[Pkg-sssd-devel] [Git][sssd-team/sssd][trixie] 18 commits: debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-88252.diff.
Bastien Roucariès (@rouca)
gitlab at salsa.debian.org
Sat Nov 14 23:48:30 GMT 2026
Bastien Roucariès pushed to branch trixie at Debian SSSD packaging / sssd
Commits:
f1d66948 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T19:39:58+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-88252.diff.
CVE-2026-88252: Fix flaw in sssd where a local user has been able to
cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by exhausting the responder service's
available file descriptors (system handles used for open connections).
(Closes: #1150238)
- - - - -
5c249955 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T19:42:47+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-90462.diff.
CVE-2026-90462: LDAP: fix fail-open in ppolicy access check on zero
results. Don't incorrectly return success and cache an allow decision,
permitting continued authorization for a deleted or deprovisioned user.
(Closes: #1148827)
- - - - -
b1186fa1 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T19:50:32+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-90994.diff.
CVE-2026-90994: Fix a flaw in sssd's PAM responder's protocol v1 parser,
where a local client with access to the PAM responder's UNIX socket as
been able to send an empty or truncated PAM request body, triggering an
out-of-bounds read, leading to a denial of service.
(Closes: #1148324)
- - - - -
55b0bd96 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T19:50:55+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-90996.diff.
CVE-2026-90996: Fix a flaw in sssd where a local unprivileges user has
been able to send a specially crafted request with a zero-length body to
the Network Security Service (NSS) responder. This could have lead to a
denial-of-service condition, causing the NSS responder to become
unstable or terminate.
(Closes: #1148326)
- - - - -
90597299 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T19:53:24+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-90463-{1,2}.diff.
CVE-2026-90463: Fix input validation vulnerability in sssd's NSS
responder: The vulnerability has allowed a local attacker to cause an
out-of-bounds read by sending specially crafted service lookup requests
to the NSS responder's UNIX socket, leading to crashes of the NSS
responder process.
(Closes: #1148452)
- - - - -
b9ababee by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T20:27:07+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-90995.diff.
CVE-2026-90995: PAM: avoid NULL deref when service item is missing.
(Closes: #1148325).
- - - - -
c6733062 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T20:33:01+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104031.diff.
CVE-2026-104031: autofs: free per-request context on successful replies.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
bf4990e7 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T20:36:16+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104032.diff.
CVE-2026-104032: autofs: add 'allowed_uids' option to the autofs
responder. Prevent unprivileged local users from repeatedly requesting
master automount map updates through the autofs responder due to missing
authorization checks.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
b7187856 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T23:09:54+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104033.diff.
CVE-2026-104033: Treat shadowExpire=0 correctly. shadowExpire can be set
to 0, representing the beginning of the Unix epoch. An account with
shadowExpire set to 0 should be treated as expired.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
af378b4b by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T23:11:11+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104036.diff.
CVE-2026-104036: nfs idmap: error out if buffer is too small. Prevent
denial-of-service caused by out-of-bounds writes when requesting
identity lookups that resolve to oversized cached entries.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
d9193ac5 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T23:12:58+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104038.diff.
CVE-2026-104038: certmap: check that SID exists in certificate. Prevent
from attachers being able to cause denial-of-services by certmap: check
that SID exists in certificate.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
82ad5d4e by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T23:15:15+01:00
CVE-2026-104039: Add CVE-2026-104039.diff.
CVE-2026-104039: PAM: clear state pointer before freeing state itself.
When handling Generic Security Services Application Programming
Interface (GSSAPI) authentication in the Pluggable Authentication Module
(PAM) responder, cached connection state was freed upon completion
without clearing the reference pointer. This could have lead to
attackers being able to exploit this by sending an additional request
over the same connection, causing the service to access invalid memory
and unexpectedly terminate.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
2af219c1 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T23:19:24+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104042.diff.
CVE-2026-104042: pam: Guard against zero-length string auth tokens.
Prevent crash in PAM responder by input validation when (crafted)
Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) requests containing a zero-length
authentication token gets sent to the responder socket.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
33882782 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T23:20:20+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104043.diff.
CVE-2026-104043: nss: guard against length underflow in packet. Prevent
from out-of-bounds memory read during packet parsing, crashing the
responder process and resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS), in case a
local attacker with access to the Name Service Switch (NSS) responder
UNIX socket triggers an integer underflow by sending a specially crafted
request with an undersized packet header.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
045c331f by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T23:49:09+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104044-pre.diff and CVE-2026-104044.diff.
CVE-2026-104044: pam: prevent null dereference in kerberos passkey flow.
Prevent local attackers from being able to trigger a Denial of Service
(DoS) by sending a specially crafted Pluggable Authentication Module
(PAM) request when passkey authentication is enabled.
The additional patch CVE-2026-104044-pre.diff fixes potential memory
leaks and is required for CVE-2026-104044.diff to apply cleanly.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
df6a8905 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T23:49:11+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104045.diff.
CVE-2026-104045: autofs: avoid leaked enumeration contexts after map. By
repeatedly sending concurrent map enumeration and invalidation requests,
an attacker has been able to cause memory to leak, leading to excessive
memory consumption that could disrupt or crash the autofs service.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
746ac931 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-14T23:51:02+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-104048.diff.
CVE-2026-104048: ipa: compare users with domain awareness against HBAC
rules.
In trust-enabled identity management environments, SSSD evaluates
Host-Based Access Control (HBAC) rules by stripping domain qualifiers
and comparing only short usernames. An authenticated user in a trusted
domain who shares the same username as an authorized local account has
been able to bypass access policies and gain unauthorized access to
protected services or hosts.
(Closes: #1150238).
- - - - -
80cb5219 by Mike Gabriel at 2026-11-15T00:47:53+01:00
debian/patches: Add CVE-2026-92821.diff.
CVE-2026-92821: ldap: pwd_expire_policy_warn does not overwrite errors
Make sure the 'pwd_expire_policy_warn' access check does not overwrite
any access denied or other errors.
- - - - -
22 changed files:
- debian/changelog
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104031.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104032.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104033.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104036.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104038.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104039.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104042.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104043.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104044-pre.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104044.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104045.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104048.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-88252.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-90462.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-90463-1.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-90463-2.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-90994.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-90995.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-90996.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-92821.diff
- debian/patches/series
Changes:
=====================================
debian/changelog
=====================================
@@ -8,6 +8,153 @@ sssd (2.10.1-2+deb13u2) trixie-security; urgency=medium
significant memory by sending a large request length header, leading to
memory exhaustion, and thus ending in a DoS.
(Closes: #1150238)
+ + Add CVE-2026-88252.diff:
+ A local user can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by exhausting the
+ responder service's available file descriptors (system handles used
+ for open connections). By opening and maintaining many concurrent
+ connections to a responder socket while continuing to queue new
+ connection attempts, an attacker can trigger an unthrottled retry
+ loop. This condition leads to high CPU utilization and stalls the
+ service, preventing legitimate identity and authentication requests
+ from being processed.
+ + Add CVE-2026-90462.diff:
+ When configured with the LDAP access provider and
+ `ldap_access_order` including `ppolicy` or `lockout`, a fail-open
+ condition in the LDAP ppolicy access check can occur if a user
+ lookup returns zero results. This can incorrectly return success and
+ cache an allow decision, permitting continued authorization for a
+ deleted or deprovisioned user. A remote attacker with prior valid
+ account context could exploit this to maintain access to information
+ and potentially make limited modifications to resources that should
+ no longer be available.
+ (Closes: #1148827)
+ + Add CVE-2026-90463*.diff:
+ A flaw was found in the sssd NSS responder. This input validation
+ vulnerability allows a local attacker, by sending specially crafted
+ service lookup requests to the NSS responder's UNIX socket, to cause
+ an out-of-bounds read. This out-of-bounds read may lead to a denial
+ of service (DoS) by crashing the NSS responder process. While
+ unprivileged local clients can typically reach the socket, there is
+ no evidence of privilege escalation or reliable data disclosure.
+ (Closes: #1148452)
+ + Add CVE-2026-90994.diff:
+ A flaw was found in sssd, specifically within the PAM (Pluggable
+ Authentication Modules) responder's protocol v1 parser,
+ pam_parse_in_data(). A local client with access to the PAM
+ responder's UNIX socket can exploit this by negotiating protocol v1
+ and sending an empty or truncated PAM request body. This can trigger
+ an out-of-bounds read, potentially causing the PAM responder to
+ terminate or restart, leading to a local denial of service.
