
+- char *keystr;
+-
+- keystr = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s",
+- SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+- SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL);
+- strupper_m(keystr);
+-
+- return keystr;
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Lock the trust password entry.
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, bool dolock)
+-{
+- if (!tdb)
+- return False;
+-
+- if (dolock)
+- return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain)) == 0);
+- else
+- tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain));
+- return True;
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void)
+-{
+- if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC ||
+- lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
+- return SEC_CHAN_BDC;
+- } else {
+- return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA;
+- }
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
+- This only tries to get the legacy hashed version of the password.
+- The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
+- the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password().
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_fetch_trust_account_password_legacy(const char *domain,
+- uint8 ret_pwd[16],
+- time_t *pass_last_set_time,
+- uint32 *channel)
+-{
+- struct machine_acct_pass *pass;
+- size_t size = 0;
+-
+- if (!(pass = (struct machine_acct_pass *)secrets_fetch(
+- trust_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+- DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- if (pass_last_set_time) {
+- *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+- }
+- memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16);
+-
+- if (channel) {
+- *channel = get_default_sec_channel();
+- }
+-
+- /* Test if machine password has expired and needs to be changed */
+- if (lp_machine_password_timeout()) {
+- if (pass->mod_time > 0 && time(NULL) > (pass->mod_time +
+- (time_t)lp_machine_password_timeout())) {
+- global_machine_password_needs_changing = True;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- SAFE_FREE(pass);
+- return True;
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
+- The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
+- the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password().
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
+- time_t *pass_last_set_time,
+- uint32 *channel)
+-{
+- char *plaintext;
+-
+- plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time,
+- channel);
+- if (plaintext) {
+- DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n"));
+- E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd);
+- SAFE_FREE(plaintext);
+- return True;
+- }
+-
+- return secrets_fetch_trust_account_password_legacy(domain, ret_pwd,
+- pass_last_set_time,
+- channel);
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Pack SID passed by pointer
+- *
+- * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data
+- * @param bufsize size of packing buffer
+- * @param sid pointer to sid to be packed
+- *
+- * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure
+- **/
+-static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
+-{
+- int idx;
+- size_t len = 0;
+- uint8 *p = pack_buf;
+- int remaining_space = pack_buf ? bufsize : 0;
+-
+- if (!sid) {
+- return -1;
+- }
+-
+- len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "bb", sid->sid_rev_num,
+- sid->num_auths);
+- if (pack_buf) {
+- p = pack_buf + len;
+- remaining_space = bufsize - len;
+- }
+-
+- for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
+- len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "b",
+- sid->id_auth[idx]);
+- if (pack_buf) {
+- p = pack_buf + len;
+- remaining_space = bufsize - len;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
+- len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "d",
+- sid->sub_auths[idx]);
+- if (pack_buf) {
+- p = pack_buf + len;
+- remaining_space = bufsize - len;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- return len;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Unpack SID into a pointer
+- *
+- * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation
+- * @param bufsize size of the buffer
+- * @param sid pointer to sid structure to be filled with unpacked data
+- *
+- * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer
+- **/
+-static size_t tdb_sid_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
+-{
+- int idx, len = 0;
+-
+- if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1;
+-
+- len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb",
+- &sid->sid_rev_num, &sid->num_auths);
+-
+- for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
+- len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b",
+- &sid->id_auth[idx]);
+- }
+-
+- for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
+- len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d",
+- &sid->sub_auths[idx]);
+- }
+-
+- return len;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Pack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer
+- *
+- * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data
+- * @param bufsize size of the buffer
+- * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be packed
+- *
+- * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure
+- **/
+-static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize,
+- TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
+-{
+- int idx, len = 0;
+- uint8 *p = pack_buf;
+- int remaining_space = pack_buf ? bufsize : 0;
+-
+- if (!pass) {
+- return -1;
+- }
+-
+- /* packing unicode domain name and password */
+- len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "d",
+- pass->uni_name_len);
+- if (pack_buf) {
+- p = pack_buf + len;
+- remaining_space = bufsize - len;
+- }
+-
+- for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) {
+- len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "w",
+- pass->uni_name[idx]);
+- if (pack_buf) {
+- p = pack_buf + len;
+- remaining_space = bufsize - len;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "dPd", pass->pass_len,
+- pass->pass, pass->mod_time);
+- if (pack_buf) {
+- p = pack_buf + len;
+- remaining_space = bufsize - len;
+- }
+-
