[Freedombox-discuss] Dumb idea: Alternative to Tor that promotes good behavior

[Jonathan Wilkes]

On 10/28/2013 01:30 PM, Simo wrote:
> On Mon, 2013-10-28 at 10:02 -0700, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
>>
>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: Simo <s at ssimo.org>
>>> To: Bill Cox <waywardgeek at gmail.com>
>>> Cc: freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
>>> Sent: Monday, October 28, 2013 8:37 AM
>>> Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] Dumb idea: Alternative to Tor that promotes good behavior
>>> On Sun, 2013-10-27 at 13:26 -0400, Bill Cox wrote:
>>>> What do you guys think?
>>> You are a great censor!
>> Do you run a tor exit-node?
> No, I can't and probably wouldn't indeed.

Me neither...

>
>> The more important point to take away is that Tor's current design
>> puts an enormous responsibility on the owner/operator of the
>> exit-node.  I don't agree with Bill's approach either but I'd suspect
>> that most people would find it very difficult to directly support
>> basic principles of free speech when watching what tends to get
>> requested through their own machines.
> I do not disagree, yet Bill's proposal is a censor's dream.
>
> My rule is simple, whenever someone says something about "illegal
> material" replace it with "dissident material" ... in most cases you
> come up with a great censorship tool, assuming it can be made to work in
> the first place.

I think the main point I'm getting at is that potential node operators 
must do a risk analysis of running the node, and if the risks to them 
can be made lower then the kinds of arguments Bill has put forth get 
much easier (in a practical sense) to counter.

You're rule is philosophically sound regardless of those risks, so it 
doesn't really address the point of why one type of overlay would be 
preferable over another.  I admire the current exit-node operators 
because they are brave enough to take on the risks, but I'd prefer a 
design where one doesn't have to be that brave in order to add key 
support to the infrastructure.

-Jonathan