+ (Closes: #1148324)
+ + Add CVE-2026-90995.diff:
+ A local attacker with privileges to connect to the PAM (Pluggable
+ Authentication Modules) responder socket can send a specially
+ crafted protocol request. If the `pam_app_services` configuration is
+ enabled and the service item is omitted from the request, a NULL
+ pointer dereference can occur. This vulnerability leads to a denial
+ of service, causing the PAM responder to crash and disrupt
+ authentication services.
+ (Closes: #1148325)
+ + Add CVE-2026-90996.diff:
+ A local unprivileged user could send a specially crafted request
+ with a zero-length body to the Network Security Services (NSS)
+ responder. This could lead to a denial-of-service condition, causing
+ the NSS responder to become unstable or terminate. This
+ vulnerability affects the availability of the system responder.
+ (Closes: #1148326)
+ + Add CVE-2026-92821.diff:
+ When configured to evaluate password expiration warnings before
+ restrictive access rules in LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access
+ Protocol) environments, an expired-password warning terminates rule
+ evaluation early and treats the access request as successful. A
+ remote authenticated user with an expired password using an
+ alternative authentication method, such as SSH public key
+ authentication, can exploit this flaw to bypass access control
+ restrictions and gain unauthorized access to protected systems.
+ (Closes: #1150199)
+ + Add CVE-2026-104031.diff:
+ In configurations where the autofs responder service is enabled,
+ memory allocated during successful request processing is not
+ released until the client connection terminates. A local attacker
+ can exploit this vulnerability by maintaining an open connection and
+ repeatedly submitting valid requests, leading to memory exhaustion
+ and a Denial of Service (DoS).
+ (Closes: #1150238)
+ + Add CVE-2026-104032.diff:
+ An unprivileged local user can repeatedly request master automount
+ map updates through the autofs responder due to missing
+ authorization checks. This triggers global cache invalidation and
+ forces repeated lookups to backend directory providers, leading to a
+ Denial of Service (DoS) from degraded automount availability and
+ elevated resource consumption.
+ + Add CVE-2026-104033.diff:
+ When configured to enforce account expiration using LDAP
+ (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) shadow attributes, SSSD
+ fails to treat an expiration value of zero as an expired account. A
+ user with valid credentials for an expired account can exploit this
+ flaw to bypass access controls and authenticate to the system. This
+ allows unauthorized access to persist after the account was intended
+ to be deactivated.
+ + Add CVE-2026-104036.diff:
+ A flaw was found in SSSD's NFS idmap plugin. When retrieving cached
+ user or group names, the plugin detects if an entry exceeds the
+ destination buffer size but fails to abort before copying data. A
+ local attacker can trigger this vulnerability by requesting identity
+ lookups that resolve to oversized cached entries, resulting in an
+ out-of-bounds write. This flaw primarily leads to a Denial of
+ Service (DoS) by crashing the identity mapping service, and may also
+ corrupt adjacent process memory.
+ + Add CVE-2026-104038.diff:
+ A remote attacker can cause a denial of service (DoS) by submitting
+ a certificate that lacks an expected Security Identifier (SID)
+ extension. In deployments configured with SID-based certificate
+ mapping rules, the service fails to verify the presence of the
+ extension before processing it, causing the process to crash during
+ authentication or lookup operations.
+ + Add CVE-2026-104039.diff:
+ A local user can cause a denial of service (DoS) by disrupting
+ system authentication services. When handling Generic Security
+ Services Application Programming Interface (GSSAPI) authentication
+ in the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) responder, cached
+ connection state is freed upon completion without clearing the
+ reference pointer. An attacker can exploit this by sending an
+ additional request over the same connection, causing the service to
+ access invalid memory and unexpectedly terminate.
+ + Add CVE-2026-104042:
+ A local attacker can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by sending a
+ crafted Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) request containing a
+ zero-length authentication token to the responder socket. Due to
+ missing input validation, the service attempts to read beyond buffer
+ boundaries when processing the token, causing the PAM responder to
+ crash.
+ + Add CVE-2026-104043:
+ A local attacker with access to the Name Service Switch (NSS)
+ responder UNIX socket can trigger an integer underflow by sending a
+ specially crafted request with an undersized packet header. This
+ issue causes an out-of-bounds memory read during packet parsing,
+ crashing the responder process and resulting in a Denial of Service
+ (DoS).
+ + Add CVE-2026-104044.diff:
+ A local attacker can trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by sending a
+ specially crafted Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) request when
+ passkey authentication is enabled. Due to a missing state validation
+ check in passkey Kerberos handling, the PAM responder dereferences
+ an uninitialized pointer and crashes. This failure disrupts
+ authentication services on the host.
+ + Add CVE-2026-104045.diff:
+ A local user can trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by exploiting a
+ race condition in the autofs responder between asynchronous
+ enumeration completion and map invalidation. By repeatedly sending
+ concurrent map enumeration and invalidation requests, an attacker
+ can cause memory to leak, leading to excessive memory consumption
+ that can disrupt or crash the autofs service.
+ + Add CVE-2026-104048:
+ In trust-enabled identity management environments, SSSD evaluates
+ Host-Based Access Control (HBAC) rules by stripping domain
+ qualifiers and comparing only short usernames. An authenticated user
+ in a trusted domain who shares the same username as an authorized
+ local account can bypass access policies and gain unauthorized
+ access to protected services or hosts.
-- Bastien Roucariès <rouca at debian.org> Sat, 14 Nov 2026 19:25:29 +0100
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104031.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 7b50db5032cb4f9c17581a9710654a56a20dd527 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 19:13:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] autofs: free per-request context on successful replies
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104031
+
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c
++++ b/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c
+@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
+- sss_cmd_done(cmd_ctx->cli_ctx, NULL);
++ sss_cmd_done(cmd_ctx->cli_ctx, cmd_ctx);
+ }
+
+ static int
+@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
+- sss_cmd_done(cmd_ctx->cli_ctx, NULL);
++ sss_cmd_done(cmd_ctx->cli_ctx, cmd_ctx);
+ }
+
+ static errno_t
+@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
+- sss_cmd_done(cmd_ctx->cli_ctx, NULL);
++ sss_cmd_done(cmd_ctx->cli_ctx, cmd_ctx);
+ }
+
+ struct cli_protocol_version *register_cli_protocol_version(void)
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104032.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+From 5d127f22ae8cadf7846ae5ab0b27efa5e732bb6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 19:54:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] autofs: add 'allowed_uids' option to the autofs responder
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+and make its default to be "0" so that only automount can connect
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104032
+:config: 'autofs' responder now supports `allowed_uids` config option that defaults to "0"
+
+Assisted-By: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+Reviewed-by: Pavel Březina <pbrezina at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2479381
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/5d127f22ae8cadf7846ae5ab0b27efa5e732bb6f
+---
+ src/config/cfg_rules.ini | 1 +
+ src/config/etc/sssd.api.conf | 1 +
+ src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/responder/autofs/autofssrv.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
+
+Index: sssd/src/config/cfg_rules.ini
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/config/cfg_rules.ini 2026-11-14 20:33:10.877169134 +0100
++++ sssd/src/config/cfg_rules.ini 2026-11-14 20:33:10.876253794 +0100
+@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@
+ option = cache_first
+
+ # autofs service
++option = allowed_uids
+ option = autofs_negative_timeout
+
+ [rule/allowed_ssh_options]
+Index: sssd/src/config/etc/sssd.api.conf
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/config/etc/sssd.api.conf 2026-11-14 20:33:10.877169134 +0100
++++ sssd/src/config/etc/sssd.api.conf 2026-11-14 20:33:10.876439231 +0100
+@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@
+
+ [autofs]
+ # autofs service
++allowed_uids = str, None, false
+ autofs_negative_timeout = int, None, false
+
+ [ssh]
+Index: sssd/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml 2026-11-14 20:33:10.877169134 +0100
++++ sssd/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml 2026-11-14 20:33:10.876773122 +0100
+@@ -2107,6 +2107,29 @@
+ </para>
+ <variablelist>
+ <varlistentry>
++ <term>allowed_uids (string)</term>
++ <listitem>
++ <para>
++ Specifies the comma-separated list of UID values or
++ user names that are allowed to access the autofs
++ responder. User names are resolved to UIDs at
++ startup.
++ </para>
++ <para>
++ Default: 0 (only the root user is allowed to access
++ the autofs responder)
++ </para>
++ <para>
++ Please note that although the UID 0 is used as the
++ default it will be overwritten with this option. If
++ you still want to allow the root user to access the
++ autofs responder, which would be the typical case,
++ you have to add 0 to the list of allowed UIDs as
++ well.