+- /* packing SID structure */
+- len += tdb_sid_pack(p, remaining_space, &pass->domain_sid);
+- if (pack_buf) {
+- p = pack_buf + len;
+- remaining_space = bufsize - len;
+- }
+-
+- return len;
+-}
+-
+-
+-/**
+- * Unpack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer
+- *
+- * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation
+- * @param bufsize size of the buffer
+- * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be filled with unpacked data
+- *
+- * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer
+- **/
+-static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize,
+- TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
+-{
+- int idx, len = 0;
+- char *passp = NULL;
+-
+- if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1;
+-
+- /* unpack unicode domain name and plaintext password */
+- len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf, bufsize - len, "d", &pass->uni_name_len);
+-
+- for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
+- len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w",
+- &pass->uni_name[idx]);
+-
+- len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd",
+- &pass->pass_len, &passp, &pass->mod_time);
+- if (passp) {
+- fstrcpy(pass->pass, passp);
+- }
+- SAFE_FREE(passp);
+-
+- /* unpack domain sid */
+- len += tdb_sid_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len,
+- &pass->domain_sid);
+-
+- return len;
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to get account password to trusted domain
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
+- DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+-{
+- struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
+- size_t size = 0;
+-
+- /* unpacking structures */
+- uint8 *pass_buf;
+- int pass_len = 0;
+-
+- ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+-
+- /* fetching trusted domain password structure */
+- if (!(pass_buf = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain),
+- &size))) {
+- DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- /* unpack trusted domain password */
+- pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass);
+- SAFE_FREE(pass_buf);
+-
+- if (pass_len != size) {
+- DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n"));
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- /* the trust's password */
+- if (pwd) {
+- *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass);
+- if (!*pwd) {
+- return False;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- /* last change time */
+- if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time;
+-
+- /* domain sid */
+- if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid);
+-
+- return True;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Routine to store the password for trusted domain
+- *
+- * @param domain remote domain name
+- * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
+- * @param sid remote domain sid
+- *
+- * @return true if succeeded
+- **/
+-
+-bool secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd,
+- const DOM_SID *sid)
+-{
+- smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name;
+- bool ret;
+-
+- /* packing structures */
+- uint8 *pass_buf = NULL;
+- int pass_len = 0;
+-
+- struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
+- ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+-
+- if (push_ucs2_allocate(&uni_dom_name, domain) == (size_t)-1) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("Could not convert domain name %s to unicode\n",
+- domain));
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
+- pass.uni_name_len = strlen_w(uni_dom_name)+1;
+- SAFE_FREE(uni_dom_name);
+-
+- /* last change time */
+- pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+-
+- /* password of the trust */
+- pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
+- fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
+-
+- /* domain sid */
+- sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid);
+-
+- /* Calculate the length. */
+- pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(NULL, 0, &pass);
+- pass_buf = SMB_MALLOC_ARRAY(uint8, pass_len);
+- if (!pass_buf) {
+- return false;
+- }
+- pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(pass_buf, pass_len, &pass);
+- ret = secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)pass_buf,
+- pass_len);
+- SAFE_FREE(pass_buf);
+- return ret;
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to delete the plaintext machine account password
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_delete_machine_password(const char *domain)
+-{
+- return secrets_delete(machine_password_keystr(domain));
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to delete the plaintext machine account password, sec channel type and
+- last change time from secrets database
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_delete_machine_password_ex(const char *domain)
+-{
+- if (!secrets_delete(machine_password_keystr(domain))) {
+- return false;
+- }
+- if (!secrets_delete(machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(domain))) {
+- return false;
+- }
+- return secrets_delete(machine_last_change_time_keystr(domain));
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to delete the domain sid
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_delete_domain_sid(const char *domain)
+-{
+- return secrets_delete(domain_sid_keystr(domain));
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm
+-the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel)
+-{
+- bool ret;
+- uint32 last_change_time;
+- uint32 sec_channel_type;
+-
+- ret = secrets_store(machine_password_keystr(domain), pass, strlen(pass)+1);
+- if (!ret)
+- return ret;
+-
+- SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL));
+- ret = secrets_store(machine_last_change_time_keystr(domain), &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time));
+-
+- SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel);
+- ret = secrets_store(machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(domain), &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type));
+-
+- return ret;
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm
+- the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string.
