[Pkg-samba-maint] [Git][samba-team/samba][master] 6 commits: Patches for CVE-2019-10218 and CVE-2019-14833
Mathieu Parent
gitlab at salsa.debian.org
Tue Oct 29 16:37:14 GMT 2019
Mathieu Parent pushed to branch master at Debian Samba Team / samba
Commits:
d9c7e90f by Mathieu Parent at 2019-10-18T18:24:44Z
Patches for CVE-2019-10218 and CVE-2019-14833
- - - - -
dcdc575c by Jeremy Allison at 2019-10-18T18:24:44Z
CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB1 client code from evil server returned names.
Disconnect with NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE if so.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14071
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
- - - - -
d93c0821 by Jeremy Allison at 2019-10-18T18:24:44Z
CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB2 client code from evil server returned names.
Disconnect with NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE if so.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14071
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
- - - - -
716dc197 by Andrew Bartlett at 2019-10-18T18:24:45Z
CVE-2019-14833: Use utf8 characters in the unacceptable password
This shows that the "check password script" handling has a bug.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12438
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
- - - - -
a50742ea by Björn Baumbach at 2019-10-18T18:24:45Z
CVE-2019-14833 dsdb: send full password to check password script
utf8_len represents the number of characters (not bytes) of the
password. If the password includes multi-byte characters it is required
to write the total number of bytes to the check password script.
Otherwise the last bytes of the password string would be ignored.
Therefore we rename utf8_len to be clear what it does and does
not represent.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12438
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb at sernet.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
- - - - -
e74a40a2 by Mathieu Parent at 2019-10-18T18:27:23Z
Release 2:4.11.0+dfsg-12
- - - - -
9 changed files:
- debian/changelog
- + debian/patches/CVE-2019-10218.master.patch
- + debian/patches/CVE-2019-14833-4.11-01.patch
- debian/patches/series
- selftest/target/Samba4.pm
- source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
- source3/libsmb/clilist.c
- source3/libsmb/proto.h
- source4/dsdb/common/util.c
Changes:
=====================================
debian/changelog
=====================================
@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
+samba (2:4.11.1+dfsg-2) unstable; urgency=high
+
+ * New upstream security release
+ - CVE-2019-10218: Malicious servers can cause Samba client code to return
+ filenames containing path separators to calling code.
+ - CVE-2019-14833: When the password contains multi-byte (non-ASCII)
+ characters, the check password script does not receive the full password
+ string.
+
+ -- Mathieu Parent <sathieu at debian.org> Fri, 18 Oct 2019 20:26:45 +0200
+
samba (2:4.11.1+dfsg-1) unstable; urgency=medium
* New upstream release
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2019-10218.master.patch
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+From 024b18d663d5ab84fe0e9a0991708d89639471b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 13:39:53 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB1 client code
+ from evil server returned names.
+
+Disconnect with NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE if so.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14071
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clilist.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ source3/libsmb/proto.h | 3 ++
+ 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clilist.c b/source3/libsmb/clilist.c
+index 5cb1fce4338..4f518339e2b 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clilist.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clilist.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,66 @@
+ #include "trans2.h"
+ #include "../libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h"
+
++/****************************************************************************
++ Check if a returned directory name is safe.
++****************************************************************************/
++
++static NTSTATUS is_bad_name(bool windows_names, const char *name)
++{
++ const char *bad_name_p = NULL;
++
++ bad_name_p = strchr(name, '/');
++ if (bad_name_p != NULL) {
++ /*
++ * Windows and POSIX names can't have '/'.
++ * Server is attacking us.
++ */
++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
++ }
++ if (windows_names) {
++ bad_name_p = strchr(name, '\\');
++ if (bad_name_p != NULL) {
++ /*
++ * Windows names can't have '\\'.
++ * Server is attacking us.
++ */
++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
++ }
++ }
++ return NT_STATUS_OK;
++}
++
++/****************************************************************************
++ Check if a returned directory name is safe. Disconnect if server is
++ sending bad names.
++****************************************************************************/
++
++NTSTATUS is_bad_finfo_name(const struct cli_state *cli,
++ const struct file_info *finfo)
++{
++ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
++ bool windows_names = true;
++
++ if (cli->requested_posix_capabilities & CIFS_UNIX_POSIX_PATHNAMES_CAP) {
++ windows_names = false;
++ }
++ if (finfo->name != NULL) {
++ status = is_bad_name(windows_names, finfo->name);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ DBG_ERR("bad finfo->name\n");
++ return status;
++ }
++ }
++ if (finfo->short_name != NULL) {
++ status = is_bad_name(windows_names, finfo->short_name);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ DBG_ERR("bad finfo->short_name\n");
++ return status;
++ }
++ }
++ return NT_STATUS_OK;
++}
++
+ /****************************************************************************
+ Calculate a safe next_entry_offset.
