[Pkg-shadow-devel] Bug#628843: login: tty hijacking possible in "su" via TIOCSTI ioctl

Simon Ruderich simon at ruderich.org
Mon Oct 3 19:34:14 UTC 2016


On Mon, Oct 03, 2016 at 09:22:50PM +0200, up201407890 at alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt wrote:
> Loss of job control in the shell.

I'm confused. I'm not talking about removing the controlling
terminal, but instead spawning a new session, opening a new pts
and connecting that to the program. This way the program has a
tty, job control works, but the tty is different and therefore
can't be controlled by the less-privileged account.

Regards
Simon
-- 
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