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
+- time_t *pass_last_set_time,
+- uint32 *channel)
+-{
+- char *ret;
+- ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(machine_password_keystr(domain), NULL);
+-
+- if (pass_last_set_time) {
+- size_t size;
+- uint32 *last_set_time;
+- last_set_time = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(machine_last_change_time_keystr(domain), &size);
+- if (last_set_time) {
+- *pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0);
+- SAFE_FREE(last_set_time);
+- } else {
+- *pass_last_set_time = 0;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- if (channel) {
+- size_t size;
+- uint32 *channel_type;
+- channel_type = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(domain), &size);
+- if (channel_type) {
+- *channel = IVAL(channel_type,0);
+- SAFE_FREE(channel_type);
+- } else {
+- *channel = get_default_sec_channel();
+- }
+- }
+-
+- return ret;
+-}
+-
+-/************************************************************************
+- Routine to delete the password for trusted domain
+-************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain)
+-{
+- return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain));
+-}
+-
+-bool secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
+-{
+- char *key = NULL;
+- bool ret;
+-
+- if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
+-
+- SAFE_FREE(key);
+- return ret;
+-}
+-
+-/*******************************************************************
+- Find the ldap password.
+-******************************************************************/
+-
+-bool fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
+-{
+- char *key = NULL;
+- size_t size = 0;
+-
+- *dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn());
+-
+- if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) {
+- SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+- DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+- }
+-
+- *pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+- SAFE_FREE(key);
+-
+- if (!size) {
+- /* Upgrade 2.2 style entry */
+- char *p;
+- char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn);
+- char *data;
+- fstring old_style_pw;
+-
+- if (!old_style_key) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n"));
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++)
+- if (*p == ',') *p = '/';
+-
+- data=(char *)secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size);
+- if (!size && size < sizeof(old_style_pw)) {
+- DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n"));
+- SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+- SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- size = MIN(size, sizeof(fstring)-1);
+- strncpy(old_style_pw, data, size);
+- old_style_pw[size] = 0;
+-
+- SAFE_FREE(data);
+-
+- if (!secrets_store_ldap_pw(*dn, old_style_pw)) {
+- DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n"));
+- SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+- SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+- return False;
+- }
+- if (!secrets_delete(old_style_key)) {
+- DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n"));
+- }
+-
+- SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+-
+- *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw);
+- }
+-
+- return True;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb.
+- **/
+-
+-NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains,
+- struct trustdom_info ***domains)
+-{
+- TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
+- char *pattern;
+- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+-
+- if (!(tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx))) {
+- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+- }
+-
+- if (!secrets_init()) {
+- return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+- }
+-
+- /* generate searching pattern */
+- pattern = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS);
+- if (pattern == NULL) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("secrets_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() "
+- "failed!\n"));
+- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+- }
+-
+- *num_domains = 0;
+-
+- /*
+- * Make sure that a talloc context for the trustdom_info structs
+- * exists
+- */
+-
+- if (!(*domains = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, struct trustdom_info *, 1))) {
+- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+- }
+-
+- /* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
+- keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
+-
+- /* searching for keys in secrets db -- way to go ... */
+- for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
+- uint8 *packed_pass;
+- size_t size = 0, packed_size = 0;
+- struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
+- char *secrets_key;
+- struct trustdom_info *dom_info;
+-
+- /* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
+- secrets_key = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx,
+- (const char *)k->node_key.dptr,
+- k->node_key.dsize);
+- if (!secrets_key) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
+- tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+- }
+-
+- packed_pass = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
+- packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size,
+- &pass);
+- /* packed representation isn't needed anymore */
+- SAFE_FREE(packed_pass);
+-
+- if (size != packed_size) {
+- DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n",
+- secrets_key));
+- continue;
+- }
+-
+- if (pass.domain_sid.num_auths != 4) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("SID %s is not a domain sid, has %d "
+- "auths instead of 4\n",
+- sid_string_dbg(&pass.domain_sid),
+- pass.domain_sid.num_auths));
+- continue;
+- }
+-
+- if (!(dom_info = TALLOC_P(*domains, struct trustdom_info))) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n"));
+- tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+- }
+-
+- if (pull_ucs2_talloc(dom_info, &dom_info->name,
+- pass.uni_name) == (size_t)-1) {
+- DEBUG(2, ("pull_ucs2_talloc failed\n"));
+- tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+- }
+-
+- sid_copy(&dom_info->sid, &pass.domain_sid);
+-
+- ADD_TO_ARRAY(*domains, struct trustdom_info *, dom_info,
+- domains, num_domains);
+-
+- if (*domains == NULL) {
+- tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n",
+- *num_domains));
+-
+- /* free the results of searching the keys */
+- tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+-
+- return NT_STATUS_OK;
+-}
+-
+-/*******************************************************************************
+- Lock the secrets tdb based on a string - this is used as a primitive form of mutex
+- between smbd instances.