+ ****************************************************************************/
+@@ -492,6 +552,13 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_list_old_recv(struct tevent_req *req, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ TALLOC_FREE(finfo);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
++
++ status = is_bad_finfo_name(state->cli, finfo);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(state->cli->conn, status);
++ TALLOC_FREE(finfo);
++ return status;
++ }
+ }
+ *pfinfo = finfo;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+@@ -727,6 +794,14 @@ static void cli_list_trans_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ ff_eos = true;
+ break;
+ }
++
++ status = is_bad_finfo_name(state->cli, finfo);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(state->cli->conn, status);
++ tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (!state->first && (state->mask[0] != '\0') &&
+ strcsequal(finfo->name, state->mask)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Error: Looping in FIND_NEXT as name %s has "
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+index 6a647da58c8..48855d7112c 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
++++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+@@ -760,6 +760,9 @@ NTSTATUS cli_posix_whoami(struct cli_state *cli,
+
+ /* The following definitions come from libsmb/clilist.c */
+
++NTSTATUS is_bad_finfo_name(const struct cli_state *cli,
++ const struct file_info *finfo);
++
+ NTSTATUS cli_list_old(struct cli_state *cli,const char *Mask,uint16_t attribute,
+ NTSTATUS (*fn)(const char *, struct file_info *,
+ const char *, void *), void *state);
+--
+2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog
+
+
+From bfa8a5991b15f69168587b88dc2d81c172f7617c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 12:08:09 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB2 client code
+ from evil server returned names.
+
+Disconnect with NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE if so.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14071
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c b/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
+index 535beaab841..3fa322c243b 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
+@@ -1442,6 +1442,13 @@ NTSTATUS cli_smb2_list(struct cli_state *cli,
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
++ /* Protect against server attack. */
++ status = is_bad_finfo_name(cli, finfo);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(cli->conn, status);
++ goto fail;
++ }
++
+ if (dir_check_ftype((uint32_t)finfo->mode,
+ (uint32_t)attribute)) {
+ /*
+--
+2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog
+
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2019-14833-4.11-01.patch
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From 52f8d4b40c1a7b88ec5e1cf4752ffb2921e96383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
+Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2019 11:50:01 +1200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2019-14833: Use utf8 characters in the unacceptable
+ password
+
+This shows that the "check password script" handling has a bug.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12438
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
+---
+ selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords | 1 +
+ selftest/target/Samba4.pm | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords
+
+diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords b/selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000000..75fa2fc32b8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++^samba.tests.samba_tool.user_check_password_script.samba.tests.samba_tool.user_check_password_script.UserCheckPwdTestCase.test_checkpassword_unacceptable\(chgdcpass:local\)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/selftest/target/Samba4.pm b/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
+index 02cdfc18bad..195e9b88044 100755
+--- a/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
++++ b/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
+@@ -1993,7 +1993,7 @@ sub provision_chgdcpass($$)
+ print "PROVISIONING CHGDCPASS...\n";
+ # This environment disallows the use of this password
+ # (and also removes the default AD complexity checks)
+- my $unacceptable_password = "widk3Dsle32jxdBdskldsk55klASKQ";
++ my $unacceptable_password = "Paßßword-widk3Dsle32jxdBdskldsk55klASKQ";
+ my $extra_smb_conf = "
+ check password script = $self->{srcdir}/selftest/checkpassword_arg1.sh ${unacceptable_password}
+ allow dcerpc auth level connect:lsarpc = yes
+--
+2.17.1
+
+
+From d99d4d9c336fc8ad5a41af64cd963f548653c7da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn=20Baumbach?= <bb at sernet.de>
+Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 16:32:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2019-14833 dsdb: send full password to check password
+ script
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+utf8_len represents the number of characters (not bytes) of the
+password. If the password includes multi-byte characters it is required
+to write the total number of bytes to the check password script.
+Otherwise the last bytes of the password string would be ignored.
