[Pkg-sssd-devel] [Git][sssd-team/sssd][trixie] 3 commits: CVE-2026-104027_CVE-2026-104029
Bastien Roucariès (@rouca)
gitlab at salsa.debian.org
Sun Nov 15 11:16:43 GMT 2026
Bastien Roucariès pushed to branch trixie at Debian SSSD packaging / sssd
Commits:
3c181871 by Bastien Roucariès at 2026-11-15T10:52:06+01:00
CVE-2026-104027_CVE-2026-104029
- - - - -
c2bd807f by Bastien Roucariès at 2026-11-15T11:00:33+01:00
CVE-2026-104030
- - - - -
1fc1df13 by Bastien Roucariès at 2026-11-15T11:44:10+01:00
CVE-2026-104035
- - - - -
6 changed files:
- debian/changelog
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104027_CVE-2026-104029.patch
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104030.diff
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104030_pre1.patch
- + debian/patches/CVE-2026-104035.diff
- debian/patches/series
Changes:
=====================================
debian/changelog
=====================================
@@ -72,6 +72,21 @@ sssd (2.10.1-2+deb13u2) trixie-security; urgency=medium
authentication, can exploit this flaw to bypass access control
restrictions and gain unauthorized access to protected systems.
(Closes: #1150199)
+ + Add CVE-2026-104029_CVE-2026-104037.patch:
+ Fix CVE-2026-104029 and CVE-2026-104037.
+ A local attacker can exploit this vulnerability
+ by sending a specially crafted request to the autofs responder UNIX
+ socket. Due to improper buffer offset calculation during request
+ parsing, the service performs an out-of-bounds memory read. This
+ flaw can cause the autofs responder process to crash, resulting in a
+ denial of service (DoS).
+ + Add CVE-2026-104030*:
+ This vulnerability allows a local user to cause a Denial of
+ Service (DoS) by submitting a specially crafted passkey
+ authentication token that lacks null terminators.
+ The authentication service reads past the end of the
+ provided memory buffer, causing the process to crash
+ and disrupting authentication services.
+ Add CVE-2026-104031.diff:
In configurations where the autofs responder service is enabled,
memory allocated during successful request processing is not
@@ -95,6 +110,14 @@ sssd (2.10.1-2+deb13u2) trixie-security; urgency=medium
flaw to bypass access controls and authenticate to the system. This
allows unauthorized access to persist after the account was intended
to be deactivated.
+ + Add CVE-2026-104035.diff:
+ An issue in the Kerberos Credential Manager (KCM) responder allows a
+ local user to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by maintaining a
+ persistent connection and repeatedly storing and destroying
+ credentials. Because the service fails to release cached objects
+ from memory when credentials are removed, memory consumption grows
+ continuously, ultimately exhausting available memory and rendering
+ the service unresponsive.
+ Add CVE-2026-104036.diff:
A flaw was found in SSSD's NFS idmap plugin. When retrieving cached
user or group names, the plugin detects if an entry exceeds the
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104027_CVE-2026-104029.patch
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 18:59:47 +0200
+Subject: autofs: fix out-of-bounds reads in request parsers
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104037
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104029
+
+Note that some bits were previously fixed by df9116178c8da462406a4e9cd21b75bb9a9a95df
+
+Assisted-By: Claude Code (Opus 4.8)
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f069803fddaea70ef73bb7bcbfe6d562e61c9272)
+
+origin: upstream, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/f069803fddaea70ef73bb7bcbfe6d562e61c9272
+---
+ src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c b/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c
+index b7d4fc1..c4aa94f 100644
+--- a/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c
++++ b/src/responder/autofs/autofssrv_cmd.c
+@@ -392,8 +392,8 @@ autofs_read_setautomntent_input(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+
+ sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+
+- /* if not terminated fail */
+- if (body[blen - 1] != '\0') {
++ /* if not NULL terminated fail */