+-*******************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout)
+-{
+- int ret = 0;
+-
+- if (!secrets_init()) {
+- return false;
+- }
+-
+- ret = tdb_lock_bystring_with_timeout(tdb, name, timeout);
+- if (ret == 0) {
+- DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name ));
+- }
+-
+- return (ret == 0);
+-}
+-
+-/*******************************************************************************
+- Unlock a named mutex.
+-*******************************************************************************/
+-
+-void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name)
+-{
+- tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name);
+- DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name ));
+-}
+-
+-/*******************************************************************************
+- Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb.
+-*******************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile)
+-{
+- fstring key;
+-
+- if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL))
+- return False;
+-
+- if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS)
+- return False;
+-
+- slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+- return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile));
+-}
+-
+-/*******************************************************************************
+- Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb
+-*******************************************************************************/
+-bool secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result)
+-{
+- fstring key;
+- struct afs_keyfile *keyfile;
+- size_t size = 0;
+- uint32 i;
+-
+- slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+-
+- keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+-
+- if (keyfile == NULL)
+- return False;
+-
+- if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) {
+- SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys);
+-
+- if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) {
+- SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- *result = keyfile->entry[i-1];
+-
+- result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno);
+-
+- return True;
+-}
+-
+-/******************************************************************************
+- When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or
+- authenticated connections.
+-
+- We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the
+- RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional
+- restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local
+- Security Policy.
+-
+- Caller to free() result in domain, username, password
+-*******************************************************************************/
+-void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password)
+-{
+- *username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL);
+- *domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL);
+- *password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL);
+-
+- if (*username && **username) {
+-
+- if (!*domain || !**domain)
+- *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup());
+-
+- if (!*password || !**password)
+- *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+-
+- DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n",
+- *domain, *username));
+-
+- } else {
+- DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n"));
+- *username = smb_xstrdup("");
+- *domain = smb_xstrdup("");
+- *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+- }
+-}
+-
+-/******************************************************************************
+- Open or create the schannel session store tdb.
+-*******************************************************************************/
+-
+-static TDB_CONTEXT *open_schannel_session_store(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+-{
+- TDB_DATA vers;
+- uint32 ver;
+- TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
+- char *fname = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/schannel_store.tdb", lp_private_dir());
+-
+- if (!fname) {
+- return NULL;
+- }
+-
+- tdb_sc = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
+-
+- if (!tdb_sc) {
+- DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: Failed to open %s\n", fname));
+- TALLOC_FREE(fname);
+- return NULL;
+- }
+-
+- vers = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION");
+- if (vers.dptr == NULL) {
+- /* First opener, no version. */
+- SIVAL(&ver,0,1);
+- vers.dptr = (uint8 *)&ver;
+- vers.dsize = 4;
+- tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION", vers, TDB_REPLACE);
+- vers.dptr = NULL;
+- } else if (vers.dsize == 4) {
+- ver = IVAL(vers.dptr,0);
+- if (ver != 1) {
+- tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+- tdb_sc = NULL;
+- DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number %d in %s\n",
+- (int)ver, fname ));
+- }
+- } else {
+- tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+- tdb_sc = NULL;
+- DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number size %d in %s\n",
+- (int)vers.dsize, fname ));
+- }
+-
+- SAFE_FREE(vers.dptr);
+- TALLOC_FREE(fname);
+-
+- return tdb_sc;
+-}
+-
+-/******************************************************************************
+- Store the schannel state after an AUTH2 call.
