[Pkg-samba-maint] [samba] 01/11: Patches for CVE-2017-12150, CVE-2017-12151 and CVE-2017-12163

Mathieu Parent sathieu at moszumanska.debian.org
Thu Sep 21 07:27:34 UTC 2017


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sathieu pushed a commit to branch jessie
in repository samba.

commit 68d2276ffaba7c6322610e2bbfceb6a493ab8479
Author: Mathieu Parent <math.parent at gmail.com>
Date:   Tue Sep 19 14:31:08 2017 +0200

    Patches for CVE-2017-12150, CVE-2017-12151 and CVE-2017-12163
---
 .../CVE-2017-12150-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt        | 234 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../CVE-2017-12151-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt        | 111 ++++++++++
 .../patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt   | 141 +++++++++++++
 debian/patches/series                              |   3 +
 4 files changed, 489 insertions(+)

diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39c4327
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12150-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+From edca45e2c698f02b93bafd9aac416a2e6b8560ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 17:16:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib:
+ get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state smb_encrypt SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
+
+This is an addition to the fixes for CVE-2015-5296.
+
+It applies to smb2mount -e, smbcacls -e and smbcquotas -e.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+index 80c3ecd..539fa55 100644
+--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
++++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ bool set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
+ 
+ int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
+ {
++	if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) {
++		return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
++	}
+ 	return auth_info->signing_state;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 9857e8cc2b058beaf402e6a0871a06a6603a687d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2016 09:26:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of
+ SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for 'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal'
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+index 0c5d7e9..97aa39e 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self, PyObject *args,
+ 		cli_credentials_get_username(cli_creds),
+ 		cli_credentials_get_domain(cli_creds),
+ 		cli_credentials_get_password(cli_creds),
+-		0, 0);
++		0, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT);
+ 	if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+
+From ac29289b5cba1a735bde37fe58366c45bc52217c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2016 05:49:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
+ in gpo_connect_server()
+
+It's important that we use a signed connection to get the GPOs!
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ libgpo/gpo_fetch.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+index 6b01544..cb969ff 100644
+--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
++++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads,
+ 			ads->auth.password,
+ 			CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS |
+ 			CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS,
+-			Undefined);
++			SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
+ 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
+ 		DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: "
+ 				"failed to connect: %s\n",
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 1ed2e185b5547bea6725724db96d2134380f2bfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:24:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials:
+ cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for
+ NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ auth/credentials/credentials.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+index 3b7d42a..43e587a 100644
+--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c
++++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
+ #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+ #include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
++#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
+ #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+ #include "tevent.h"
+ #include "param/param.h"
+@@ -362,6 +363,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cre
+ 
+ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *cred) 
+ {
++	uint32_t gensec_features = 0;
++
+ 	if (cred->bind_dn) {
+ 		return true;
+ 	}
+@@ -389,6 +392,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c
+ 		return true;
+ 	}
+ 
++	gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred);
++	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
++		return true;
++	}
++
++	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
++		return true;
++	}
++
++	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
++		return true;
++	}
++
+ 	return false;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 16be7d9869486f517a0036ddc429b54ebbb86e99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:35:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add
+ smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory()
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c | 5 +++++
+ libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+index 691b8ff..3c41127 100644
+--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
++++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+ 	return false;
+ }
+ 
++bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
++{
++	return conn->mandatory_signing;
++}
++
+ void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options)
+ {
+ 	set_socket_options(conn->sock_fd, options);
+diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+index 16c8848..6809807 100644
+--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
++++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+ 
+ enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
++bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+ 
+ void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options);
+ const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_local_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 5710fadbefa29eb012c375608a1324a50a4f469d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2016 06:07:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if
+ authentication was not requested
+
+With forced encryption or required signing we should also don't fallback.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+index d2a4c19..3b3e6b9 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ 		/* If a password was not supplied then
+ 		 * try again with a null username. */
+ 		if (password[0] || !username[0] ||
++			force_encrypt || smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) ||
+ 			get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) ||
++			get_cmdline_auth_info_use_ccache(auth_info) ||
+ 			!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup(c, "",
+ 				    		"", 0,
+ 						"", 0,
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4fd015c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12151-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From b64b501b43bac62c15d4c77c150048c428cecfe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:13:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on() helper function
+
+This allows to check if the current cli_state uses encryption
+(either via unix extentions or via SMB3).
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clientgen.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ source3/libsmb/proto.h     |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+index cfb3b16..868ee59 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+@@ -339,6 +339,19 @@ uint16_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli)
+ 	return cli->smb1.pid;
+ }
+ 
++bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli)
++{
++	if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
++		return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn);
++	}
++
++	if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) {
++		return false;
++	}
++
++	return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon);
++}
++
+ bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli)
+ {
+ 	uint16_t tid = cli_state_get_tid(cli);
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+index dc9aa17..e872e31 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
++++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ const char *cli_state_remote_realm(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint16_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t pid);
+ uint16_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli);
++bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli);
+ bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint16_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli);
+ uint16_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t tid);
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+
+From 06462b225c097e0eb5a8b48003282c41c28b6aa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2016 10:36:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on()
+
+This will keep enforced encryption across dfs referrals.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clidfs.c         | 4 ++--
+ source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+index 3b3e6b9..074f8ed 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ 			     "IPC$",
+ 			     dfs_auth_info,
+ 			     false,
+-			     smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
++			     cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
+ 			     smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
+ 			     0,
+ 			     0x20,
+@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ 				dfs_refs[count].share,
+ 				dfs_auth_info,
+ 				false,
+-				smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
++				cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
+ 				smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
+ 				0,
+ 				0x20,
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+index 5e31dfb..0513374 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context,
+ 
+                 for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) {
+                         num_servers++;
+-                        if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) {
++                        if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) {
+                                 return (void *)false;
+                         }
+                 }
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e9f99e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+From 364275d1ae8c55242497e7c8804fb28aa3b73465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 10:13:14 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from
+ writing server memory to file.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13020
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/smbd/reply.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
+index 317143f..7b07078 100644
+--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
++++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
+@@ -4474,6 +4474,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */
++	/*
++	 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
++	 */
+ 	if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) {
+ 		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ 		error_to_writebrawerr(req);
+@@ -4574,6 +4577,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
+ 			exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed");
+ 		}
+ 
++		/*
++		 * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163
++		 * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite
++		 * bytes available - we just read from the client.
++		 */
+ 		nwritten = write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite);
+ 		if (nwritten == -1) {
+ 			TALLOC_FREE(buf);
+@@ -4647,6 +4655,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
+ 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
+ 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
+ 	size_t numtowrite;
++	size_t remaining;
+ 	off_t startpos;
+ 	const char *data;
+ 	NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+@@ -4679,6 +4688,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
+ 	startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
+ 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
++	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
++	 */
++	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
++	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
++		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) {
+ 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
+ 		    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
+@@ -4756,6 +4776,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
+ {
+ 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
+ 	size_t numtowrite;
++	size_t remaining;
+ 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
+ 	off_t startpos;
+ 	const char *data;
+@@ -4796,6 +4817,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
+ 	startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
+ 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
++	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
++	 */
++	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
++	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
++		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++		END_PROFILE(SMBwrite);
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	if (!fsp->print_file) {
+ 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
+ 			(uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
+@@ -5018,6 +5050,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
++		/*
++		 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
++		 */
+ 		if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite ||
+ 				smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) {
+ 			reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+@@ -5444,6 +5479,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
+ {
+ 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
+ 	size_t numtowrite;
++	size_t remaining;
+ 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
+ 	NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ 	off_t startpos;
+@@ -5477,6 +5513,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
+ 	mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4));
+ 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 1;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
++	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
++	 */
++	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
++	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
++		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	if (fsp->print_file == NULL) {
+ 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
+ 		    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
+@@ -6069,6 +6116,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
+ 
+ 	numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1);
+ 
++	/*
++	 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
++	 */
+ 	if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) {
+ 		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ 		END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 7c564c1..df8c923 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -29,3 +29,6 @@ shadow_copy2_tests_42.patch
 Fix-deadlock-when-re-joining-a-domain.patch
 CVE-2017-7494.patch
 CVE-2017-11103-Orpheus-Lyre-KDC-REP-service-name-val.patch
+CVE-2017-12150-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt
+CVE-2017-12151-v4-4.patches.metze02.txt
+CVE-2017-12163-all-metze01.patch.txt

-- 
Alioth's /usr/local/bin/git-commit-notice on /srv/git.debian.org/git/pkg-samba/samba.git




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