++ if ((blen == 0) || (body[blen - 1] != '\0')) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+@@ -565,7 +565,8 @@ autofs_read_getautomntent_input(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ sss_packet_get_body(pctx->creq->in, &body, &blen);
+
+ SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&namelen, body+c, blen, &c);
+- if (namelen == 0 || namelen > blen - c) {
++ /* '>=' keeps the terminator at mapname[namelen] within the body */
++ if (namelen == 0 || namelen >= blen - c) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+@@ -581,8 +582,9 @@ autofs_read_getautomntent_input(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(_cursor, body + c + namelen + 1, blen, &c);
+- SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(_max_entries, body + c + namelen + 1, blen, &c);
++ c += namelen + 1;
++ SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(_cursor, body + c, blen, &c);
++ SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(_max_entries, body + c, blen, &c);
+ *_mapname = mapname;
+
+ return EOK;
+@@ -754,7 +756,8 @@ autofs_read_getautomntbyname_input(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+
+ /* Get map name. */
+ SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&namelen, body + c, blen, &c);
+- if (namelen == 0 || namelen > blen - c) {
++ /* '>=' keeps the terminator at mapname[namelen] within the body */
++ if (namelen == 0 || namelen >= blen - c) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+@@ -774,7 +777,8 @@ autofs_read_getautomntbyname_input(struct cli_ctx *cli_ctx,
+
+ /* Get key name. */
+ SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&keylen, body + c, blen, &c);
+- if (keylen == 0 || keylen > blen - c) {
++ /* '>=' keeps the terminator at keyname[keylen] within the body. */
++ if (keylen == 0 || keylen >= blen - c) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104030.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen at redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 12:12:23 -0400
+Subject: authtok: add length to unpack passkey blob
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104030
+
+Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 7227f9130f19db55a9873a4104ce9a431755ef99)
+bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2479429
+origin: backport, https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/7227f9130f19db55a9873a4104ce9a431755ef99
+---
+ Makefile.am | 1 +
+ src/util/authtok.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
+index 9ba1387..e84e021 100644
+--- a/Makefile.am
++++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -1296,6 +1296,7 @@ libsss_util_la_SOURCES = \
+ src/util/find_uid.c \
+ src/util/sss_ini.c \
+ src/util/io.c \
++ src/util/sss_iobuf.c \
+ src/util/util_sss_idmap.c \
+ src/util/well_known_sids.c \
+ src/util/string_utils.c \
+diff --git a/src/util/authtok.c b/src/util/authtok.c
+index 7842bbb..ba8cf75 100644
+--- a/src/util/authtok.c
++++ b/src/util/authtok.c
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
+ */
+
+ #include "authtok.h"
++#include "util/sss_iobuf.h"
+
+ struct sss_auth_token {
+ enum sss_authtok_type type;
+@@ -670,37 +671,77 @@ errno_t sss_authtok_set_2fa(struct sss_auth_token *tok,
+
+ errno_t sss_auth_unpack_passkey_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const uint8_t *blob,
++ size_t blob_len,
+ char **_prompt,
+ char **_key,
+ char **_pin)
+ {
+- size_t len = 0;
+- char *prompt;
+- char *key;
+- char *pin;
++ errno_t ret;
++ struct sss_iobuf *iobuf = NULL;
++ const char *prompt_str;
++ const char *key_str;
++ const char *pin_str;
++ char *prompt = NULL;
++ char *key = NULL;
++ char *pin = NULL;
++
++ if (blob == NULL || _prompt == NULL || _key == NULL || _pin == NULL) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Invalid parameters.\n");
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++
++ if (blob_len == 0) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Blob length is zero.\n");
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
+
+- prompt = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, (const char *) blob + len);
++ iobuf = sss_iobuf_init_readonly(NULL, blob, blob_len, true);
++ if (iobuf == NULL) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to create iobuf.\n");
++ return ENOMEM;
++ }
++
++ /* Extract prompt string */