+- Note we must be root here.
+-*******************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_store_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+- const char *remote_machine,
+- const struct dcinfo *pdc)
+-{
+- TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
+- TDB_DATA value;
+- bool ret;
+- char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE,
+- remote_machine);
+- if (!keystr) {
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- strupper_m(keystr);
+-
+- /* Work out how large the record is. */
+- value.dsize = tdb_pack(NULL, 0, "dBBBBBfff",
+- pdc->sequence,
+- 8, pdc->seed_chal.data,
+- 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data,
+- 8, pdc->srv_chal.data,
+- 16, pdc->sess_key,
+- 16, pdc->mach_pw,
+- pdc->mach_acct,
+- pdc->remote_machine,
+- pdc->domain);
+-
+- value.dptr = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, uint8, value.dsize);
+- if (!value.dptr) {
+- TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- value.dsize = tdb_pack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff",
+- pdc->sequence,
+- 8, pdc->seed_chal.data,
+- 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data,
+- 8, pdc->srv_chal.data,
+- 16, pdc->sess_key,
+- 16, pdc->mach_pw,
+- pdc->mach_acct,
+- pdc->remote_machine,
+- pdc->domain);
+-
+- tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx);
+- if (!tdb_sc) {
+- TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+- TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- ret = (tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr, value, TDB_REPLACE) == 0 ? True : False);
+-
+- DEBUG(3,("secrets_store_schannel_session_info: stored schannel info with key %s\n",
+- keystr ));
+-
+- tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+- TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+- TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr);
+- return ret;
+-}
+-
+-/******************************************************************************
+- Restore the schannel state on a client reconnect.
+- Note we must be root here.
+-*******************************************************************************/
+-
+-bool secrets_restore_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+- const char *remote_machine,
+- struct dcinfo **ppdc)
+-{
+- TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
+- TDB_DATA value;
+- unsigned char *pseed_chal = NULL;
+- unsigned char *pclnt_chal = NULL;
+- unsigned char *psrv_chal = NULL;
+- unsigned char *psess_key = NULL;
+- unsigned char *pmach_pw = NULL;
+- uint32 l1, l2, l3, l4, l5;
+- int ret;
+- struct dcinfo *pdc = NULL;
+- char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE,
+- remote_machine);
+-
+- *ppdc = NULL;
+-
+- if (!keystr) {
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- strupper_m(keystr);
+-
+- tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx);
+- if (!tdb_sc) {
+- TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- value = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr);
+- if (!value.dptr) {
+- DEBUG(0,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: Failed to find entry with key %s\n",
+- keystr ));
+- tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- pdc = TALLOC_ZERO_P(mem_ctx, struct dcinfo);
+-
+- /* Retrieve the record. */
+- ret = tdb_unpack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff",
+- &pdc->sequence,
+- &l1, &pseed_chal,
+- &l2, &pclnt_chal,
+- &l3, &psrv_chal,
+- &l4, &psess_key,
+- &l5, &pmach_pw,
+- &pdc->mach_acct,
+- &pdc->remote_machine,
+- &pdc->domain);
+-
+- if (ret == -1 || l1 != 8 || l2 != 8 || l3 != 8 || l4 != 16 || l5 != 16) {
+- /* Bad record - delete it. */
+- tdb_delete_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr);
+- tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+- TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+- TALLOC_FREE(pdc);
+- SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal);
+- SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal);
+- SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal);
+- SAFE_FREE(psess_key);
+- SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw);
+- SAFE_FREE(value.dptr);
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+-
+- memcpy(pdc->seed_chal.data, pseed_chal, 8);
+- memcpy(pdc->clnt_chal.data, pclnt_chal, 8);
+- memcpy(pdc->srv_chal.data, psrv_chal, 8);
+- memcpy(pdc->sess_key, psess_key, 16);
+- memcpy(pdc->mach_pw, pmach_pw, 16);
+-
+- /* We know these are true so didn't bother to store them. */
+- pdc->challenge_sent = True;
+- pdc->authenticated = True;
+-
+- DEBUG(3,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: restored schannel info key %s\n",
+- keystr ));
+-
+- SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal);
+- SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal);
+- SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal);
+- SAFE_FREE(psess_key);
+- SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw);
+-
+- TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
+- SAFE_FREE(value.dptr);
+-
+- *ppdc = pdc;
+-
+- return True;
+-}
+-
+-bool secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secret)
+-{
+- char *tdbkey = NULL;
+- bool ret;
+-
+- if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n"));
+- return False;
+- }
+-
+- ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1);
+-
+- SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);
+- return ret;
+-}
+-
+-/*******************************************************************
+- Find the ldap password.