++ </para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++ <varlistentry>
+ <term>autofs_negative_timeout (integer)</term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+Index: sssd/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv.c 2026-11-14 20:33:10.877169134 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv.c 2026-11-14 20:33:10.877153973 +0100
+@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@
+ #include "sss_iface/sss_iface_async.h"
+ #include "util/sss_ptr_hash.h"
+
++/* 'automount' runs under root */
++#define DEFAULT_ALLOWED_UIDS "0"
++
+ static errno_t
+ autofs_get_config(struct autofs_ctx *actx,
+ struct confdb_ctx *cdb)
+@@ -102,6 +105,7 @@
+ struct resp_ctx *rctx;
+ struct sss_cmd_table *autofs_cmds;
+ struct autofs_ctx *autofs_ctx;
++ char *uid_str;
+ int ret;
+
+ autofs_cmds = get_autofs_cmds();
+@@ -133,6 +137,23 @@
+ autofs_ctx->rctx = rctx;
+ autofs_ctx->rctx->pvt_ctx = autofs_ctx;
+
++ ret = confdb_get_string(autofs_ctx->rctx->cdb, autofs_ctx->rctx,
++ CONFDB_AUTOFS_CONF_ENTRY, CONFDB_SERVICE_ALLOWED_UIDS,
++ DEFAULT_ALLOWED_UIDS, &uid_str);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, "Failed to get allowed UIDs.\n");
++ goto fail;
++ }
++
++ ret = csv_string_to_uid_array(autofs_ctx->rctx, uid_str,
++ &autofs_ctx->rctx->allowed_uids_count,
++ &autofs_ctx->rctx->allowed_uids);
++ talloc_free(uid_str);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, "Failed to set allowed UIDs.\n");
++ goto fail;
++ }
++
+ /* Create the lookup table for setautomntent results */
+ autofs_ctx->maps = sss_ptr_hash_create(autofs_ctx,
+ autofs_maps_delete_cb,
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104033.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 69fde641a59e91abf2fbad6c0821579b866e40d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 16:20:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Treat shadowExpire=0 correctly
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+shadowExpire can be set to 0, representing the beginning of the Unix
+epoch. An account with shadowExpire set to 0 should be treated as
+expired.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104033
+
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c
++++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c
+@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@
+ }
+
+ today = (long) (time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24));
+- if (sp_expire > 0 && today >= sp_expire) {
++ if (sp_expire >= 0 && today >= sp_expire) {
+
+ ret = pam_add_response(pd, SSS_PAM_SYSTEM_INFO,
+ sizeof(SHADOW_EXPIRE_MSG),
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104036.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 671d224106b98952cfd1f26176759629a859509d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sumit Bose <sbose at redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2026 13:04:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] nfs idmap: error out if buffer is too small
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Although SSSD's NFS idmap plugin checks the buffer size it does not
+error out immediately if the buffer is too small. This patch fixes
+this.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104036
+
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/sss_client/nfs/sss_nfs_client.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/sss_client/nfs/sss_nfs_client.c
++++ b/src/sss_client/nfs/sss_nfs_client.c
+@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@
+ IDMAP_LOG(0, ("%s: reply too long; pw_name_len=%lu, len=%lu",
+ __func__, pw_name_len, len));
+ rc = ENOBUFS;
++ goto done;
+ }
+ IDMAP_LOG(1, ("found uid %i in memcache", uid));
+ memcpy(name, pwd.pw_name, pw_name_len);
+@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@
+ IDMAP_LOG(0, ("%s: reply too long; gr_name_len=%lu, len=%lu",
+ __func__, gr_name_len, len));
+ rc = ENOBUFS;
++ goto done;
+ }
+ IDMAP_LOG(1, ("found gid %i in memcache", gid));
+ memcpy(name, grp.gr_name, gr_name_len);
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104038.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From db521e9e3156309256b764261ebb0343fb4a6bfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2026 12:35:30 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] certmap: check that SID exists in certificate
+
+We have to check that SID is not NULL before using
+it in mapping rule.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104038
+
+Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose at redhat.com>
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2478980
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/db521e9e3156309256b764261ebb0343fb4a6bfd
+---
+ src/lib/certmap/sss_certmap.c | 4 ++++
+ src/tests/cmocka/test_certmap.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: sssd/src/lib/certmap/sss_certmap.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/lib/certmap/sss_certmap.c 2026-11-14 23:11:18.144290203 +0100
++++ sssd/src/lib/certmap/sss_certmap.c 2026-11-14 23:11:18.128290114 +0100
+@@ -580,6 +580,10 @@
+ char *exp;
+ char *sep;
+
++ if (sid == NULL) {
++ CM_DEBUG(ctx, "SID is missing.");
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
+ if (attr_name == NULL) {
+ exp = talloc_strdup(ctx, sid);
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attr_name, "rid") == 0) {
+Index: sssd/src/tests/cmocka/test_certmap.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/tests/cmocka/test_certmap.c 2026-11-14 23:11:18.144290203 +0100
++++ sssd/src/tests/cmocka/test_certmap.c 2026-11-14 23:11:18.140290180 +0100
+@@ -831,6 +831,26 @@
+ "d+GO2zfbNX8oS/LjZ5f/Vpmiu04VPdiifdYAbfCQez3bevYBQn4D/bq/xVHoHSLY" \
+ "x0N7c7iPuFTCbg+OVrkH3OtPuRT/4kTn"
+
++#define TEST_CERT_WITHOUT_SID_EXT \
++ "MIIDSzCCAjOgAwIBAgIUOue9814XTdiAqheGZjzrkrdhooAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL" \
++ "BQAwGDEWMBQGA1UEAwwNcm9vdC1kYy5hZC52bTAeFw0yNjEwMDgxNTEyMzBaFw0y" \
++ "NzEwMDgxNTEyMzBaMBgxFjAUBgNVBAMMDXJvb3QtZGMuYWQudm0wggEiMA0GCSqG" \
++ "SIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDxRgOYuKIudmsg25qT787h+daIBu5wMDIY" \
++ "Auy5goiXObVmf6H5mcR4QxupA7Js39Wts70Yhaupl1AANqXjl/Di0B0B3LJ69bqn" \
++ "Bv4J4zYdXdjyR7XBzbJVAExr8smomOqVUjC2MpPb2yTkSpVYQyTdUdCCc6EJBQoP" \
++ "IJrjxZHwH+pGInQDupCycia9MlawLWQFFZ8rIaspsIDTjbsww9k9pIQUgVQNHHl+" \
++ "0MBNV70Bn4L5rvb2yeyEV8PrmX0ql9mfoJaXZ+JMbQwLe5cSk/NviO/d0iqCWB9c" \
++ "CQhac4cmXBwkY4tRPt7IsTNWdlj/vni80QYlhy7+dBr9kQRm+TKnAgMBAAGjgYww" \
++ "gYkwHQYDVR0OBBYEFMKwt+h2D1upXwnl7n+RbNKUNbxaMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMKw" \
++ "t+h2D1upXwnl7n+RbNKUNbxaMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr" \
++ "BgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwGAYDVR0RBBEwD4INcm9vdC1kYy5hZC52bTANBgkq" \
++ "hkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA52V9wY6MGzVusbxLKSdeIv6zTHzOSC2W18nzqgsz6GEv" \
++ "adQEqf3B43dQOjK0llqxebqoBJkV5dlnoCeMNf50Q328w6abeAW5cl0S9yOHvNEi" \
++ "BU1Z6PrsMBH23RaMh5e8eKN3iCYGwA5YP+GlEFu0JocuU+wj+44auwUnnAw7bqLj" \
++ "9QW5kHBIvs5WoJM1RGDMKSIJ6LkWF09eBjSiLqW2fo7JGqZuqkjoU0C2gxdKi9C8" \
++ "d7WEzXRqZW+VZ6Ia9sLI/G5LLH241JiyM7VcR02cfmBJO9MAFRYmFE9jmh2JIqgA" \
++ "Zp+ZRX9+wWtunLMj8Oa8b6qXMG0OJLoMAYRzmSYnIg=="
++
+ void test_sss_cert_get_content(void **state)
+ {
+ int ret;
+@@ -2813,15 +2833,20 @@
+
+ uint8_t *der;
+ size_t der_size;
+-
+- der = sss_base64_decode(NULL, TEST_CERT_WITH_SID_EXT, &der_size);
+- assert_non_null(der);
++ uint8_t *der_no_sid;
++ size_t der_no_sid_size;
+
+ ret = sss_certmap_init(NULL, ext_debug, NULL, &ctx);
+ assert_int_equal(ret, EOK);
+ assert_non_null(ctx);
+ assert_null(ctx->prio_list);
+
++ der = sss_base64_decode(ctx, TEST_CERT_WITH_SID_EXT, &der_size);
++ assert_non_null(der);
++
++ der_no_sid = sss_base64_decode(ctx, TEST_CERT_WITHOUT_SID_EXT, &der_no_sid_size);
++ assert_non_null(der_no_sid);
++
+ /* full sid */
+ ret = sss_certmap_add_rule(ctx, 100,
+ "KRB5:<ISSUER>.*",
+@@ -2882,6 +2907,11 @@
+ assert_string_equal(filter, "rule98=1001");
+ assert_null(domains);
+
++ /* SID is not present in certificate, must fail but not crash */
++ ret = sss_certmap_expand_mapping_rule(ctx, der_no_sid, der_no_sid_size,
++ &filter, &domains);
++ assert_int_not_equal(ret, 0);
++
+ sss_certmap_free_ctx(ctx);
+ }
+
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104039.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From f3e65b06ccbe083dd569a6ccf8e6ad6405862852 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2026 12:04:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] PAM: clear state pointer before freeing state itself
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104039
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2478956
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/f3e65b06ccbe083dd569a6ccf8e6ad6405862852
+---
+ src/responder/pam/pamsrv_gssapi.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+Index: sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_gssapi.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_gssapi.c 2026-11-14 23:13:42.413073696 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_gssapi.c 2026-11-14 23:13:42.411613367 +0100
+@@ -626,6 +626,9 @@