++ ret = sss_iobuf_read_stringz(iobuf, &prompt_str);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Unable to read prompt string.\n");
++ goto done;
++ }
++
++ prompt = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, prompt_str);
+ if (prompt == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "talloc_strdup prompt failed.\n");
+- return ENOMEM;
++ ret = ENOMEM;
++ goto done;
+ }
+- len += strlen(prompt) + 1;
+
+- key = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, (const char *) blob + len);
++ /* Extract key string */
++ ret = sss_iobuf_read_stringz(iobuf, &key_str);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Unable to read key string.\n");
++ goto done;
++ }
++
++ key = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, key_str);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "talloc_strdup key failed.\n");
+- talloc_free(prompt);
+- return ENOMEM;
++ ret = ENOMEM;
++ goto done;
+ }
+- len += strlen(key) + 1;
+
+- if ((strcasecmp(prompt, "true") == 0)) {
+- pin = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, (const char *) blob + len);
++ /* Extract pin string if prompt is "true" */
++ if (strcasecmp(prompt, "true") == 0) {
++ ret = sss_iobuf_read_stringz(iobuf, &pin_str);
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Unable to read pin string.\n");
++ goto done;
++ }
++
++ pin = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, pin_str);
+ if (pin == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "talloc_strdup pin failed.\n");
+- talloc_free(prompt);
+- talloc_free(key);
+- return ENOMEM;
++ ret = ENOMEM;
++ goto done;
+ }
+ } else {
+ pin = NULL;
+@@ -709,8 +750,16 @@ errno_t sss_auth_unpack_passkey_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ *_prompt = prompt;
+ *_key = key;
+ *_pin = pin;
++ ret = EOK;
+
+- return EOK;
++done:
++ if (ret != EOK) {
++ talloc_free(prompt);
++ talloc_free(key);
++ talloc_free(pin);
++ }
++ talloc_free(iobuf);
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ errno_t sss_authtok_set_passkey_krb(struct sss_auth_token *tok,
+@@ -770,7 +819,7 @@ static errno_t sss_authtok_set_passkey_from_blob(struct sss_auth_token *tok,
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- ret = sss_auth_unpack_passkey_blob(tmp_ctx, data, &prompt, &key,
++ ret = sss_auth_unpack_passkey_blob(tmp_ctx, data, len, &prompt, &key,
+ &pin);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "sss_auth_unpack_passkey_blob returned [%d]: [%s].\n",
+@@ -816,8 +865,8 @@ errno_t sss_authtok_get_passkey(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ return (tok->type == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_EMPTY) ? ENOENT : EACCES;
+ }
+
+- ret = sss_auth_unpack_passkey_blob(mem_ctx, tok->data, &prompt, &key,
+- &pin);
++ ret = sss_auth_unpack_passkey_blob(mem_ctx, tok->data, tok->length,
++ &prompt, &key, &pin);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "sss_auth_unpack_passkey_blob returned [%d]: [%s].\n",
+ ret, sss_strerror(ret));
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104030_pre1.patch
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen at redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2025 16:03:44 -0500
+Subject: authtok: Set Kerberos passkey PIN to NULL when UV is false
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman at redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit be5df34126b3755cd63f829a885b68cb93fb6fa6)
+
+origin: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/be5df34126b3755cd63f829a885b68cb93fb6fa6
+---
+ src/util/authtok-utils.c | 6 +-----
+ src/util/authtok.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/util/authtok-utils.c b/src/util/authtok-utils.c
+index ac3c8bb..f6b205e 100644
+--- a/src/util/authtok-utils.c
++++ b/src/util/authtok-utils.c
+@@ -122,12 +122,8 @@ errno_t sss_auth_pack_passkey_blob(uint8_t *buf,
+ /* Add provided PIN */
+ if (pin != NULL) {
+ pin_len = strlen(pin) + 1;
+- /* User verification is false */
+- } else {
+- pin = "";
+- pin_len = 0;
++ memcpy(buf + len, pin, pin_len);
+ }
+- memcpy(buf + len, pin, pin_len);
+
+ return EOK;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/util/authtok.c b/src/util/authtok.c
+index 6a6e74e..7842bbb 100644
+--- a/src/util/authtok.c
++++ b/src/util/authtok.c