+-******************************************************************/
+-
+-char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key)
+-{
+- char *secret = NULL;
+- char *tdbkey = NULL;
+-
+- if (( ! owner) || ( ! key)) {
+- DEBUG(1, ("Invalid Paramters"));
+- return NULL;
+- }
+-
+- if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n"));
+- return NULL;
+- }
+-
+- secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL);
+- SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);
+-
+- return secret;
+-}
+-
Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/printing/printing.c
===================================================================
--- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/printing/printing.c
@@ -59,19 +1576,6 @@
/* handle a Samba upgrade */
-Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/printing/nt_printing.c
-===================================================================
---- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/printing/nt_printing.c
-+++ samba-3.2.0pre2/source/printing/nt_printing.c
-@@ -2541,7 +2541,7 @@
-
- if (geteuid() == 0) {
- if (asprintf(&printdb_path, "%s%s.tdb",
-- lock_path("printing/"),
-+ cache_path("printing/"),
- sharename) < 0) {
- return (uint32)-1;
- }
Index: samba-3.2.0pre2/source/printing/printing_db.c
===================================================================
--- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/printing/printing_db.c
Modified: branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-filespaths.patch
===================================================================
--- branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-filespaths.patch 2008-03-08 11:49:26 UTC (rev 1735)
+++ branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-filespaths.patch 2008-03-08 21:29:16 UTC (rev 1736)
@@ -5,9 +5,12 @@
Fixes: #49011
-Status wrt upstream: Applied in 3.2.0
+Status wrt upstream: Mean to be forwarded upstream (a good rationale
+ about FHS is probably recommended)
Note: Use dedicated directories for:
+ - discardable cache data (/var/cache/samba):
+ browse.dat, printers.tbd, <printer>.tdb
- non discardable state data:
all TDB files that may need to be backed up
- shared data (/usr/share/samba):
@@ -29,8 +32,7 @@
lock_path; everything else needs to be investigated.
- If the file name occurs elsewhere in the fhs.patch, update the
patch to fix these new references to the same place (either
- cache_path or state_path. If cache_path, the change belongs
- to fhs-filespaths-debatable)
+ cache_path or state_path)
- If the file is a tdb file, and the code that opens it uses
TDB_CLEAR_IF_FIRST, lock_path is correct; just update the query
above with the new filename, no other changes are needed.
@@ -57,6 +59,52 @@
if (stat(msg_path, &st) != 0) {
/* the msg file isn't available */
DEBUG(10, ("lang_tdb_init: %s: %s\n", msg_path,
+Index: samba-3.2.0pre1/source/lib/util.c
+===================================================================
+--- samba-3.2.0pre1.orig/source/lib/util.c
++++ samba-3.2.0pre1/source/lib/util.c
+@@ -2655,6 +2655,41 @@
+ }
+
+ /**
++ * @brief Returns an absolute path to a file in the Samba data directory.
++ *
++ * @param name File to find, relative to CODEPAGEDIR.
++ *
++ * @retval Pointer to a static #pstring containing the full path.
