[Pkg-samba-maint] [samba] 01/12: Patches for CVE-2017-12150, CVE-2017-12151 and CVE-2017-12163
Mathieu Parent
sathieu at moszumanska.debian.org
Thu Sep 21 07:24:56 UTC 2017
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
sathieu pushed a commit to branch master
in repository samba.
commit 2916bb40a1f96ef58976bdf3ae0cf74a025b225c
Author: Mathieu Parent <math.parent at gmail.com>
Date: Tue Sep 19 14:31:08 2017 +0200
Patches for CVE-2017-12150, CVE-2017-12151 and CVE-2017-12163
---
.../CVE-2017-12150-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt | 381 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../CVE-2017-12151-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt | 111 ++++++
.../patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt | 141 ++++++++
debian/patches/series | 3 +
4 files changed, 636 insertions(+)
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7eb1ef8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+From 9fb528332f48de59d70d48686e3af4df70206635 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 17:06:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] CVE-2017-12150: s3:popt_common: don't turn a guessed
+ username into a specified one
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/include/auth_info.h | 1 +
+ source3/lib/popt_common.c | 6 +-----
+ source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/include/auth_info.h b/source3/include/auth_info.h
+index c6f71ad..8212c27 100644
+--- a/source3/include/auth_info.h
++++ b/source3/include/auth_info.h
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_from_file(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
+ const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_username(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info);
+ void set_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
+ const char *username);
++void reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info);
+ const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info);
+ void set_cmdline_auth_info_domain(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
+ const char *domain);
+diff --git a/source3/lib/popt_common.c b/source3/lib/popt_common.c
+index 9928c70..36b5e92 100644
+--- a/source3/lib/popt_common.c
++++ b/source3/lib/popt_common.c
+@@ -238,7 +238,6 @@ void popt_common_credentials_set_delay_post(void)
+ void popt_common_credentials_post(void)
+ {
+ struct user_auth_info *auth_info = cmdline_auth_info;
+- const char *username = NULL;
+
+ if (get_cmdline_auth_info_use_machine_account(auth_info) &&
+ !set_cmdline_auth_info_machine_account_creds(auth_info))
+@@ -259,10 +258,7 @@ void popt_common_credentials_post(void)
+ * correctly parsed yet. If we have a username we need to set it again
+ * to run the string parser for the username correctly.
+ */
+- username = get_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info);
+- if (username != NULL && username[0] != '\0') {
+- set_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info, username);
+- }
++ reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info);
+ }
+
+ static void popt_common_credentials_callback(poptContext con,
+diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+index ad51a4f..80142e2 100644
+--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
++++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ struct user_auth_info {
+ struct cli_credentials *creds;
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
++ bool got_username;
+ bool got_pass;
+ int signing_state;
+ bool smb_encrypt;
+@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_from_file(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
+ if (!ok) {
+ exit(EIO);
+ }
++ auth_info->got_username = true;
+ }
+
+ const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_username(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
+@@ -123,11 +125,38 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
+ exit(ENOMEM);
+ }
+
++ auth_info->got_username = true;
+ if (strchr_m(username, '%') != NULL) {
+ auth_info->got_pass = true;
+ }
+ }
+
++void reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
++{
++ const char *username = NULL;
++ const char *new_val = NULL;
++
++ if (!auth_info->got_username) {
++ return;
++ }
++
++ username = cli_credentials_get_username(auth_info->creds);
++ if (username == NULL) {
++ return;
++ }
++ if (username[0] == '\0') {
++ return;
++ }
++
++ cli_credentials_parse_string(auth_info->creds,
++ username,
++ CRED_SPECIFIED);
++ new_val = cli_credentials_get_username(auth_info->creds);
++ if (new_val == NULL) {
++ exit(ENOMEM);
++ }
++}
++
+ const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
+ {
+ const char *domain = NULL;
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 97a7ddff5d327bf5bcc27c8a88b000b3a187a827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 17:16:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib:
+ get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state smb_encrypt SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
+
+This is an addition to the fixes for CVE-2015-5296.
