[Pkg-shadow-devel] Bug#330350: passwd: Potential symlink attack
problem in remove-shell?
Christian Perrier
bubulle at debian.org
Tue Sep 27 17:07:56 UTC 2005
Package: passwd
Version: 1:4.0.12-2
Severity: normal
By looking at /usr/sbin/remove-shell, I see this:
==============================================================
file=/etc/shells
# I want this to be GUARANTEED to be on the same filesystem as $file
tmpfile=${file}.tmp
otmpfile=${file}.tmp2
set -o noclobber
trap "rm -f $tmpfile $otmpfile" EXIT
if ! cat $file > $tmpfile
then
cat 1>&2 <<EOF
Either another instance of $0 is running, or it was previously interrupted.
Please examine ${tmpfile} to see if it should be moved onto ${file}.
EOF
exit 1
fi
==============================================================
I actually think this is HIGHLY vulnerable to a symlink attack because of an
unsafe creation of a temporary file, with a predictable name.
Other shadow maintainers, do you confirm? If so, we have a nice security
bug, people...:-|
-- System Information:
Debian Release: testing/unstable
APT prefers unstable
APT policy: (500, 'unstable'), (500, 'stable')
Architecture: i386 (i686)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/bash
Kernel: Linux 2.6.12-1-686
Locale: LANG=fr_FR.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=fr_FR.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8) (ignored: LC_ALL set to fr_FR.UTF-8)
Versions of packages passwd depends on:
ii libc6 2.3.5-6 GNU C Library: Shared libraries an
ii libpam-modules 0.76-23 Pluggable Authentication Modules f
ii libpam0g 0.76-23 Pluggable Authentication Modules l
ii login 1:4.0.12-2 system login tools
passwd recommends no packages.
-- debconf information:
passwd/password-mismatch:
* passwd/username: bubulle
passwd/password-empty:
passwd/make-user: true
passwd/shadow: true
passwd/username-bad:
* passwd/user-fullname: Christian Perrier
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