++ **/
++
++char *data_path(const char *name)
++{
++ static pstring fname;
++ snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s/%s", dyn_CODEPAGEDIR, name);
++ return fname;
++}
++
++/*****************************************************************
++a useful function for returning a path in the Samba state directory
++ *****************************************************************/
++char *state_path(char *name)
++{
++ static pstring fname;
++
++ pstrcpy(fname,dyn_STATEDIR());
++ trim_string(fname,"","/");
++
++ if (!directory_exist(fname,NULL)) {
++ mkdir(fname,0755);
++ }
++
++ pstrcat(fname,"/");
++ pstrcat(fname,name);
++
++ return fname;
++}
++
++/**
+ * @brief Returns the platform specific shared library extension.
+ *
+ * @retval Pointer to a static #fstring containing the extension.
Index: samba-3.2.0pre1/source/lib/util_unistr.c
===================================================================
--- samba-3.2.0pre1.orig/source/lib/util_unistr.c
Modified: branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-newpaths.patch
===================================================================
--- branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-newpaths.patch 2008-03-08 11:49:26 UTC (rev 1735)
+++ branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/fhs-newpaths.patch 2008-03-08 21:29:16 UTC (rev 1736)
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
Fixes: #49011
-Status wrt upstream: Applied in 3.2.0
+Status wrt upstream: Mean to be forwarded upstream (a good rationale
+ about FHS is probably recommended)
Note: See fhs-filespaths for rationale about the meaning of the new
path variables
@@ -140,47 +141,3 @@
+
+char *dyn_STATEDIR(void);
+char *dyn_CACHEDIR(void);
-Index: samba-3.2.0pre1/source/lib/util.c
-===================================================================
---- samba-3.2.0pre1.orig/source/lib/util.c
-+++ samba-3.2.0pre1/source/lib/util.c
-@@ -2655,6 +2655,39 @@
- }
-
- /**
-+ * @brief Returns an absolute path to a file in the Samba data directory.
-+ *
-+ * @param name File to find, relative to CODEPAGEDIR.
-+ *
-+ * @retval Pointer to a talloc'ed string containing the full path.
-+ **/
-+
-+char *data_path(const char *name)
-+{
-+ return talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", dyn_CODEPAGEDIR, name);
-+}
-+
-+/*****************************************************************
-+a useful function for returning a path in the Samba state directory
-+ *****************************************************************/
-+char *state_path(char *name)
-+{
-+ pstring fname;
-+
-+ pstrcpy(fname,dyn_STATEDIR());
-+ trim_string(fname,"","/");
-+
-+ if (!directory_exist(fname,NULL)) {
-+ mkdir(fname,0755);
-+ }
-+
-+ pstrcat(fname,"/");
-+ pstrcat(fname,name);
-+
-+ return talloc_strdup(talloc_tos(), fname);
-+}
-+
-+/**
- * @brief Returns the platform specific shared library extension.
- *
- * @retval Pointer to a static #fstring containing the extension.
Modified: branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/smbpasswd-syslog.patch
===================================================================
--- branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/smbpasswd-syslog.patch 2008-03-08 11:49:26 UTC (rev 1735)
+++ branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/smbpasswd-syslog.patch 2008-03-08 21:29:16 UTC (rev 1736)
@@ -313,25 +313,25 @@
if ( retval != PAM_SUCCESS ) {
if (on( SMB_DEBUG, ctrl )) {
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "auth: could not identify user");
-+ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "auth: could not identify user");
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "auth: could not identify user");
}
AUTH_RETURN;
}
if (on( SMB_DEBUG, ctrl )) {
- _log_err( LOG_DEBUG, "username [%s] obtained", name );
-+ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "username [%s] obtained", name );
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "username [%s] obtained", name );
}
if (geteuid() != 0) {
- _log_err( LOG_DEBUG, "Cannot access samba password database, not running as root.");
-+ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Cannot access samba password database, not running as root.");
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Cannot access samba password database, not running as root.");
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
AUTH_RETURN;
}
if (!initialize_password_db(True, NULL)) {
- _log_err( LOG_ALERT, "Cannot access samba password database" );
-+ _log_err(pamh, LOG_ALERT, "Cannot access samba password database" );
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_ALERT, "Cannot access samba password database" );
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