+
+It applies to smb2mount -e, smbcacls -e and smbcquotas -e.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+index 80142e2..90ee67c 100644
+--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
++++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+@@ -265,6 +265,9 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state_raw(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
+
+ int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
+ {
++ if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) {
++ return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
++ }
+ return auth_info->signing_state;
+ }
+
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From b760a464ee3d94edeff6eb10a0b08359d6e98099 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2016 09:26:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of
+ SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for 'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal'
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+index 59c0998..350c6d4 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self, PyObject *args,
+
+ req = cli_full_connection_creds_send(
+ NULL, self->ev, "myname", host, NULL, 0, share, "?????",
+- cli_creds, 0, 0);
++ cli_creds, 0, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT);
+ if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From f42ffde214c3be1d6ba3afd8fe88a3e04470c4bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2016 05:49:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
+ in gpo_connect_server()
+
+It's important that we use a signed connection to get the GPOs!
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ libgpo/gpo_fetch.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+index 836bc23..3740d4e 100644
+--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
++++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads,
+ ads->auth.password,
+ CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS |
+ CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS,
+- Undefined);
++ SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
+ DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: "
+ "failed to connect: %s\n",
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From d8c6aceb94ab72991eb538ab5dc388686a177052 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:24:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials:
+ cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for
+ NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ auth/credentials/credentials.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+index 06648c7..5e3b5e8 100644
+--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c
++++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
+ #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+ #include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
++#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+ #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+ #include "tevent.h"
+ #include "param/param.h"
+@@ -300,6 +301,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cre
+
+ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *cred)
+ {
++ uint32_t gensec_features = 0;
++
+ if (cred->bind_dn) {
+ return true;
+ }
+@@ -327,6 +330,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c
+ return true;
+ }
+
++ gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred);
++ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
++ return true;
++ }
++
++ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
++ return true;
++ }
++
++ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
++ return true;
++ }
++
+ return false;
+ }
+
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 28f4a8dbd2b82bb8fb9f6224e1641d935766e62a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:35:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add
+ smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory()
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c | 5 +++++
+ libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+index b21d796..239e5eb 100644
+--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
++++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+ return false;
+ }
+
++bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
++{
++ return conn->mandatory_signing;
++}
++
+ void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options)
+ {
+ set_socket_options(conn->sock_fd, options);
+diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+index e48fc35..2594f07 100644
+--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
++++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+
+ enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
++bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+
+ void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options);
+ const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_local_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 28506663282a1457708c38c58437e9eb9c0002bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2016 06:07:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if
+ authentication was not requested
+
+With forced encryption or required signing we should also don't fallback.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 16 ++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+index 75012b2..fdcd665 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include "trans2.h"
+ #include "libsmb/nmblib.h"
+ #include "../libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h"
++#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+
+ /********************************************************************
+ Important point.
+@@ -145,9 +146,6 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ char *servicename;
+ char *sharename;
+ char *newserver, *newshare;
+- const char *username;
+- const char *password;
+- const char *domain;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ int flags = 0;
+ int signing_state = get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info);
+@@ -225,21 +223,15 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ smb2cli_conn_set_max_credits(c->conn, DEFAULT_SMB2_MAX_CREDITS);
+ }
+
+- username = get_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info);
+- password = get_cmdline_auth_info_password(auth_info);
+- domain = get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(auth_info);
+- if ((domain == NULL) || (domain[0] == '\0')) {
+- domain = lp_workgroup();
+- }
+-
+ creds = get_cmdline_auth_info_creds(auth_info);
+
+ status = cli_session_setup_creds(c, creds);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ /* If a password was not supplied then
+ * try again with a null username. */
+- if (password[0] || !username[0] ||
+- get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) ||
++ if (force_encrypt || smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) ||
++ cli_credentials_authentication_requested(creds) ||
++ cli_credentials_is_anonymous(creds) ||
+ !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup_anon(c)))
+ {
+ d_printf("session setup failed: %s\n",
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9314acf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From 3157ccef61bd0698207054daf060cf2986d1d110 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:13:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on() helper function
+
+This allows to check if the current cli_state uses encryption
+(either via unix extentions or via SMB3).