+
+Therefore we rename utf8_len to be clear what it does and does
+not represent.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12438
+
+Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb at sernet.de>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
+---
+ selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords | 1 -
+ source4/dsdb/common/util.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords
+
+diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords b/selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 75fa2fc32b8..00000000000
+--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/unacceptable-passwords
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1 +0,0 @@
+-^samba.tests.samba_tool.user_check_password_script.samba.tests.samba_tool.user_check_password_script.UserCheckPwdTestCase.test_checkpassword_unacceptable\(chgdcpass:local\)
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/source4/dsdb/common/util.c b/source4/dsdb/common/util.c
+index e521ed09999..3ebec827404 100644
+--- a/source4/dsdb/common/util.c
++++ b/source4/dsdb/common/util.c
+@@ -2036,21 +2036,36 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const uint32_t pwdProperties,
+ const uint32_t minPwdLength)
+ {
+- const char *utf8_pw = (const char *)utf8_blob->data;
+- size_t utf8_len = strlen_m(utf8_pw);
+ char *password_script = NULL;
++ const char *utf8_pw = (const char *)utf8_blob->data;
++
++ /*
++ * This looks strange because it is.
++ *
++ * The check for the number of characters in the password
++ * should clearly not be against the byte length, or else a
++ * single UTF8 character would count for more than one.
++ *
++ * We have chosen to use the number of 16-bit units that the
++ * password encodes to as the measure of length. This is not
++ * the same as the number of codepoints, if a password
++ * contains a character beyond the Basic Multilingual Plane
++ * (above 65535) it will count for more than one "character".
++ */
++
++ size_t password_characters_roughly = strlen_m(utf8_pw);
+
+ /* checks if the "minPwdLength" property is satisfied */
+- if (minPwdLength > utf8_len) {
++ if (minPwdLength > password_characters_roughly) {
+ return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_PWD_TOO_SHORT;
+ }
+
+- /* checks the password complexity */
++ /* We might not be asked to check the password complexity */
+ if (!(pwdProperties & DOMAIN_PASSWORD_COMPLEX)) {
+ return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+- if (utf8_len == 0) {
++ if (password_characters_roughly == 0) {
+ return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_COMPLEX_ENOUGH;
+ }
+
+@@ -2058,6 +2073,7 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ if (password_script != NULL && *password_script != '\0') {
+ int check_ret = 0;
+ int error = 0;
++ ssize_t nwritten = 0;
+ struct tevent_context *event_ctx = NULL;
+ struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
+ int cps_stdin = -1;
+@@ -2120,7 +2136,9 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+
+ cps_stdin = samba_runcmd_export_stdin(req);
+
+- if (write(cps_stdin, utf8_pw, utf8_len) != utf8_len) {
++ nwritten = write(cps_stdin, utf8_blob->data,
++ utf8_blob->length);
++ if (nwritten != utf8_blob->length) {
+ close(cps_stdin);
+ cps_stdin = -1;
+ TALLOC_FREE(password_script);
+--
+2.17.1
+
=====================================
debian/patches/series
=====================================
@@ -11,3 +11,5 @@ fix-nfs-service-name-to-nfs-kernel-server.patch
build-Remove-tests-for-getdents-and-getdirentries.patch
wscript-remove-all-checks-for-_FUNC-and-__FUNC.patch
wscript-split-function-check-to-one-per-line-and-sor.patch
+CVE-2019-10218.master.patch
+CVE-2019-14833-4.11-01.patch
=====================================
selftest/target/Samba4.pm
=====================================
@@ -1993,7 +1993,7 @@ sub provision_chgdcpass($$)
print "PROVISIONING CHGDCPASS...\n";
# This environment disallows the use of this password
# (and also removes the default AD complexity checks)
- my $unacceptable_password = "widk3Dsle32jxdBdskldsk55klASKQ";
+ my $unacceptable_password = "Paßßword-widk3Dsle32jxdBdskldsk55klASKQ";
my $extra_smb_conf = "
check password script = $self->{srcdir}/selftest/checkpassword_arg1.sh ${unacceptable_password}
allow dcerpc auth level connect:lsarpc = yes
=====================================
source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
=====================================
@@ -1442,6 +1442,13 @@ NTSTATUS cli_smb2_list(struct cli_state *cli,
goto fail;
}
+ /* Protect against server attack. */
+ status = is_bad_finfo_name(cli, finfo);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(cli->conn, status);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
if (dir_check_ftype((uint32_t)finfo->mode,
(uint32_t)attribute)) {
/*
=====================================
source3/libsmb/clilist.c
=====================================
@@ -24,6 +24,66 @@
#include "trans2.h"
#include "../libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h"
+/****************************************************************************
+ Check if a returned directory name is safe.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS is_bad_name(bool windows_names, const char *name)
+{
+ const char *bad_name_p = NULL;
+
+ bad_name_p = strchr(name, '/');
+ if (bad_name_p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Windows and POSIX names can't have '/'.
+ * Server is attacking us.
+ */
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
+ }
+ if (windows_names) {
+ bad_name_p = strchr(name, '\\');
+ if (bad_name_p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Windows names can't have '\\'.
