[Pkg-shadow-devel] Bug#505271: closed ... fixed in shadow 1:4.1.1-6
thijs at debian.org
Mon Jan 26 13:37:52 UTC 2009
On Friday 23 January 2009 04:06, Paul Szabo wrote:
> Belatedly, I realize that this still leaves a DoS attack: fill up utmp
> with entries for all possible PIDs, then login will fail. Maybe that is
> "properly" Bug#505071 (as distinct from this one)? Please see there
> about ideas on how to perform this DoS without access to group utmp.
Although from the description I think it's definately something that's good to
fix, I do not think it's that serious to be a DSA. Still, thanks for your
help in analysing these issues - I hope Nicolas will pick up on this for a
future release of shadow.
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