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clientgen.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ source3/libsmb/proto.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+index 2b53a93..e675f95 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+@@ -334,6 +334,19 @@ uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli)
+ return cli->smb1.pid;
+ }
+
++bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli)
++{
++ if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
++ return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn);
++ }
++
++ if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) {
++ return false;
++ }
++
++ return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon);
++}
++
+ bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli)
+ {
+ uint32_t tid;
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+index a583a8e..8fbceef 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
++++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ const char *cli_state_remote_realm(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint32_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t pid);
+ uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli);
++bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli);
+ bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint32_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint32_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t tid);
+--
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 105cc438c6cb3dc741e861855e3fa5a94a156ff0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2016 10:36:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on()
+
+This will keep enforced encryption across dfs referrals.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 4 ++--
+ source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+index fdcd665..b8edeb6 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ "IPC$",
+ dfs_auth_info,
+ false,
+- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
++ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
+ smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
+ 0,
+ 0x20,
+@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ dfs_refs[count].share,
+ dfs_auth_info,
+ false,
+- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
++ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
+ smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
+ 0,
+ 0x20,
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+index ed6ca2b..b55cf1e 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context,
+
+ for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) {
+ num_servers++;
+- if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) {
++ if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) {
+ return (void *)false;
+ }
+ }
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e9f99e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+From 364275d1ae8c55242497e7c8804fb28aa3b73465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 10:13:14 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from
+ writing server memory to file.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13020
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/smbd/reply.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
+index 317143f..7b07078 100644
+--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
++++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
+@@ -4474,6 +4474,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */
++ /*
++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
+ if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ error_to_writebrawerr(req);
+@@ -4574,6 +4577,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
+ exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed");
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163
++ * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite
++ * bytes available - we just read from the client.
++ */
+ nwritten = write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite);
+ if (nwritten == -1) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(buf);
+@@ -4647,6 +4655,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
+ connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
+ ssize_t nwritten = -1;
+ size_t numtowrite;
++ size_t remaining;
+ off_t startpos;
+ const char *data;
+ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+@@ -4679,6 +4688,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
+ startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
+ data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
+
++ /*
++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
++ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) {
+ init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
+ (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
+@@ -4756,6 +4776,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
+ {
+ connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
+ size_t numtowrite;
++ size_t remaining;
+ ssize_t nwritten = -1;
+ off_t startpos;
+ const char *data;
+@@ -4796,6 +4817,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
+ startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
+ data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
+
++ /*
++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
++ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++ END_PROFILE(SMBwrite);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (!fsp->print_file) {
+ init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
+ (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
+@@ -5018,6 +5050,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
++ /*
++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
+ if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite ||
+ smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+@@ -5444,6 +5479,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
+ {
+ connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
+ size_t numtowrite;
++ size_t remaining;
+ ssize_t nwritten = -1;
+ NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ off_t startpos;
+@@ -5477,6 +5513,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
+ mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4));
+ data = (const char *)req->buf + 1;
+
++ /*
++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
++ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (fsp->print_file == NULL) {
+ init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
+ (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
+@@ -6069,6 +6116,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
+
+ numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1);
+
++ /*
++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
++ */
+ if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 6a0872ce..cea0374 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -15,3 +15,6 @@ Add-documentation-to-systemd-Unit-files.patch
fix_kill_path_in_units.patch
nmbd-requires-a-working-network.patch
provision-Update-root-DNS-servers-list.patch
+CVE-2017-12150-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt
+CVE-2017-12151-v4-6.patches.metze02.txt
+CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt
--
Alioth's /usr/local/bin/git-commit-notice on /srv/git.debian.org/git/pkg-samba/samba.git
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