+ OM_uint32 minor;
+
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &state->ctx, NULL);
++ if (state->cli_ctx != NULL && state->cli_ctx->state_ctx == state) {
++ state->cli_ctx->state_ctx = NULL;
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104042.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 115e745149fcfa4d08e8a6242acf1c0350d24989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen at redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 14:21:49 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] pam: guard against zero-length string auth tokens
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104042
+
+Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+
+[backport]
+* SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PAM_STACKED introduced by 2.11.0 see https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/93f9db57a34618f02f1f3edd454b1b9760c80802
+drop it
+
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2478862
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/115e745149fcfa4d08e8a6242acf1c0350d24989
+---
+ src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+Index: sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c 2026-11-14 23:15:34.588410285 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c 2026-11-14 23:16:48.721606817 +0100
+@@ -210,6 +210,11 @@
+ case SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSKEY:
+ case SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSKEY_KRB:
+ case SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSKEY_REPLY:
++ if (auth_token_length == 0) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "Zero-length auth [%s] type token, returning EINVAL\n",
++ sss_authtok_type_to_str(auth_token_type));
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
+ ret = sss_authtok_set(tok, auth_token_type,
+ auth_token_data, auth_token_length);
+ break;
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104043.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From df9116178c8da462406a4e9cd21b75bb9a9a95df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen at redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2026 14:39:48 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] nss: guard against length underflow in packet
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104043
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/responder/common/responder_packet.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/responder/common/responder_packet.c b/src/responder/common/responder_packet.c
+index db74cc13d32..28e1149f50d 100644
+--- a/src/responder/common/responder_packet.c
++++ b/src/responder/common/responder_packet.c
+@@ -215,6 +215,12 @@ int sss_packet_recv(struct sss_packet *packet, int fd)
+ }
+
+ new_len = sss_packet_get_len(packet);
++ if (new_len < SSS_NSS_HEADER_SIZE) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
++ "Refusing undersized packet from fd %d (length %zu bytes)\n",
++ fd, new_len);
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
+ if (new_len > packet->memsize) {
+ enum sss_cli_command cmd = sss_packet_get_cmd(packet);
+ size_t max_recv_size;
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104044-pre.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 043de0435f09451fcf7c065711a418d448621939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: tong_1001 <sxt1001 at qq.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 08:50:05 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] fix potential memory leak
+
+Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose at redhat.com>
+
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/043de0435f09451fcf7c065711a418d448621939
+---
+ src/responder/ifp/ifp_users.c | 5 +++--
+ src/responder/ifp/ifpsrv_cmd.c | 1 +
+ src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c | 3 ++-
+ src/tools/sssctl/sssctl_cache.c | 3 ++-
+ 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+Index: sssd/src/responder/ifp/ifp_users.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/ifp/ifp_users.c 2026-11-14 23:21:02.587414300 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/ifp/ifp_users.c 2026-11-14 23:21:02.586988012 +0100
+@@ -1718,13 +1718,14 @@
+
+ ret = ifp_users_user_get(tmp_ctx, sbus_req, ifp_ctx, &domain, &user);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+- return ret;
++ goto done;
+ }
+
+ username = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(user, SYSDB_NAME, NULL);
+ if (username == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "User name is empty!\n");
+- return ERR_INTERNAL;
++ ret = ERR_INTERNAL;
++ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Run initgroups. */
+Index: sssd/src/responder/ifp/ifpsrv_cmd.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/ifp/ifpsrv_cmd.c 2026-11-14 23:21:02.587414300 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/ifp/ifpsrv_cmd.c 2026-11-14 23:21:02.587125205 +0100
+@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@
+ num = res->count;
+ groupnames = talloc_zero_array(mem_ctx, const char *, num + 1);
+ if (groupnames == NULL) {
++ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+Index: sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c 2026-11-14 23:21:02.587414300 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c 2026-11-14 23:21:02.587235984 +0100
+@@ -1305,7 +1305,8 @@
+ * takes care of automatically removing it from the hash table then */
+ pctx->pk_table_data = talloc_zero(tmp_ctx, struct pam_passkey_table_data);
+ if (pctx->pk_table_data == NULL) {
+- return ENOMEM;
++ ret = ENOMEM;
++ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (pctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
+Index: sssd/src/tools/sssctl/sssctl_cache.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/tools/sssctl/sssctl_cache.c 2026-11-14 23:21:02.587414300 +0100
++++ sssd/src/tools/sssctl/sssctl_cache.c 2026-11-14 23:21:02.587367208 +0100
+@@ -1156,7 +1156,8 @@
+
+ if (opts.domain == NULL) {
+ ERROR("%s\n", extended_help);
+- return EINVAL;
++ ret = EINVAL;
++ goto done;
+ }
+
+ attr = SYSDB_NAME;
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104044.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+From ed02f9d3559eb306d4a0a7bd4b117ade7aa9c48f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen at redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 14:27:15 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] pam: prevent null dereference in kerberos passkey flow
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104044
+
+Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2478664
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/ed02f9d3559eb306d4a0a7bd4b117ade7aa9c48f
+---
+ src/responder/common/responder.h | 3 +++
+ src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h | 1 -
+ src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+Index: sssd/src/responder/common/responder.h
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/common/responder.h 2026-11-14 23:22:27.271709787 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/common/responder.h 2026-11-14 23:22:27.269704803 +0100
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@
+ };
+
+ struct cli_creds;
++struct pam_passkey_table_data;
+
+ struct cli_ctx {
+ struct tevent_context *ev;
+@@ -146,6 +147,8 @@
+ struct tevent_timer *idle;
+ time_t last_request_time;
+ uint32_t client_id_num;
++
++ struct pam_passkey_table_data *pk_table_data;
+ };
+
+ struct sss_cmd_table {
+Index: sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h 2026-11-14 23:22:27.271709787 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h 2026-11-14 23:24:51.538057748 +0100
+@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@
+ char **gssapi_indicators_map;
+ bool gssapi_check_upn;
+ bool passkey_auth;
+- struct pam_passkey_table_data *pk_table_data;
+ };
+
+ struct pam_auth_req {
+Index: sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c 2026-11-14 23:22:27.271709787 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c 2026-11-14 23:22:27.269921534 +0100
+@@ -144,7 +144,13 @@
+ return EIO;
+ }
+
+- data = sss_ptr_hash_lookup(pctx->pk_table_data->table, key,
++ if (preq->cctx->pk_table_data == NULL || preq->cctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
++ "Passkey KRB state table missing (pre-auth state not initialized).\n");
++ return EIO;
++ }
++
++ data = sss_ptr_hash_lookup(preq->cctx->pk_table_data->table, key,
+ struct pk_child_user_data);
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+@@ -1294,6 +1300,7 @@
+ char *pk_key;
+ errno_t ret;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
++ struct cli_ctx *cctx = preq->cctx;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+@@ -1302,17 +1309,21 @@
+
+ /* Passkey data (pk_table_data) is stolen onto client ctx, it will
+ * be freed when the client closes, and the sss_ptr_hash interface
+- * takes care of automatically removing it from the hash table then */
+- pctx->pk_table_data = talloc_zero(tmp_ctx, struct pam_passkey_table_data);
+- if (pctx->pk_table_data == NULL) {
+- ret = ENOMEM;
+- goto done;
++ * takes care of automatically removing it from the hash table then.