AUTH_RETURN;
}
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@
sampass = samu_new( NULL );
if (!sampass) {
- _log_err( LOG_ALERT, "Cannot talloc a samu struct" );
-+ _log_err(pamh, LOG_ALERT, "Cannot talloc a samu struct" );
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_ALERT, "Cannot talloc a samu struct" );
retval = nt_status_to_pam(NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
AUTH_RETURN;
}
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- _log_err( LOG_ALERT
-+ _log_err(pamh, LOG_ALERT
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_ALERT
, "pam_get_item returned error to pam_sm_authenticate" );
return PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVER_ERR;
} else if (pass == NULL) {
@@ -374,16 +374,56 @@
===================================================================
--- samba-3.2.0pre2.orig/source/pam_smbpass/pam_smb_acct.c
+++ samba-3.2.0pre2/source/pam_smbpass/pam_smb_acct.c
-@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
+@@ -59,26 +59,25 @@
+
+ /* Samba initialization. */
+ load_case_tables();
+- setup_logging( "pam_smbpass", False );
+ in_client = True;
+
+- ctrl = set_ctrl( flags, argc, argv );
++ ctrl = set_ctrl(pamh, flags, argc, argv );
+
+ /* get the username */
+
+ retval = pam_get_user( pamh, &name, "Username: " );
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (on( SMB_DEBUG, ctrl )) {
+- _log_err( LOG_DEBUG, "acct: could not identify user" );
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "acct: could not identify user" );
+ }
+ return retval;
}
+ if (on( SMB_DEBUG, ctrl )) {
+- _log_err( LOG_DEBUG, "acct: username [%s] obtained", name );
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "acct: username [%s] obtained", name );
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+- _log_err( LOG_DEBUG, "Cannot access samba password database, not running as root.");
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Cannot access samba password database, not running as root.");
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+ }
+
+@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@
+ from a SIGPIPE it's not expecting */
+ oldsig_handler = CatchSignal(SIGPIPE, SIGNAL_CAST SIG_IGN);
+ if (!initialize_password_db(True, NULL)) {
+- _log_err( LOG_ALERT, "Cannot access samba password database" );
++ _log_err(pamh, LOG_ALERT, "Cannot access samba password database" );
+ CatchSignal(SIGPIPE, SIGNAL_CAST oldsig_handler);
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+ }
+@@ -100,7 +99,7 @@
+ }
+
if (!pdb_getsampwnam(sampass, name )) {
- _log_err( LOG_DEBUG, "acct: could not identify user" );
+ _log_err(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "acct: could not identify user");
CatchSignal(SIGPIPE, SIGNAL_CAST oldsig_handler);
return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
}
-@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@
+@@ -113,8 +112,8 @@
if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_DISABLED) {
if (on( SMB_DEBUG, ctrl )) {
Modified: branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/smbstatus-locking.patch
===================================================================
--- branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/smbstatus-locking.patch 2008-03-08 11:49:26 UTC (rev 1735)
+++ branches/samba/experimental/debian/patches/smbstatus-locking.patch 2008-03-08 21:29:16 UTC (rev 1736)
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Fixes: Maybe #164179?
-Status wrt upstream: Applied
+Status wrt upstream: Should maybe be forwarded
Note:
@@ -10,21 +10,28 @@
===================================================================
--- samba-3.2.0pre1.orig/source/utils/status.c
+++ samba-3.2.0pre1/source/utils/status.c
-@@ -404,6 +404,17 @@
-
+@@ -277,6 +277,7 @@
+ {
+ int c;
+ int profile_only = 0;
++ TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
+ BOOL show_processes, show_locks, show_shares;
+ poptContext pc;
+ struct poptOption long_options[] = {
+@@ -405,6 +406,16 @@
if ( show_locks ) {
int result;
-+ struct db_context *db;
-+ db = db_open(NULL, lock_path("locking.tdb"), 0,
-+ TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDONLY, 0);
+
++ tdb = tdb_open_log(lock_path("locking.tdb"), 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDONLY, 0);
+
-+ if (!db) {
++ if (!tdb) {
+ d_printf("%s not initialised\n", lock_path("locking.tdb"));
+ d_printf("This is normal if an SMB client has never connected to your server.\n");
+ exit(0);
+ } else {
-+ TALLOC_FREE(db);
++ tdb_close(tdb);
+ }
-
++
if (!locking_init(1)) {
d_printf("Can't initialise locking module - exiting\n");
+ ret = 1;
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