+ * Server is attacking us.
+ */
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
+ }
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Check if a returned directory name is safe. Disconnect if server is
+ sending bad names.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+NTSTATUS is_bad_finfo_name(const struct cli_state *cli,
+ const struct file_info *finfo)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ bool windows_names = true;
+
+ if (cli->requested_posix_capabilities & CIFS_UNIX_POSIX_PATHNAMES_CAP) {
+ windows_names = false;
+ }
+ if (finfo->name != NULL) {
+ status = is_bad_name(windows_names, finfo->name);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DBG_ERR("bad finfo->name\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+ if (finfo->short_name != NULL) {
+ status = is_bad_name(windows_names, finfo->short_name);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DBG_ERR("bad finfo->short_name\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
/****************************************************************************
Calculate a safe next_entry_offset.
****************************************************************************/
@@ -492,6 +552,13 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_list_old_recv(struct tevent_req *req, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
TALLOC_FREE(finfo);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
+
+ status = is_bad_finfo_name(state->cli, finfo);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(state->cli->conn, status);
+ TALLOC_FREE(finfo);
+ return status;
+ }
}
*pfinfo = finfo;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
@@ -727,6 +794,14 @@ static void cli_list_trans_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
ff_eos = true;
break;
}
+
+ status = is_bad_finfo_name(state->cli, finfo);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(state->cli->conn, status);
+ tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!state->first && (state->mask[0] != '\0') &&
strcsequal(finfo->name, state->mask)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Error: Looping in FIND_NEXT as name %s has "
=====================================
source3/libsmb/proto.h
=====================================
@@ -760,6 +760,9 @@ NTSTATUS cli_posix_whoami(struct cli_state *cli,
/* The following definitions come from libsmb/clilist.c */
+NTSTATUS is_bad_finfo_name(const struct cli_state *cli,
+ const struct file_info *finfo);
+
NTSTATUS cli_list_old(struct cli_state *cli,const char *Mask,uint16_t attribute,
NTSTATUS (*fn)(const char *, struct file_info *,
const char *, void *), void *state);
=====================================
source4/dsdb/common/util.c
=====================================
@@ -2036,21 +2036,36 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const uint32_t pwdProperties,
const uint32_t minPwdLength)
{
- const char *utf8_pw = (const char *)utf8_blob->data;
- size_t utf8_len = strlen_m(utf8_pw);
char *password_script = NULL;
+ const char *utf8_pw = (const char *)utf8_blob->data;
+
+ /*
+ * This looks strange because it is.
+ *
+ * The check for the number of characters in the password
+ * should clearly not be against the byte length, or else a
+ * single UTF8 character would count for more than one.
+ *
+ * We have chosen to use the number of 16-bit units that the
+ * password encodes to as the measure of length. This is not
+ * the same as the number of codepoints, if a password
+ * contains a character beyond the Basic Multilingual Plane
+ * (above 65535) it will count for more than one "character".
+ */
+
+ size_t password_characters_roughly = strlen_m(utf8_pw);
/* checks if the "minPwdLength" property is satisfied */
- if (minPwdLength > utf8_len) {
+ if (minPwdLength > password_characters_roughly) {
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_PWD_TOO_SHORT;
}
- /* checks the password complexity */
+ /* We might not be asked to check the password complexity */
if (!(pwdProperties & DOMAIN_PASSWORD_COMPLEX)) {
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
- if (utf8_len == 0) {
+ if (password_characters_roughly == 0) {
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_COMPLEX_ENOUGH;
}
@@ -2058,6 +2073,7 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
if (password_script != NULL && *password_script != '\0') {
int check_ret = 0;
int error = 0;
+ ssize_t nwritten = 0;
struct tevent_context *event_ctx = NULL;
struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
int cps_stdin = -1;
@@ -2120,7 +2136,9 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
cps_stdin = samba_runcmd_export_stdin(req);
- if (write(cps_stdin, utf8_pw, utf8_len) != utf8_len) {
+ nwritten = write(cps_stdin, utf8_blob->data,
+ utf8_blob->length);
+ if (nwritten != utf8_blob->length) {
close(cps_stdin);
cps_stdin = -1;
TALLOC_FREE(password_script);
View it on GitLab: https://salsa.debian.org/samba-team/samba/compare/5f5cb037fe06339b3b2534ca101a66e6b20a1689...e74a40a2c7c2de97accacfb4aa8b3038066cbc29
--
View it on GitLab: https://salsa.debian.org/samba-team/samba/compare/5f5cb037fe06339b3b2534ca101a66e6b20a1689...e74a40a2c7c2de97accacfb4aa8b3038066cbc29
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