++ * This persists across PREAUTH and AUTHENTICATE requests. */
++ if (cctx->pk_table_data == NULL) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "Allocating pk_table_data for client\n");
++ cctx->pk_table_data = talloc_zero(cctx, struct pam_passkey_table_data);
++ if (cctx->pk_table_data == NULL) {
++ ret = ENOMEM;
++ goto done;
++ }
+ }
+
+- if (pctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
+- pctx->pk_table_data->table = sss_ptr_hash_create(pctx->pk_table_data,
++ if (cctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
++ cctx->pk_table_data->table = sss_ptr_hash_create(cctx->pk_table_data,
+ NULL, NULL);
+- if (pctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
++ if (cctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+@@ -1324,13 +1335,13 @@
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- pctx->pk_table_data->key = talloc_strdup(pctx->pk_table_data, pk_key);
+- if (pctx->pk_table_data->key == NULL) {
++ cctx->pk_table_data->key = talloc_strdup(cctx->pk_table_data, pk_key);
++ if (cctx->pk_table_data->key == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- ret = sss_ptr_hash_add(pctx->pk_table_data->table, pk_key, data,
++ ret = sss_ptr_hash_add(cctx->pk_table_data->table, pk_key, data,
+ struct pk_child_user_data);
+ if (ret == EEXIST) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "pk_table key [%s] already exists\n",
+@@ -1342,8 +1353,7 @@
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- talloc_steal(mem_ctx, pctx->pk_table_data);
+- pctx->pk_table_data->data = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, data);
++ cctx->pk_table_data->data = talloc_steal(cctx, data);
+
+ ret = EOK;
+
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104045.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 3dbcfe3458798e056e22b74a63562c288e7de0eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen at redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2026 14:47:35 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] autofs: avoid leaked enumeration contexts after map
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104045
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c b/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c
+index 7c80909939b..63caa0d6efd 100644
+--- a/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c
++++ b/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c
+@@ -351,7 +351,14 @@ static void autofs_setent_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ state->enum_ctx->ready = true;
+
+ /* Make the enumeration context disappear with maps table. */
+- talloc_steal(state->autofs_ctx->maps, state->enum_ctx);
++ if (sss_ptr_hash_has_key(state->autofs_ctx->maps, state->enum_ctx->key)) {
++ talloc_steal(state->autofs_ctx->maps, state->enum_ctx);
++ } else {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC,
++ "Key [%s] was orphaned during async operation, "
++ "skipping reparent to avoid leak\n",
++ state->enum_ctx->key);
++ }
+
+ setent_notify_done(&state->enum_ctx->notify_list);
+ tevent_req_done(req);
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104048.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From b7234202fea1b1092ac20aed68abedc413883cca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Pavel=20B=C5=99ezina?= <pbrezina at redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2026 14:08:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ipa: compare users with domain awareness against HBAC rules
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+HBAC reduced both the request-side and rule-side user identities to bare
+shortnames before comparison, discarding the domain. In trust-enabled IPA
+deployments this let a trusted-domain user whose shortname collided with an
+IPA-local user named in an HBAC allow rule satisfy that rule, bypassing the
+intended authorization boundary.
+
+Preserve the fully-qualified internal name (user at domain) on both SSSD call
+sites instead of stripping it to the shortname:
+
+- hbac_eval_user_element() (ipa_hbac_common.c): store the already
+ domain-qualified username directly in users->name.
+- hbac_user_attrs_to_rule() (ipa_hbac_users.c): store the already
+ internal-fqname-formatted SYSDB_NAME directly in new_users->names[].
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104048
+
+Assisted-By: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_common.c | 9 +++++----
+ src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_users.c | 12 +++---------
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_common.c b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_common.c
+index 1fee41a36df..7d6ea8dd075 100644
+--- a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_common.c
++++ b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_common.c
+@@ -393,12 +393,13 @@ hbac_eval_user_element(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- ret = sss_parse_internal_fqname(tmp_ctx, username, &shortname, NULL);
+- if (ret != EOK) {
+- ret = ERR_WRONG_NAME_FORMAT;
++ /* Keep the fully-qualified internal name (user at domain) so that the HBAC
++ * evaluator compares users with domain awareness. */
++ users->name = talloc_strdup(users, username);
++ if (users->name == NULL) {
++ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+- users->name = talloc_steal(users, shortname);
+
+ ipa_domain = get_domains_head(domain);
+ if (ipa_domain == NULL) {
+diff --git a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_users.c b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_users.c
+index 2f9e9865de7..b2092cefbc9 100644
+--- a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_users.c
++++ b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_hbac_users.c
+@@ -257,16 +257,10 @@ hbac_user_attrs_to_rule(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- ret = sss_parse_internal_fqname(tmp_ctx, sysdb_name,
+- &shortname, NULL);
+- if (ret != EOK) {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
+- "Cannot parse %s, skipping\n", sysdb_name);
+- continue;
+- }
+-
++ /* Store the fully-qualified internal name (user at domain) so that the
++ * HBAC evaluator compares rule users with domain awareness. */
+ new_users->names[num_users] = talloc_strdup(new_users->names,
+- shortname);
++ sysdb_name);
+ if (new_users->names[num_users] == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-88252.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+From a44d7358b21256b8c1da99d99a3ea7ad7ba42e07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Pavel=20B=C5=99ezina?= <pbrezina at redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2026 14:08:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] responder: back off accept() on fd exhaustion to stop
+ busy-spin
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+accept_fd_handler() did not inspect errno on accept() failure. When
+accept() failed with EMFILE/ENFILE (process/system out of file
+descriptors), the persistently registered listening fd (rctx->lfde)
+stayed readable and, with a non-empty listen backlog, the event loop
+re-fired the handler immediately, failing again forever. This busy-spin
+pegs a CPU and stalls the responder, a local DoS reachable by any user
+via the NSS/PAM sockets.
+
+On EMFILE/ENFILE, disable readability on the listening fd
+(TEVENT_FD_NOT_READABLE) and schedule a one-shot tevent timer (parented
+under accept_fd_ctx, guarded against double-scheduling) that re-enables
+it (TEVENT_FD_READABLE) after a bounded exponential backoff (200ms,
+doubling, capped at 5s, reset on the next successful accept). If the
+timer cannot be allocated, readability is re-enabled immediately so the
+listener never becomes permanently deaf. errno is saved before DEBUG().
