[Freedombox-discuss] Policy questions

Jonas Smedegaard dr at jones.dk
Wed May 4 08:23:23 UTC 2011

On 11-05-04 at 11:44am, Sandy Harris wrote:
> We have a bit of a design problem in that we want the FB to
> be very secure, but also to require a minimum of system
> administration.

Very relevant point!

> Our security requirements are very high.
> People might be jailed or even killed if security on these
> machines is broken. For example, Zimbabwe recently
> jailed a bunch of people for downloading Internet reports
> on the Tunisian revolution and discussing them.

But then again.  I envision several use cases of FreedomBoxes with 
different needs.

FreedomBoxes in my home country, Denmark: The physical home is generally 
respected as requiring preapproval from a judge to enter.  My friends 
living here sure need a non-crackable box but do not risk their lives 
owning it or turning it on.  They probably use the box more for fun than 
for serious cyber war activities themselves, but some of them might be 
interested in helping others - e.g. enable Tor/mesh/IPv6 exit node.

FreedomBoxes in "cyber war zones": At places where you can get tortured 
for political activities, the very existence of a FreedomBox likely is 
problematic.  I seriously doubt FreedomBoxes are even relevant to use at 
such places: A crucial need, I imagine, is stealth - which means a beige 
Plug device too easily stand out.  Those areas of the World sure need 
tools.  They can benefit from lots and lots of FreedomBoxes available 
elsewhere, to help create gates across fences, and to help create noise 
for internal communication. But most likely they are better off using a 
different boxing themselves.

I believe we should not try to cover all cyber warfare use with the 
FreedomBox, but (at least at first) on creating a box that is _usable_ 
and with relatively "harmless" tools loaded on it.

 - Jonas

 * Jonas Smedegaard - idealist & Internet-arkitekt
 * Tlf.: +45 40843136  Website: http://dr.jones.dk/

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