[Freedombox-discuss] Policy questions

Mathieu Jourdan mathieu.jourdan at gmail.com
Wed May 4 17:09:17 UTC 2011

On 4 May 2011 10:23, Jonas Smedegaard <dr at jones.dk> wrote:
> On 11-05-04 at 11:44am, Sandy Harris wrote:
>> We have a bit of a design problem in that we want the FB to
>> be very secure, but also to require a minimum of system
>> administration.
> Very relevant point!
>> Our security requirements are very high.
>> People might be jailed or even killed if security on these
>> machines is broken. For example, Zimbabwe recently
>> jailed a bunch of people for downloading Internet reports
>> on the Tunisian revolution and discussing them.
> But then again.  I envision several use cases of FreedomBoxes with
> different needs.
> FreedomBoxes in my home country, Denmark: The physical home is generally
> respected as requiring preapproval from a judge to enter.  My friends
> living here sure need a non-crackable box but do not risk their lives
> owning it or turning it on.  They probably use the box more for fun than
> for serious cyber war activities themselves, but some of them might be
> interested in helping others - e.g. enable Tor/mesh/IPv6 exit node.


In France, it is the same. However, citizen are not always aware of
their rights and policemen are not always prompt to inform citizen of
their rights. More than that, they do not hesitate to lie to get your
signature down on an official paper. Now that they have your
authorization, they can go back to your home and pick up what they
want, most often your computer and storage devices.

My point is that we can't rely on the law because it may be by-passed
especially by the ones who represent it (you know, the guys who should
protect you), and so it is. And it's only a matter of time to change
the rules.

In spite of that, I agree that we can't expect to build a perfectly
secure freedombox at the first time. But we will have to improve it.


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