+Other accept() errors and the successful path are unchanged.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-88252
+
+Assisted-By: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2479240
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/a44d7358b21256b8c1da99d99a3ea7ad7ba42e07
+---
+ src/responder/common/responder_common.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: sssd/src/responder/common/responder_common.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/common/responder_common.c 2026-11-14 19:36:16.113493204 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/common/responder_common.c 2026-11-14 19:36:16.111114064 +0100
+@@ -493,9 +493,21 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/* When accept() fails because the process or the system ran out of file
++ * descriptors (EMFILE/ENFILE), the listening fd stays readable and the event
++ * loop would immediately re-fire the accept handler, busy-spinning the
++ * responder. In that case we temporarily disable readability on the listening
++ * fd and re-enable it after a backoff. The backoff grows exponentially (so we
++ * do not hammer the CPU while fd pressure persists) up to a cap, and is reset
++ * to the base value on the next successful accept(). */
++#define ACCEPT_RESUME_BACKOFF_BASE_US (200 * 1000) /* 200 ms */
++#define ACCEPT_RESUME_BACKOFF_MAX_US (5 * 1000 * 1000) /* 5 s */
++
+ struct accept_fd_ctx {
+ struct resp_ctx *rctx;
+ connection_setup_t connection_setup;
++ struct tevent_timer *resume_accept_timer;
++ uint32_t accept_backoff_us;
+ };
+
+ /*
+@@ -518,6 +530,56 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
++static void accept_resume_timer(struct tevent_context *ev,
++ struct tevent_timer *te,
++ struct timeval current_time,
++ void *data)
++{
++ struct accept_fd_ctx *accept_ctx;
++
++ accept_ctx = talloc_get_type(data, struct accept_fd_ctx);
++
++ accept_ctx->resume_accept_timer = NULL;
++ TEVENT_FD_READABLE(accept_ctx->rctx->lfde);
++}
++
++/* Handle an accept() failure caused by file descriptor exhaustion by pausing
++ * accept() for a bounded, exponentially growing backoff instead of letting the
++ * event loop busy-spin on the still-readable listening fd. */
++static void accept_fd_backoff(struct accept_fd_ctx *accept_ctx)
++{
++ struct resp_ctx *rctx = accept_ctx->rctx;
++ struct timeval tv;
++
++ if (accept_ctx->resume_accept_timer != NULL) {
++ return;
++ }
++
++ tv = tevent_timeval_current_ofs(accept_ctx->accept_backoff_us / 1000000,
++ accept_ctx->accept_backoff_us % 1000000);
++
++ accept_ctx->resume_accept_timer = tevent_add_timer(rctx->ev, accept_ctx, tv,
++ accept_resume_timer,
++ accept_ctx);
++ if (accept_ctx->resume_accept_timer == NULL) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
++ "Failed to schedule accept() resume timer, keeping the fd readable\n");
++ return;
++ }
++
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_IMPORTANT_INFO,
++ "Out of file descriptors, pausing accept() for %u ms\n",
++ accept_ctx->accept_backoff_us / 1000);
++
++ TEVENT_FD_NOT_READABLE(rctx->lfde);
++
++ /* Grow the backoff for the next consecutive failure, up to the cap. */
++ accept_ctx->accept_backoff_us *= 2;
++ if (accept_ctx->accept_backoff_us > ACCEPT_RESUME_BACKOFF_MAX_US) {
++ accept_ctx->accept_backoff_us = ACCEPT_RESUME_BACKOFF_MAX_US;
++ }
++}
++
+ static void accept_fd_handler(struct tevent_context *ev,
+ struct tevent_fd *fde,
+ uint16_t flags, void *ptr)
+@@ -548,11 +610,24 @@
+ len = sizeof(cctx->addr);
+ cctx->cfd = accept(rctx->lfd, (struct sockaddr *)&cctx->addr, &len);
+ if (cctx->cfd == -1) {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Accept failed [%s]\n", strerror(errno));
++ ret = errno;
++
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Accept failed [%s]\n", strerror(ret));
+ talloc_free(cctx);
++
++ /* On file descriptor exhaustion the listening fd stays readable and
++ * the event loop would busy-spin re-entering this handler. Back off
++ * instead. Other errors (e.g. ECONNABORTED/EINTR/EPROTO) are transient
++ * and handled by simply returning. */
++ if (ret == EMFILE || ret == ENFILE) {
++ accept_fd_backoff(accept_ctx);
++ }
+ return;
+ }
+
++ /* Successful accept: reset the fd-exhaustion backoff to its base value. */
++ accept_ctx->accept_backoff_us = ACCEPT_RESUME_BACKOFF_BASE_US;
++
+ ret = get_client_cred(cctx);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "get_client_cred() failed\n");
+@@ -780,6 +855,7 @@
+ if(!accept_ctx) goto failed;
+ accept_ctx->rctx = rctx;
+ accept_ctx->connection_setup = conn_setup;
++ accept_ctx->accept_backoff_us = ACCEPT_RESUME_BACKOFF_BASE_US;
+
+ rctx->lfde = tevent_add_fd(rctx->ev, rctx, rctx->lfd,
+ TEVENT_FD_READ, accept_fd_handler,
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-90462.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 42db412156eeae2fe47b5a76519cd79d6ecf61d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 17:20:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] LDAP: fix fail-open in ppolicy access check on zero results
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In `sdap_access_ppolicy_step_done()` a base-scoped ppolicy search that
+returned zero entries logged "Denying access" but left `locked` as
+false, so the common tail returned EOK and cached an "allow" decision.
+This let a deleted or deprovisioned but cached on the host user keep
+passing access checks.
+
+Set `locked = true` for the num_results < 1 case so the request is
+denied and the deny decision is cached, consistent with
+the analogous handling in `sdap_access_filter_done()`.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-90462
+
+Commit message Assisted-By: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2479483
+origin: upstream, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/42db412156eeae2fe47b5a76519cd79d6ecf61d1
+---
+ src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c
+index bbfa2620d04..4f4711e6fce 100644
+--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c
++++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c
+@@ -1912,11 +1912,11 @@ is_account_locked(const char *pwdAccountLockedTime,
+ static void sdap_access_ppolicy_step_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ {
+ int ret, tret, dp_error;
+- size_t num_results;
++ size_t num_results = 0;
+ bool locked = false;
+ const char *pwdAccountLockedTime;
+ const char *pwdAccountLockedDurationTime;
+- struct sysdb_attrs **results;
++ struct sysdb_attrs **results = NULL;
+ struct tevent_req *req;
+ struct sdap_access_ppolicy_req_ctx *state;
+
+@@ -1954,6 +1954,7 @@ static void sdap_access_ppolicy_step_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CONF_SETTINGS,
+ "User [%s] was not found with the specified filter. "
+ "Denying access.\n", state->username);
++ locked = true;
+ } else if (results == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "num_results > 0, but results is NULL\n");
+ ret = ERR_INTERNAL;
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-90463-1.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+From 79821dc9ab9fb04f6e6b6fa09cb5474f0ec11685 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 14:56:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] NSS: factor request body validation into a helper
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Replace the copy&pasted "get body, reject empty/short, check NULL
+termination" preamble in the NSS request parsers with a single
+`sss_nss_get_input_body()` helper taking a minimum length and a
+terminator flag.
+Used by `parse_name()`, `parse_name_ex()`, `parse_svc_name()`,
+`parse_svc_port()`, `parse_cert()`, `parse_sid()` and `parse_addr()`;
+the exact-length parsers `parse_id()`/`parse_id_ex()` keep their own
+checks.
+
+Implementation assisted-by: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pavel Březina <pbrezina at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c | 141 +++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c b/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c
+index 890d4d71184..a921061141c 100644
+--- a/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c
++++ b/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c
+@@ -101,11 +101,14 @@ void sss_nss_protocol_reply(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ sss_nss_protocol_done(cli_ctx, ret);
+ }
+
+-errno_t
+-sss_nss_protocol_parse_name(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx, const char **_rawname)
++static errno_t
++sss_nss_get_input_body(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
++ size_t min_len,
++ bool require_terminator,
++ uint8_t **_body,
++ size_t *_blen)
+ {
+ struct cli_protocol *pctx;
+- const char *rawname;
+ uint8_t *body;
+ size_t blen;
+
+@@ -113,18 +116,39 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_name(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx, const char **_rawname)
+
+ sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+
+- /* If the body is empty fail. */
+- if (blen == 0) {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
++ if (require_terminator && min_len < 1) {
++ min_len = 1;
++ }
++
++ if (blen < min_len) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body too short!\n");
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- /* If not terminated fail. */
+- if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
++ if (require_terminator && body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated!\n");
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
++ *_body = body;
++ *_blen = blen;
++
++ return EOK;
++}
++
++errno_t
++sss_nss_protocol_parse_name(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx, const char **_rawname)
++{
++ const char *rawname;
++ uint8_t *body;
++ size_t blen;
++ errno_t ret;
++
++ ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx, 1, true, &body, &blen);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ return ret;
++ }
++
+ /* If the body isn't valid UTF-8, fail */
+ if (!sss_utf8_check(body, blen - 1)) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not UTF-8 string!\n");
+@@ -146,20 +170,19 @@ errno_t
+ sss_nss_protocol_parse_name_ex(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx, const char **_rawname,
+ uint32_t *_flags)
+ {
+- struct cli_protocol *pctx;
+ const char *rawname;
+ uint8_t *body;
+ size_t blen;
+ uint8_t *p;
+ uint32_t flags;
++ errno_t ret;
+
+- pctx = talloc_get_type(cli_ctx->protocol_ctx, struct cli_protocol);
+-
+- sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+-
+- if (blen < 1 + sizeof(uint32_t)) {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body too short!\n");
+- return EINVAL;
++ /* The trailing uint32_t flags follow the NUL-terminated name, so the
++ * terminator is not the last byte; check its position ourselves below. */
++ ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx, 1 + sizeof(uint32_t), false,