+@@ -694,12 +694,16 @@ errno_t sss_auth_unpack_passkey_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ }
+ len += strlen(key) + 1;
+
+- pin = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, (const char *) blob + len);
+- if (pin == NULL) {
+- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "talloc_strdup pin failed.\n");
+- talloc_free(prompt);
+- talloc_free(key);
+- return ENOMEM;
++ if ((strcasecmp(prompt, "true") == 0)) {
++ pin = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, (const char *) blob + len);
++ if (pin == NULL) {
++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "talloc_strdup pin failed.\n");
++ talloc_free(prompt);
++ talloc_free(key);
++ return ENOMEM;
++ }
++ } else {
++ pin = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *_prompt = prompt;
+@@ -820,7 +824,9 @@ errno_t sss_authtok_get_passkey(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- pin_len = strlen(pin);
++ if (pin != NULL) {
++ pin_len = strlen(pin);
++ }
+
+ *_prompt = prompt;
+ *_key = key;
=====================================
debian/patches/CVE-2026-104035.diff
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From: =?utf-8?q?Pavel_B=C5=99ezina?= <pbrezina at redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 13:46:29 +0200
+Subject: kcm: prune per-connection credential cache on destroy
+
+The per-connection credential cache (conn_data->creds) was populated
+additively by GET_CRED_UUID_LIST / GET_CRED_BY_UUID but never pruned on
+DESTROY. Because a destroyed-and-recreated ccache yields credentials with
+new UUIDs, stale kcm_cred entries (each up to KCM_PACKET_MAX_SIZE = 10MB)
+accumulated across STORE/GET_CRED_UUID_LIST/DESTROY cycles on a long-lived
+connection, allowing any local user with access to the KCM socket to
+exhaust responder memory (local DoS).
+
+Prune the cached credentials on DESTROY and INITIALIZE to mitigate this.
+
+:fixes: CVE-2026-104035
+
+Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono at redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen at redhat.com>
+
+origin: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/9f08547a282cb2d5f0168426416be55b7dfe9990
+---
+ src/responder/kcm/kcmsrv_ops.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/responder/kcm/kcmsrv_ops.c b/src/responder/kcm/kcmsrv_ops.c
+index 00a0564..c940e85 100644
+--- a/src/responder/kcm/kcmsrv_ops.c
++++ b/src/responder/kcm/kcmsrv_ops.c
+@@ -503,6 +503,8 @@ static void kcm_op_initialize_cc_delete_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ {
+ struct tevent_req *req = tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
+ struct tevent_req);
++ struct kcm_op_initialize_state *state = tevent_req_data(req,
++ struct kcm_op_initialize_state);
+ errno_t ret;
+
+ ret = kcm_ccdb_delete_cc_recv(subreq);
+@@ -515,6 +517,11 @@ static void kcm_op_initialize_cc_delete_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ /* Free existing credentials cache table so this ccache data is removed.
++ * This may remove uuids from other ccaches as well, but this is fine as
++ * they will be looked up again when needed. */
++ talloc_zfree(state->op_ctx->conn_data->creds);
++
+ kcm_op_initialize_create_step(req);
+ }
+
+@@ -832,6 +839,11 @@ static void kcm_op_destroy_delete_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ /* Free existing credentials cache table so this ccache data is removed.
++ * This may remove uuids from other ccaches as well, but this is fine as
++ * they will be looked up again when needed. */
++ talloc_zfree(state->op_ctx->conn_data->creds);
++
+ state->op_ret = EOK;
+ tevent_req_done(req);
+ }
=====================================
debian/patches/series
=====================================
@@ -34,3 +34,7 @@ CVE-2026-104044.diff
CVE-2026-104045.diff
CVE-2026-104048.diff
CVE-2026-92821.diff
+CVE-2026-104027_CVE-2026-104029.patch
+CVE-2026-104030_pre1.patch
+CVE-2026-104030.diff
+CVE-2026-104035.diff
View it on GitLab: https://salsa.debian.org/sssd-team/sssd/-/compare/80cb52197f67fca1ef27a624ba531e93e1c4f82d...1fc1df13f70dc98330f873920b8fdbb18e549c3c
--
View it on GitLab: https://salsa.debian.org/sssd-team/sssd/-/compare/80cb52197f67fca1ef27a624ba531e93e1c4f82d...1fc1df13f70dc98330f873920b8fdbb18e549c3c
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