++ &body, &blen);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* If first argument not terminated fail. */
+@@ -264,7 +287,6 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_svc_name(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ const char **_name,
+ const char **_protocol)
+ {
+- struct cli_protocol *pctx;
+ const char *protocol;
+ const char *name;
+ size_t protocol_len;
+@@ -272,21 +294,11 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_svc_name(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ uint8_t *body;
+ size_t blen;
+ int i;
++ errno_t ret;
+
+- pctx = talloc_get_type(cli_ctx->protocol_ctx, struct cli_protocol);
+-
+- sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+-
+- /* If the body is empty fail. */
+- if (blen == 0) {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
+- return EINVAL;
+- }
+-
+- /* If not terminated fail. */
+- if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated\n");
+- return EINVAL;
++ ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx, 1, true, &body, &blen);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate service name length. */
+@@ -327,28 +339,17 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_svc_port(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ uint16_t *_port,
+ const char **_protocol)
+ {
+- struct cli_protocol *pctx;
+ const char *protocol;
+ size_t protocol_len;
+ uint16_t port;
+ uint8_t *body;
+ size_t blen;
+ int i;
++ errno_t ret;
+
+- pctx = talloc_get_type(cli_ctx->protocol_ctx, struct cli_protocol);
+-
+- sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+-
+- /* If the body is empty fail. */
+- if (blen == 0) {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
+- return EINVAL;
+- }
+-
+- /* If not terminated fail. */
+- if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated\n");
+- return EINVAL;
++ ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx, 1, true, &body, &blen);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT16(&port, body, NULL);
+@@ -379,7 +380,6 @@ errno_t
+ sss_nss_protocol_parse_cert(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ const char **_derb64)
+ {
+- struct cli_protocol *pctx;
+ const char *derb64;
+ size_t pem_size;
+ char *pem_cert;
+@@ -387,20 +387,9 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_cert(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ size_t blen;
+ errno_t ret;
+
+- pctx = talloc_get_type(cli_ctx->protocol_ctx, struct cli_protocol);
+-
+- sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+-
+- /* If the body is empty fail. */
+- if (blen == 0) {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
+- return EINVAL;
+- }
+-
+- /* If not terminated fail. */
+- if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated\n");
+- return EINVAL;
++ ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx, 1, true, &body, &blen);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ derb64 = (const char *)body;
+@@ -427,7 +416,6 @@ errno_t
+ sss_nss_protocol_parse_sid(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ const char **_sid)
+ {
+- struct cli_protocol *pctx;
+ struct sss_nss_ctx *nss_ctx;
+ const char *sid;
+ uint8_t *bin_sid;
+@@ -435,22 +423,13 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_sid(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ uint8_t *body;
+ size_t blen;
+ enum idmap_error_code err;
++ errno_t ret;
+
+- pctx = talloc_get_type(cli_ctx->protocol_ctx, struct cli_protocol);
+ nss_ctx = talloc_get_type(cli_ctx->rctx->pvt_ctx, struct sss_nss_ctx);
+
+- sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+-
+- /* If the body is empty fail. */
+- if (blen == 0) {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
+- return EINVAL;
+- }
+-
+- /* If not terminated fail. */
+- if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated\n");
+- return EINVAL;
++ ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx, 1, true, &body, &blen);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ sid = (const char *)body;
+@@ -479,7 +458,6 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_addr(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ uint32_t *_addrlen,
+ uint8_t **_addr)
+ {
+- struct cli_protocol *pctx;
+ uint8_t *body;
+ size_t blen;
+ uint32_t af;
+@@ -487,13 +465,12 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_addr(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+ char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+ const char *addrstr = NULL;
++ errno_t ret;
+
+- pctx = talloc_get_type(cli_ctx->protocol_ctx, struct cli_protocol);
+-
+- sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+-
+- if (blen < sizeof(uint32_t) * 2) {
+- return EINVAL;
++ ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx, sizeof(uint32_t) * 2, false,
++ &body, &blen);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32(&af, body, NULL);
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-90463-2.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+From e83a030e335044ef143f88b9593204e39e6f94b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 16:39:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] NSS: bound service parser reads to the request body length
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+`sss_nss_protocol_parse_svc_port()` and `sss_nss_protocol_parse_svc_name()`
+only required a single terminating NULL, then read past it: svc_port
+copied an 8-byte header and scanned the protocol string without
+ensuring the body was that long, and svc_name scanned the protocol
+field with no upper bound when the body held no second terminator. A
+crafted GETSERVBYPORT/GETSERVBYNAME request from a local client could
+therefore read beyond the packet body and crash the NSS responder.
+
+Require the full fixed header plus the protocol terminator in svc_port,
+and bound the protocol scan by blen in svc_name. Also correct the stale
+GETSERVBYPORT request layout comment (the header is 8 bytes, not 16).
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-90463
+
+Assisted-By: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pavel Březina <pbrezina at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
+ src/sss_client/nss_services.c | 7 ++++---
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c b/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c
+index a921061141c..1b7be31f6f7 100644
+--- a/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c
++++ b/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_svc_name(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ size_t name_len;
+ uint8_t *body;
+ size_t blen;
+- int i;
++ size_t i;
+ errno_t ret;
+
+ ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx, 1, true, &body, &blen);
+@@ -301,17 +301,25 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_svc_name(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+- /* Calculate service name length. */
++ /* Calculate service name length. The trailing NULL guaranteed by
++ * sss_nss_get_input_body() bounds this scan. */
+ for (i = 0, name_len = 0; body[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ name_len++;
+ }
+
+- /* Calculate protocol name length, use index from previous cycle. */
+- for (protocol_len = 0; body[i + 1] != '\0'; i++) {
++ if (name_len == 0) {
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++
++ /* Calculate protocol name length. The protocol field follows the service
++ * name's NULL terminator; bound the scan by blen so a request without a
++ * second terminator cannot read past the packet body. */
++ for (i = name_len + 1, protocol_len = 0; i < blen && body[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ protocol_len++;
+ }
+
+- if (name_len == 0) {
++ if (i >= blen) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated\n");
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+@@ -347,7 +355,14 @@ sss_nss_protocol_parse_svc_port(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ int i;
+ errno_t ret;
+
+- ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx, 1, true, &body, &blen);
++ /* The request body is an 8-byte fixed header followed by a NUL-terminated
++ * protocol string: bytes 0-1 hold the 16-bit port (network byte order),
++ * bytes 2-3 and 4-7 are zero padding (a uint16 then a uint32), and the
++ * protocol string starts at byte 8. Require the whole header plus at least
++ * the protocol's terminating NUL. */
++ ret = sss_nss_get_input_body(cli_ctx,
++ 2 * sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + 1,
++ true, &body, &blen);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_services.c b/src/sss_client/nss_services.c
+index 6ca48443ee5..855a55ae023 100644
+--- a/src/sss_client/nss_services.c
++++ b/src/sss_client/nss_services.c
+@@ -59,9 +59,10 @@ static void sss_nss_getservent_data_clean(void) {
+ * Protocol may be zero-length to imply "any"
+ *
+ * GETSERVBYPORT Request:
+- * 0-3: 16-bit port number in network byte order
+- * 4-15: Reserved/padding
+- * 16-X: Zero-terminated string (protocol)
++ * 0-1: 16-bit port number in network byte order
++ * 2-3: 16-bit reserved/padding
++ * 4-7: 32-bit reserved/padding
++ * 8-X: Zero-terminated string (protocol)
+ * Protocol may be zero-length to imply "any"
+ *
+ * Replies:
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-90994.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From 8dbdcf9987363d734faef25be76cc0f51180f5c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 10:58:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] PAM: fix out-of-bounds read in v1 request parser
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+pam_parse_in_data() computed "last = blen - 1" before validating blen,
+so an empty body (blen == 0) underflowed last to SIZE_MAX and the string
+parsing loops read past the buffer. A truncated body could likewise
+advance "end" to blen, making the next "body[end++]" terminator check
+read one byte out of bounds. A local client negotiating protocol v1 could
+send such a malformed request and crash the PAM responder (local DoS).
+
+Reject bodies smaller than the v1 minimum up front (matching the style of
+pam_parse_in_data_v2()) and bounds-check "end" before each terminator
+dereference.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-90994
+
+Assisted-By: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+Index: sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c 2026-11-14 19:50:19.764580847 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c 2026-11-14 19:50:19.762497979 +0100
+@@ -450,28 +450,38 @@
+ size_t last;
+ int ret;
+
++ /* A valid v1 request holds five NUL-terminated strings (user, service,
++ * tty, ruser, rhost) followed by two auth tokens. Each string needs at
++ * least its terminator and each auth token needs a type+length header,
++ * so anything smaller is malformed.
++ */
++ if (blen < (5 + 2*2*sizeof(uint32_t))) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Received data is invalid.\n");
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++
+ last = blen - 1;
+ end = 0;
+
+ /* user name */
+ for (start = end; end < last; end++) if (body[end] == '\0') break;
+- if (body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
++ if (end >= blen || body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
+ pd->logon_name = (char *) &body[start];
+
+ for (start = end; end < last; end++) if (body[end] == '\0') break;
+- if (body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
++ if (end >= blen || body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
+ pd->service = (char *) &body[start];
+
+ for (start = end; end < last; end++) if (body[end] == '\0') break;
+- if (body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
++ if (end >= blen || body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
+ pd->tty = (char *) &body[start];
+
+ for (start = end; end < last; end++) if (body[end] == '\0') break;
+- if (body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
++ if (end >= blen || body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
+ pd->ruser = (char *) &body[start];
+
+ for (start = end; end < last; end++) if (body[end] == '\0') break;
+- if (body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
++ if (end >= blen || body[end++] != '\0') return EINVAL;
+ pd->rhost = (char *) &body[start];
+
+ ret = extract_authtok_v1(pd->authtok, body, blen, &end);
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-90995.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 00b51c155a208eb90454d82b320069dfc74f631d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 12:17:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] PAM: avoid NULL deref when service item is missing
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+SSS_PAM_ITEM_SERVICE is optional in the v2/v3 client protocol, so
+pd->service may be NULL. A crafted request omitting it triggered a
+NULL dereference in get_domain_request_type() when pam_app_services
+is configured, crashing the PAM responder (local DoS). Return the
+POSIX default when service is unset, and guard the debug log too.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-90995
+
+Assisted-By: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2479464
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/00b51c155a208eb90454d82b320069dfc74f631d
+---
+ src/responder/pam/pam_prompting_config.c | 2 +-
+ src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c | 13 +++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: sssd/src/responder/pam/pam_prompting_config.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/pam/pam_prompting_config.c 2026-11-14 19:53:51.121601133 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/pam/pam_prompting_config.c 2026-11-14 19:53:51.120808632 +0100
+@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@
+
+
+ dummy = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/%s", section_path,
+- service_name);
++ service_name ? service_name : "-");
+ for (c = 0; c < num_sections; c++) {
+ if (strcmp(sections[c], section_path) == 0) {
+ global = true;
+Index: sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c 2026-11-14 19:53:51.121601133 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c 2026-11-14 20:24:17.025769694 +0100
+@@ -947,8 +947,10 @@
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_ALL, "Authentication types for user [%s] and service "
+- "[%s]:%s%s%s%s\n", pd->user, pd->service,
+- types.password_auth ? " password": "",
++ "[%s]:%s%s%s%s\n",
++ pd->user ? pd->user : "-",
++ pd->service ? pd->service : "-",
++ types.password_auth ? " password" : "",
+ types.otp_auth ? " two-factor" : "",
+ types.passkey_auth ? " passkey" : "",
+ types.cert_auth ? " smartcard" : "");
+@@ -1824,6 +1826,13 @@
+ /* By default, only POSIX domains are to be contacted */
+ req_dom_type = CACHE_REQ_POSIX_DOM;
+
++ /* SSS_PAM_ITEM_SERVICE is optional in the client protocol, so the service
++ * may be unset. Without a service name it can never match a configured
++ * application service, so fall back to the POSIX default. */
++ if (preq->pd->service == NULL) {
++ return req_dom_type;
++ }
++
+ for (int i = 0; pctx->app_services[i]; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(pctx->app_services[i], preq->pd->service) == 0) {
+ req_dom_type = CACHE_REQ_APPLICATION_DOM;
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-90996.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From c7f1b8a3d506e38af3949eed19e034eb6a005bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 14:43:57 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] NSS: reject empty request body before body[blen - 1] access
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Header-only NSS requests yield blen == 0, causing a size_t underflow
+in the request parsers that read body[blen - 1]. Guard `parse_name()`,
+`parse_svc_name()`, `parse_svc_port()`, `parse_cert()` and `parse_sid()`
+against an empty body.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-90996
+
+Assisted-By: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pavel Březina <pbrezina at redhat.com>
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2478986
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/c7f1b8a3d506e38af3949eed19e034eb6a005bbf
+---
+ src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
+
+Index: sssd/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c
+===================================================================
+--- sssd.orig/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c 2026-11-14 19:50:43.740027777 +0100
++++ sssd/src/responder/nss/nss_protocol.c 2026-11-14 19:50:43.737034156 +0100
+@@ -113,6 +113,12 @@
+
+ sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+
++ /* If the body is empty fail. */
++ if (blen == 0) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++
+ /* If not terminated fail. */
+ if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated!\n");
+@@ -271,6 +277,12 @@
+
+ sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+
++ /* If the body is empty fail. */
++ if (blen == 0) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++
+ /* If not terminated fail. */
+ if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated\n");
+@@ -327,6 +339,12 @@
+
+ sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+
++ /* If the body is empty fail. */
++ if (blen == 0) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++
+ /* If not terminated fail. */
+ if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated\n");
+@@ -373,6 +391,12 @@
+
+ sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+
++ /* If the body is empty fail. */
++ if (blen == 0) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++
+ /* If not terminated fail. */
+ if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated\n");
+@@ -417,6 +441,12 @@
+
+ sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+
++ /* If the body is empty fail. */
++ if (blen == 0) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Empty body!\n");
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++
+ /* If not terminated fail. */
+ if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Body is not null terminated\n");
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-92821.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From e83a29ceaffb1cb106696f24213a1ed6851f6baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sumit Bose <sbose at redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2026 13:49:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ldap: pwd_expire_policy_warn does not overwrite errors
+
+Make sure the 'pwd_expire_policy_warn' access check does not overwrite
+any access denied or other errors.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-92821
+
+Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Dan Lavu <dlavu at redhat.com>
+---
+ src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c
+index cfdde8c014c..cc3c2baa755 100644
+--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c
++++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_access.c
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ struct sdap_access_req_ctx {
+ struct ldb_message *user_entry;
+ size_t current_rule;
+ enum sdap_access_control_type ac_type;
++ bool pw_expire_warn_seen;
+ };
+
+ static errno_t sdap_access_check_next_rule(struct sdap_access_req_ctx *state,
+@@ -150,6 +151,7 @@ sdap_access_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ state->access_ctx = access_ctx;
+ state->conn = conn;
+ state->current_rule = 0;
++ state->pw_expire_warn_seen = false;
+
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC,
+ "Performing access check for user [%s]\n", pd->user);
+@@ -212,8 +214,8 @@ static errno_t sdap_access_check_next_rule(struct sdap_access_req_ctx *state,
+ while (ret == EOK) {
+ switch (state->access_ctx->access_rule[state->current_rule]) {
+ case LDAP_ACCESS_EMPTY:
+- /* we are done with no errors */
+- return EOK;
++ /* all rules passed; preserve warn semantics if seen */
++ return state->pw_expire_warn_seen ? ERR_PASSWORD_EXPIRED_WARN : EOK;
+
+ /* This option is deprecated by LDAP_ACCESS_PPOLICY */
+ case LDAP_ACCESS_LOCKOUT:
+@@ -295,7 +297,8 @@ static errno_t sdap_access_check_next_rule(struct sdap_access_req_ctx *state,
+ state->access_ctx->type,
+ state->access_ctx->id_ctx->opts);
+ if (ret == ERR_PASSWORD_EXPIRED) {
+- ret = ERR_PASSWORD_EXPIRED_WARN;
++ state->pw_expire_warn_seen = true;
++ ret = EOK;
+ }
+ break;
+
=====================================
debian/patches/series
=====================================
@@ -14,3 +14,23 @@ CVE-2026-80048_1.patch
CVE-2026-80048_2.patch
CVE-2026-80048_3.patch
CVE-2026-80048_4.patch
+CVE-2026-88252.diff
+CVE-2026-90462.diff
+CVE-2026-90994.diff
+CVE-2026-90996.diff
+CVE-2026-90463-1.diff
+CVE-2026-90463-2.diff
+CVE-2026-90995.diff
+CVE-2026-104031.diff
+CVE-2026-104032.diff
+CVE-2026-104033.diff
+CVE-2026-104036.diff
+CVE-2026-104038.diff
+CVE-2026-104039.diff
+CVE-2026-104042.diff
+CVE-2026-104043.diff
+CVE-2026-104044-pre.diff
+CVE-2026-104044.diff
+CVE-2026-104045.diff
+CVE-2026-104048.diff
+CVE-2026-92821.diff
View it on GitLab: https://salsa.debian.org/sssd-team/sssd/-/compare/dac9525f41d9b27d7260b3c34ff2b47799537955...80cb52197f67fca1ef27a624ba531e93e1c4f82d
--
View it on GitLab: https://salsa.debian.org/sssd-team/sssd/-/compare/dac9525f41d9b27d7260b3c34ff2b47799537955...80cb52197f67fca1ef27a624ba531e93e1c4f82d
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